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Program Overview
Wednesday, July 7, 2021
00:00-8:00am PDT (Los Angeles Time): EU Cycle 1
00:00-1:00: Plenary-- Michal Bauer, Zoom Link
Title: Triggers of Inter-group Hostility
Host: Michele Belot
1:00-2:40: EU Sessions 1
3:00-4:40: EU Sessions 2
5:00-6:00: Social Event-- Off-topic session:
The ESA Ethical Guidelines Discussion (I)
Hosts: Ben Greiner, Michal Krawczyk, Dorothea Kuebler, Jeroen van de Ven, and Marie-Claire Villeval
6:00-7:00: Social Events: Topic session
The Future of Experimental Economics
Hosts: Friederike Mengel
7:00-8:00: EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING (Committee Member Only)
8:00-16:00 PDT (Los Angeles Time): NA Cycle 1
8:00-9:00: Plenary-- Rachel Kranton, Zoom Link
Title: Deconstructing experimental findings of group bias
Host: Yan Chen
9:00-10:40: NA Sessions 1
11:00-12:40: NA Sessions 2
13:00-14:00: Plenary-- Ragan Petrie, Zoom Link
Title: Do charities know what triggers donations?
Host: Laura Gee
14:00-15:00: Social Events: Off-topic Sessions
The ESA Ethical Guidelines Discussion (II)
Hosts: Catherine Eckel
15:00-16:00: Social Events: Off-topic Sessions
Faculty vs Non-faculty Classic Economic Game Challenge
Hosts: Walter Yuan, MobLab & Joseph Wang, National Taiwan University
Two teams, faculty vs non-faculty, going head to head on classic economic games! The top performer on the winning team (with the
higher per capita earnings) gets to choose autographed books by Al Roth and Matt Jackson or an Amazon gift card of 100 USD,
with other members entering a lottery for the rest. Secure your slot, pre-registration available at this Google signup sheet. (Walk-ins
welcome, though you may miss the first few rounds registering on the spot.)
16:00-23:59 PDT (Los Angeles Time): AP Cycle 1
16:00-17:00: Plenary-- Erte Xiao, Zoom Link
Title: Incentives to Persevere
Host: Shirley Wang
17:00-18:40: AP Sessions 1
19:00-20:40: AP Sessions 2
21:00-22:00: Social Events: Off-topic Sessions
The ESA Ethical Guidelines Discussion (III)
Hosts: Lata Gangadharan
22:00-22:59: Social Events: Topic Sessions
Cross Country Online Game Challenge
Hosts: Shirley Wang, Remin University, Nathanael Berger MobLab, & Phil Limberg, MobLab
You join the team from your block (Asia-Pacific, Europe, Americas) to play classic economic games. The block team with the
highest per capita earnings will be eligible for exciting prizes: The top performer gets to choose autographed books by Al Roth and
Matt Jackson or an Amazon gift card of 100 USD, with other members entering a lottery for the rest. Secure your slot, pre-
registration available at this Google signup sheet. (Walk-ins welcome, though you may miss the first few rounds registering on the
spot.)
23:00-23:59: Social Events: Hang-out!
Interaction with Presenters
Hosts: GSH
Thursday, July 8, 2021
00:00-8:00am PDT (Los Angeles Time): EU Cycle 2
1:00-2:40: EU Sessions 3
3:00-4:40: EU Sessions 4
5:00-6:00: Plenary-- Ingvild Almas, Zoom Link
Title: Gender and Decision Making
Host: Roel van Veldhuizen
6:00-7:00: Social Events: Hang-out!
Interaction with Presenters
Hosts: GSH
7:00-8:00: Members Meeting, Zoom Link
Summary: Business and Information for all ESA members -- please join the conversation! Newly elected officers, upcoming
conference sites, new replication policy, mentoring, ESA's budget, the new ESA ethical guidelines and the new contract for ESA
journals will be announced, along with ideas to improve visibility and publication opportunities for your research.
8:00-16:00 PDT (Los Angeles Time): NA Cycle 2
8:00-9:00: Plenary-- Dan Friedman, Zoom Link
Title: Market Mysteries, Old and New
Host: Tim Cason
9:00-10:40: NA Sessions 3
11:00-12:40: NA Sessions 4
13:00-14:00: Social Events: Hang-out!
Interaction with Presenters
Hosts: GSH
14:00-15:00: Social Events: Hang-out!
Interaction with Presenters
Hosts: GSH
16:00-23:59 PDT (Los Angeles Time): AP Cycle 2
16:00-17:00: Plenary-- Nobuyuki Hanaki, Zoom Link
Title: An experiment on the Nash program: Comparing two bargaining implementations of the Shapley value
Host: Lata Gangadharan
17:00-18:40: AP Sessions 3
19:00-20:40: AP Sessions 4
21:00-22:00: Social Events: Topic Sessions
Cross Country Studies
Hosts: Shirley Wang, Remin University & Stefan Trautmann, University of Heidelberg
During this social event we want to discuss cross-country studies with student or maybe broader population samples. We want to
talk about what insights we can expect to gain from such cross-country comparison of economic behavior and attitudes, and what
methods and tools can be used to implement cross-country research. We also want to consider which pitfalls to avoid when it comes
to design and implementation, but also with respect to the interpretation of experimental results.
22:00-23:00: Social Events-- Topic Sessions
Nudges and Policy
Hosts: Lionel Page
23:00-0:00: Social Events: Hang-out!
Interaction with Presenters
Hosts: GSH
Friday, July 9, 2021
00:00-8:00am PDT (Los Angeles Time): EU Cycle 3
1:00-2:40: EU Sessions 5
3:00-4:40: EU Sessions 6
5:00-6:00: Plenary-- Ernst Fehr, Zoom Link
Title: Framing and Attention - The Attentional Foundations of Framing Effects
Host: Marie-Claire Villeval
7:00-8:00: Social Events: Hang-out!
Interaction with Presenters
Hosts: GSH
ESA 2021 Global Around-the-Clock Conference Program Presentation Recordings
Plenary talks will be available at the ESA YouTube Channel after the conference.
ESA 2021 Global Around-the-Clock Conference Program Details
Wednesday, July 7, 0:00am - 1:00am PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Plenary Talk: Triggers of Inter-group Hostility-- Michal Bauer. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Eldar Dadon
Wednesday, July 7, 1:00am - 2:40am PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Session 1, Advice. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Laura Manukyan
Marie-Pierre Dargnies, : Trust in an expert depending on the expert's gender and the individual's characteristics: An experiment
Julia Rose, Burgundy School of Business: Client-Advisor Matching in the Finance Industry
Session 2, Asset Markets 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Philip Melnikov
Edward Halim, Nanyang Technological University: Delegated Portfolio Management and Incentive Contract in Social Trading Networks: An
Experiment
Prachi Hejib, University of East Anglia: The effects of information provision on decisions over risky assets
Xiaoyu Zhou, FAU Erlangen-- Nuernberg: Information aggregation over separated markets. An experiment
Thomas Stoeckl, Management Center Innsbruck, Department Business & Management: Regulation of insider trading and short selling.
Evaluating the joint effects of two market interventions.
Session 3, Biases 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Silvia F. Castro
Paolo Crosetto, INRA - GAEL: The rise and fall of context effects
Katharina Momsen, University of Innsbr: Information Search and Default Bias
Yigit Oezcelik, University of Liverpool: Non-numerical and social anchoring in a ratings
Session 4, Contests, Conflicts, and Losses. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Dominik Bruckner
Biljana Meiske, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance: Productivity Shock and Conflict: The Role of Loss Aversion
Simeon Schudy, LMU Munich: The Efficacy of Tournaments for Non-Routine Team Tasks
Ayse Gul Mermer, University of Amsterdam, CREED: Fierce Competitors and Drop-Outs: Contests with Loss-Averse Agents
Session 5, Fairness and Reciprocity. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Manela Karunadasa
Simon Siegenthaler, University of Texas, Dallas: Leading-by-example: legitimizing pay disparity through risk
Christian Koch, University of Vienna: Anti-migration sentiments and fairness perceptions
Jan Schmitz, Radboud University: Reciprocity in multi player interactions - Evidence from the lab and the field
Session 6, Games 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Hovo Manukyan
Daehong Min, New York University Abu Dhabi: Viable Nash Equilibria: An Experiment
Evan Friedman, University of Essex: Stochastic Choice and Noisy Beliefs in Games: an Experiment
ZAFER Akin, American University in Dubai: Asymmetric Guessing Games
Session 7, Industrial Organization 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Satarupa Mitra
Francois Cochard, UNIVERSITE DE FRANCHE-COMTE: How to Fight Multi-market Cartels: An Experimental Comparison between the
American and the European Leniency Programs
Matthew Walker, Durham University Business School, UK: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation into the Welfare Consequences of
Late Payments
Felix Holzmeister, University of Innsbruck, Department of Economics: The Economics of Label Credence Goods
Session 8, Nudging. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Eldar Dadon
Ivan Soraperra, University of Amsterdam: Behavioral Nudges to Curb OTC Sales of Antibiotics: A RCT study in Ethiopia
Abigail Hurwitz, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem: Enhancing Longevity Awareness to Improve Retirement Security
Taisuke Imai, LMU Munich: CO2 emissions and consumption behavior: The role of beliefs, information, and attitudes
Session 9, Social Norms 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Haoran Yang
Daniele Nosenzo, Aarhus University: The Coordinating Power of Social Norms
Eugenio Verrina, GATE-Lyon: Personal norms - and not only social norms - shape economic behavior
Caroline Graf, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam: Social Norms Offer Explanation for Inconsistent Effects of Incentives on Prosocial Behavior
Anouk Schippers, University of Groningen: Sharing with minimal regulation? Evidence from neighborhood book exchange
Session 10, Voting. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Monika Pompeo
Moumita Deb, University of Birmingham: Experiments in Information Acquisition and Voting
Joao Ferreira, University of Southampton: The Expressive Power of Voting Rules
Francesco Capozza, Erasmus University Rotterdam: Political Competition, Cognitive Dissonance and Political Beliefs
Wednesday, July 7, 3:00am - 4:40am PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Session 1, Artificial Intelligence. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Laura Manukyan
Jan Rene Judek, Faculty of Business: Reducing Algorithm Aversion Through Experience
Marco Lorenz, Georg-August-University Goettingen: The Tragedy of Algorithm Aversion
Ivan Barreda-Tarrazona, Universitat Jaume I: Artificial vs. emotional intelligence in Prisoner's Dilemma
Moritz von Zahn, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFW: Expl(AI)ned: The Impact of Explainable Artificial Intelligence on Human
Learning and Information Processing
Session 2, Asset Markets 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Philip Melnikov
Doron Sonsino, Sarnat school of Business Administration, Center for Academic Studies, Or Yehuda and and Ben-Gurion University, Economics
Department: The decrease in confidence with forecast extremity: A survey of results and implications
Anita Kopanyi-Peuker, Radboud University: The Role of the End Time in Experimental Asset Markets
Steve Heinke, University of Basel: Mental Capabilities, Heterogeneous Trading Patterns and Performance in an Experimental Asset Market
Dominik Schmidt, Management Center Innsbruck: Insider trading legislation and trader migration
Session 3, Cooperation 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Silvia F. Castro
Francesca Pancotto, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia: Resilience and Cooperation
Vincent Laferriere, University of Lausanne: Multigame contact and cooperation
Daniela Ruetzler, University of Innsbruck: The ontological roots of human cooperation
Yongping Bao, University of Bremen: Sustaining Cooperation with Correlated Information
Session 4, Covid-19 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Dominik Bruckner
Shambhavi Priyam, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods: Expectations and Trust in Government during the COVID-19
Pandemic
Dominik Meier, University of Basel: What motivates people to volunteer during a pandemic?
Ximeng Fang, University of Bonn: Does information about local COVID-19 incidence rates increase the use of digital contact tracing apps?
Astrid Hopfensitz, Toulouse School of Economics: Married individuals more likely to comply with protective health measures against COVID-
19: evidence from a large multinational sample
Session 5, Gender 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Manela Karunadasa
Christian Thoeni, University of Lausanne: Is there really nothing to see here? On gender differences in preferences
Sefa Erkus, Karabuk University: Gender Differences in Public Speaking Aversion on Video Conferences
Nathalie Roemer, Leibniz University Hannover: Do gender differences in the promotion of own ideas lead to gender differences in support
received?
Robert Stueber, WZB: Preference for Homogeneity? Occupational Segregation and Gender Stereotypes
Session 6, Overconfidence. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Hovo Manukyan
Marieta Valente, Universidade do Minho, Portugal: Exploring perceptions and expectations of grades in a quantitative course: results from an
incentivized experiment
Adrian Hillenbrand, University of Bonn: Delegation under Overconfidence
Marta Kozakiewicz, Bonn University: Belief-Based Utility and Signal Interpretation
Lia Flores, University of Porto: Overplacement in logical reasoning skills due to political differences
Session 7, Public Goods 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Satarupa Mitra
Anna Cartwright, Coventry University: Predicting Efficiency in Threshold Public Good Games: A Learning Direction Theory Approach
Vincent Theroude, GATE-LSE: Heterogeneity in endowments in Public Good Games: a meta-analysis
Shuwen Li, Shanghai Jiao Tong University: Climate policies under collective risk: Provision of local irrigation systems in the lab and field
Session 8, Redistribution. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Eldar Dadon
Florian Schneider, University of Zurich: Preferences for the allocation of production rewards between capital and labor
Jan Hausfeld, University of Amsterdam: Redistribution beyond equality and status quo - heterogeneous societies in the lab
Fabio Tufano, University of Nottingham: Testing a condensed methodology to estimate distributional preferences a la Fisman et al. (2007)
Nina Weber, King's College London: Experience of social mobility and support for redistribution: Beating the odds or blaming the system
Session 9, Time Preferences. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Haoran Yang
Ben Greiner, Wirtschaftsuniversity Wien: Time preferences towards the end of life
Michele Belot, Cornell University: Eliciting time preferences when income and consumption vary: Theory, Validation and Application to Job
Search
Sili Zhang, University of Zurich: How Preference Misperceptions Confound the Identification of Time Preferences
Session 10, Trust. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Monika Pompeo
Giorgia Romagnoli, NYU: Fostering trust: When the rhetoric of sharing can backfire
Heloise Clolery, CREST: Measuring Trust without Error: a Comparison between Surveys and Games
Dina Tasneem, American University of Sharjah: Trust and Citizen Engagement in Participatory Governance
Diya Abraham, Vienna University of Economics and Business: Social comparisons and effort provision: The psychological effect of being less
trusted than one's peers
Wednesday, July 7, 5:00am - 6:00am PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Social Event, Off- topic session: The ESA Ethical Guidelines Discussion. Ben Greiner, Michal Krawczyk, Dorothea
Kuebler, Jeroen van de Ven, and Marie-Claire Villeval. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Philip Melnikov
Wednesday, July 7, 6:00am - 7:00am PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Social Event, Topic session: The Future of Experimental Economics-- Friederike Mengel. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Luis Avalos
Wednesday, July 7, 7:00am - 8:00am PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Executive Committee Meeting. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Mouli Modak
Wednesday, July 7, 8:00am - 9:00am PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Plenary Talk: Deconstructing experimental findings of group bias-- Rachel Kranton. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Mouli Modak
Wednesday, July 7, 9:00am - 10:40am PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Session 1, Applied Economics. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Mouli Modak
Xiannong Zhang, Washington University in St. Louis: The impact of negative links: theory and evidence
Sabine Kroeger, Department of Economics, Laval University: Do People Vote Sincerely under Preferential Voting?
Stanton Hudja, Baylor University: An Experimental Exploration of Reasonable Doubt
Cesar Mantilla, Universidad del Rosario: Environmental valuation using bargaining games: an application to water
Session 2, Choice Archetecture. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Swechha Chada
Thomas Rietz, University of Iowa: Investment defaults and retirement savings allocations
Nora Szech, KIT: Choice Architecture and Incentives Increase COVID-19 Vaccine Intentions and Test Demand
Andrea Sorensen, University of St. Thomas: Individual compliance with disease-preventive behaviors: Experimental evidence
Lanny Zrill, Langara College: Default-Setting and Default Bias: Does the Choice Architect Matter?
Session 3, Decision Theory 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Shan Gui
Maivand Sarin, University of Cologne: In Your Name! The Effect of Intermediaries on Discrimination
Paul Healy, Ohio State University: Testing Elicitation Mechanisms Via Team Chat
Kevin Laughren, Simon Fraser University: Experimentally Decomposing Inattention
Jason Paulo Tayawa, The Ohio State University: Drivers of Oveprecision: Overweighting and Neglecting Correlation of Multiple Signals
Session 4, Markets and Repeated Games. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Tianyi Li
Liang Qiao, THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA: Will gifts disrupt online market reputation systems? An experimental study
Katerina Sherstyuk, University of Hawaii, Dept of Economics: Experimental Commodity Markets with Storage
Tim Cason, Purdue University: Investment Incentives in Tradable Emissions Markets with Price Floors
David Cooper, Florida State University: IRPD Games with Changing Discount Rates
Session 5, Methodology. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Daniel Gomez-Vasquez
Carola Grebitus, Arizona State University: It's complex -- How does offering more products affect consumer decision making?
Lina Diaz, George Mason University: Estimating Social Preferences Using Stated Satisfaction: Novel Support for Inequity Aversion
Francesco Bogliacino, Universidad Nacional de Colombia: Measuring Norms: Assessing the Bicchieri-Xiao elicitation method
Session 6, Norms. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Duan Liu
Eugen Dimant, University of Pennsylvania: Social Proximity and the Erosion of Norm Compliance
Marta Maras, Gettysburg College: Intentionality Matters for Third-Party Punishment but not Compensation in Trust Games
Rafael Charris, Universidad Nacional de Colombia: The effect of Negative Shocks on pro-social and anti-social behavior
Wednesday, July 7, 11:00am - 12:40pm PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Session 1, Decision Theory 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Tianyi Li
Cary Deck, University of Alabama: Exploring the Intensity of Higher-Order Risk Attitudes
Russell Golman, Carnegie Mellon University: The Demand for, and Avoidance of, Information
Barry Sopher, Rutgers University: Maximizing the Growth Rate of Wealth vs Maximizing Expected Utility of Wealth: The St. Petersburg
Gamble Revisited
Hyundam Je, Texas A&M University: Preferences for the Resolution of Risk and Ambiguity
Session 2, Field Experiments 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Shanshan Zhang
King King Li, Shenzhen Audencia Business School, Shenzhen University: What Drives Excessive Borrowing and Under-Borrowing? A Field
Experiment
Holly Dykstra, Harvard Kennedy School: Patience Across the Payday Cycle
Paul Feldman, Johns Hopkins University: Measuring the Time Preferences of Experienced Producers
Natalia Valdez Gonzalez, Texas A&M University: A Tale of the Tortoise and the Hare: Monetary Incentives, Social Status and Physical Activity
Session 3, Lying and Communication. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Matthew Gomies
Junya Zhou, Purdue University: Costly Verification and Commitment in Persuasion
Daniel Parra, WZB Berlin Social Science Center: Does lying for others dominate lying aversion?
Siyu Wang, Wichita State University: Is It What You Say, or How You Say It? An Experimental Investigation of Communication Messages
Fangtingyu Hu, University of Minnesota: Strategic Responses to Lying
Session 4, Norms and Trust. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Shan Gui
Austin Bradley, Virginia Tech: Investigating Trust Using Natural Language Processing
Diego Aycinena, Universidad del Rosario: Measuring norms: Assessing the Krupka-Weber elicitation method
Yufei Ren, University of Minnesota Duluth: Is a high level of trust and trustworthiness within the organization a good thing to the firm?
Diya Ganguly, University of Nebraska-Lincoln: Role of gender identity on conservation effort choice in an agricultural land leasing context: A
Lab Experiment
Session 5, Public Goods 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Daniel Gomez-Vasquez
Braxton Gately, University of Arkansas: Paved with Good Intentions: Group Identity and Partial Willful Ignorance in Public Goods Games
Kanatip Winichakul, University of Pittsburgh: The Gift of Giving: Disclosing Tribute Donation Size and Taboo Charitable Behavior
Brock Stoddard, Appalachian State University: Framing and Inequality in Public Goods Games
Jason Aimone, Baylor University: Dynamics of Public Goods Contributions Under Probabilistic Punishment
Wednesday, July 7, 1:00pm - 2:00pm PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Plenary Talk: Do charities know what triggers donations-- Ragan Petrie. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Duan Liu
Wednesday, July 7, 2:00pm - 3:00pm PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Social Event, Off- Topic session: The ESA Ethical Guidelines Discussion-- Catherine Eckel. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Matthew Gomies
Wednesday, July 7, 3:00pm - 4:00pm PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Social Event, Off-topic Session: Faculty vs Non-faculty Classic Economic Game Challenge-- Walter Yuan, MobLab and
Joseph Wang, National Taiwan University. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Shanshan Zhang
Wednesday, July 7, 4:00pm - 5:00pm PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Plenary Talk: Incentives to Persevere-- Erte Xiao. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Lan Zhou
Wednesday, July 7, 5:00pm - 6:40pm PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Session 1, Bounded rationality. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Wendan Zhang
Lawrence Choo, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics: Can market selection reduce anomalous behaviour in games?
Jingyi Meng, Nankai University: Workload and Economic Decision-Making: Stress versus Financial Resources
Joseph Tao-yi Wang, National Taiwan University: Simulating Zero-Intelligence Traders to match Classroom Double Auction Market Results
Session 2, Leadership. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Yunwen He
Yaxiong Li, University of Auckland: (Un)Willing to lead? Men, Women and the Leadership Gap
Masao Fukutomi, Kyoto University, Japan: An Experimental Study of Guilt Aversion in Group Decision Making
Yutong Li, Renmin University of China: Gender Differences, Individual Qualifications, and Leader Selection Mechanisms
Nor Izzatina Abdul Aziz, Institut Kajian Malaysia dan Antarabangsa (IKMAS), National University of Malaysia: Social Status and public
spiritedness in representation: Experimental evidence from Borneo
Session 3, Risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Bhagya Gunawardena
Vinayak Alladi, University of Sydney: The Impact of Background Ambiguity On Risk Taking: Evidence From The Lab
Jiatong Han, Zhejiang University: Incentive matters in risk preference elicitation: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment
Session 4, Contests and rankings. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Xiduo Chen
Hanlin Lou, University of Technology Sydney: Choosing the best pond to motivate performance: relative feedback and performance in groups
Session 5, Health, education, and labour markets. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Shuya He
Marcello Puca, University of Bergamo: Discrimination and Stereotypes in the Age of Covid19: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Weiguang Deng, Hunan University: Discriminations against Marital and Childbearing Status in Employments: A Field Experiment from China
Yuxin Yao, East China Normal University: Peer Effects of Ability and Misbehaviors in Classroom: Evidence from a Seat Randomization
Experiment
Elena Keller, UNSW Sydney: Exploring the demand for fertility treatments: a revealed-preference experiment
Wednesday, July 7, 7:00pm - 8:40pm PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Session 1, Bargaining. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Lan Zhou
Ailin Leng, Nanjing Audit University: A Rubinstein Bargaining Experiment in Continuous Time
Duk Gyoo Kim, University of Mannheim: Multilateralism Paradox of Network in Bargaining
Na Zuo, Shandong University: Can Virtual Bargaining Explain Coordination in Public Good Games Characterizing Team Production? With a lab
experimental test.
Ta-wei Hung, National Taiwan University: Emotional Bargaining After Litigation: An Experimental Study of the Coase Theorem
Session 2, Corruption and dishonesty. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Yunwen He
Yidong Huang, Shanghai International Studies University: Economic Preferences and State-Level Corruption
Jingzhuo Wu, Tsinghua University: Social Relations and Lying: An Experimental Study
Shuguang Jiang, Zhejiang University of Finance&Economics: Group Monitoring, Endogenous Crackdown, and Anti-corruption: An Experiment
Yixin Chen, Renmin University of China: Will government officials behave more honestly? Experiment based on samples of civil servants and
students
Session 3, Other-regarding preferences 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Bhagya Gunawardena
Sara Gil Gallen, University degli studi di Bari - Aldo Moro: Equality of opportunity in a random dicator's game
Senran Lin, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics: The reciprocal spillover effects of informal risk sharing on formal insurance
Qing Zhang, Hunan University of Technology and Business: Intertemporal Trust Game
Yuta Shimodaira, Osaka Univesity: Evaluation of Social Preference Representation Using CES Function
Session 4, Social dilemmas 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Xiduo Chen
Yihan Xiao, Tsinghua University: The Effect of Observability on the Volunteer's Dilemma
Yexin Zhou, Beijing Normal University: Reward, Punishment and Children's Cooperation Preference
Chi Cui, Northeast Normal University, China: A Signal of Following Social Norms Promotes Cooperation in Public Goods Game
Ozan Isler, Queensland University of Technology: Strong reciprocity and selfish intuitions explain cooperation in maintenance and provision
dilemmas
Session 5, Financial markets and institutions. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Shuya He
Tsz Kwan Tse, Osaka University: Making Better Decisions in Financial Market: Human Forecaster vs. Algorithmic Forecaster
Jieyi Duan, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University: An Experimental Study on Quantitative Easing
Juanjuan Meng, Peking University: Can All Humans Benefit from AI Assistance? Algorithm Aversion and Overconfidence
Session 6, Industrial organisation. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Wendan Zhang
Muhammed Bulutay, Technische University Berlin: Imperfect Tacit Collusion and Asymmetric Price Transmission
Surjasama Lahiri, Deakin University: The Effect of Competition on Fine Print in Contracts: Theory and Experiment
Binglin Gong, East China Normal University: Can adjusted reputation score improve market efficiency? -Theory and Experiment
Ryo Mikami, Osaka University: Consumer Search and Stock-out: A Laboratory Experiment
Wednesday, July 7, 9:00pm - 10:00pm PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Social Event, Off- Topic session: The ESA Ethical Guidelines Discussion-- Lata Gandaharan. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Yunwen He
Wednesday, July 7, 10:00pm - 11:00pm PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Social Event, Topic session: Cross Country Online Game Challenge-- Shirley Wang, Nathanael Berger, & Phil Limberg.
Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Bhagya Gunawardena
Wednesday, July 7, 11:00pm - 0:00am PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Social Event, Hangout: Interaction with Presenters. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Lan Zhou
Thursday, July 8, 1:00am - 2:40am PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Session 1, Auctions. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Wendan Zhang
Sander Onderstal, University of Amsterdam: A wind tunnel test of wind farm auctions
Dirk Engelmann, Humboldt University Berlin: Winner's and Loser's Curse in Single-Unit and Multi-Unit Auctions
Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Technische University Berlin: Cognitive Abilities and Spillovers between Auction Formats
Session 2, Biases 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Laura Manukyan
Frieder Neunhoeffer, University of Amsterdam, Ca' Foscari University Venice: The pigeonholing effect - On subscription traps and context-
dependent preference reversals
Henrik Orzen, University of Mannheim: Escalating commitment to a failing course of action - A re-examination
Amnon Maltz, University of Haifa: Context Effects in Strategic Environments
Session 3, Communication. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Haoran Yang
Eli Spiegelman, Vanier College: Would you believe that?! Irrelevant information influences behavioral responses to cheap talk
Andreas Ziegler, University of Amsterdam: Optimal (un-)coordination under uncertainty: testing information design in the laboratory
Konstantinos Ioannidis, University of Amsterdam: Habitual communication
Session 4, Covid-19 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Silvia F. Castro
Luca Corazzini, University of Venice: Narratives on COVID-19 and Policy Opinions: A Survey Experiment
Joanna Rachubik, University of Warsaw: Willingness to get vaccinated against COVID-19: an experimental study on a Polish representative
sample
Hurwitz, Abigail, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem: COVID-19 vaccines may also reduce personal financial fragility - a field study in Israel
Adriana Carolina Pinate, Gran Sasso Science Institute: Altruism in the time of COVID-19: We are all in this together, but who is we?
Session 5, Discrimination 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Philip Melnikov
Yi Sheng, Tilburg University: Discriminatory Tastes
Hamideh Mohtashami Borzadaran, University of Birmingham: Discrimination during Brexit?
Pol Campos-Mercade, Lund University: Irrational Statistical Discrimination
Gonul Dogan, University of Cologne: Social Exclusion
Session 6, Experimental Methodology. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Manela Karunadasa
Aleksandr Alekseev, University of Regensburg: The Power of Incentives
Yefim Roth, University of Haifa: The role of attention in checking decisions
Lorenzo Estepa Mohedano, Universidad Loyola: Beans vs. Slider: Eliciting probabilities in the  field
Daniel Navarro-Martinez, Pompeu Fabra University: Increasing the external validity of social preference games by reducing measurement error
Session 7, Games 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Hovo Manukyan
Aleksei Chernulich, New York University Abu Dhabi: A Natural Experiment on the Value of Strategic Unpredictability: Sign Stealing in
Baseball
Ciril Bosch Rosa, TU Berlin: Coordination under Loss Contracts
xu zhibo, none: Level-k Analysis on Dynamic Game with Incomplete Information and Uncertainty: An experimental study
Session 8, Individual Decisions 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Satarupa Mitra
Alexander Neverov, Institute of PsychoEconomic Researches: The influence of information-processing style on economic results of individual
agents in conditions of fundamental uncertainty
Lukasz Tanajewski, Kozminski University: Preference and inconsistency in decision making: a model combining binary choice with WTP/A
range data
Manuel Grieder, Zurich University of Applied Sciences (ZHAW): How Choice Complexity in Liberalized Markets Hurts the Demand for Green
Electricity
Session 9, Intervention/RCT 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Eldar Dadon
Henning Hermes, NHH Bergen / Department of Economics: Behavioral Barriers and the Socioeconomic Gap in Child Care Enrollment
Pau Balart, Universitat de les Illes Balears: Unraveling Soft-Commitment: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment on Recycling
Michael Brock, UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA: The Can Challenge: Exploring the Best Way to Incentivise Recycling Behaviour
Session 10, Motivated Reasoning. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Dominik Bruckner
Max Lobeck, Paris School of Economics: Motivating Beliefs in a Just World
Jantsje Mol, University of Amsterdam: Strategic confusion: searching extra trees to avoid seeing the forest
Davide Domenico Pace, Univarsity of Amsterdam: Fair Shares and Selective Attention
Session 11, Social Preferences. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Monika Pompeo
Lingqing Jiang, University of Essex: Oops!... I Did It Again: Understanding Mechanisms of Persistence in Prosocial Behavior
Chiara Nardi, IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca: Social and Moral Distance in Risky Settings
Ann-Katrin Kienle, University of Applied Sciences of the Grisons: Under pressure: stress and the support of neediness
Thursday, July 8, 3:00am - 4:40am PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Session 1, Asset Markets 3. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Laura Manukyan
Christoph Huber, University of Innsbruck: Market Shocks and Professionals' Investment Behavior - Evidence from the COVID-19 Crash
Thomas Stoeckl, Management Center Innsbruck, Department Business & Management: Analyzing concentration patterns in experimental asset
markets.
Dominik Schmidt, Management Center Innsbruck: Having a say on insider trading regulation. An experiment studying traders' choice of
regulation
Session 2, Bargaining and Self Image. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Haoran Yang
Franziska Heinicke, University of Mannheim: Bargaining under the threat of a nuclear option
Jose Ignacio Rivero, THEMA - CY Cergy-Paris University: Bargaining With Moral Agents
Benoit Tarroux, University Lyon 2 and GATE: Social preferences through choices between menus of allocations: An experiment
Vasilisa Petrishcheva, Duesseldorf Insitute for Competition Economics: Willful Ignorance and Reference-Dependence of Self-Image Concerns
Session 3, Consumer Behavior. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Silvia F. Castro
Rocco Caferra, University of Bari: Consumer willingness to pay a price premium for bio-based products: Do certifications matter?
Mario Intini, University of Bari Aldo Moro, Italy: Cheaper or eco-friendly products: what do consumers prefer? An experiment in the transport
sector
Ayse Tugba Atasoy, RWTH Aachen University: Default vs. Active Choices: An Experiment on Electricity Tariff Switching
Frauke Stehr, Maastricht University: Making Up for Harming Others - An Experiment on Voluntary Compensation Behavior
Session 4, Cooperation 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Philip Melnikov
Huanren Zhang, University of Southern Denmark: Cooperation in infinitely repeated games under the shadow of inequality
Ro'i Zultan, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev: Perceptions of conflict: parochial cooperationand outgroup spite revisited
Christine Grimm, WU Vienna: Cooperation, Punishment and Endogenous Information Manipulation
Simona Cicognani, Utrecht School of Economics: Cooperating when the end is near: the impact of cognitive ability and task complexity
Session 5, Creativity and Innovation. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Manela Karunadasa
Maria del Pino Ramos Sosa, Universidad Loyola Andalucia: Evaluating creativity in a creative field: how cognitive ability, 2D:4D and risk
preferences influence creativity
Marina Schroeder, Leibniz University Hannover: Teams Do Not Outperform Individuals in a Simple Creative Task
Ayse Gul Mermer, University of Amsterdam, CREED: Does Communication Help to Coordinate on Early Adoption of Innovation?
Katharina Bruett, University of Amsterdam: How teams can overcome free riding in strategic experimentation
Session 6, Gender 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Hovo Manukyan
Simone Haeckl, UiS University of Stavanger: Closing the gender STEM gap - A large-scale randomized-controlled trial in elementary schools
Diogo Geraldes, Utrecht School of Economics: An Experiment on Gender Representation in Majoritarian Bargaining
Michalis Drouvelis, University of Birmingham: Gender differences in performance: the role of social incentives
Helena Fornwagner, University of Innsbruck: Predictably competitive: What faces can tell us about competitive behavior
Session 7, Identity 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Satarupa Mitra
Wenbo Zou, University of California, Davis: Ingroup Bias in a Social Learning Experiment
Evgeniya Chabanova, University of Mainz, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main: Does choosing who you are explain how you behave?
Subhasish Modak Chowdhury, University of Bath: In-group versus Out-group Preferences in Intergroup Conflict: An Experiment
Maria Jose Vazquez, ETEA Foundation, Development Institute, Universidad Loyola Andalucia: I don't belong here! A simple model on
intergroup cooperation and an experimental test with stigmatized individuals
Session 8, Individual Decisions 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Eldar Dadon
Luca Henkel, University of Bonn: Experimental Evidence on the Relationship between Perceived Ambiguity and Likelihood Insensitivity
Yair Antler, Tel Aviv University: An Experimental Analysis of the Prize-Probability Tradeoff in Stopping Problems
Roel van Veldhuizen, Lund University: Time Pressure: Preferences and Performance Effects
Session 9, Labor Market 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Dominik Bruckner
Essi Kujansuu, European University Institute: Fairness of Wage Cuts
Karen Hauge, Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research: Supported Employment or treatment-as-usual? Results from a large-scale
randomized field experiment
Marina Krauss, University of Augsburg: Child Care and Maternal Labor Supply: A Field Experiment
Todd Kaplan, University of Exeter: Increasing Employment Through the Partial Release of Information
Session 10, Lying 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Monika Pompeo
Margarita Leib, University of Amsterdam: Collaborative Dishonesty: A Meta-Study
Sorravich Kingsuwankul, Gate Lab, University of Lyon: Risk taking with unethical money: An experimental study
Aslihan Akdeniz, University of Amsterdam: The evolution of honesty by partner choice
Session 11, Punishment. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Anand Kumar
Stefanie Jaussi, University of Bern, Institute for Organization and HR: Keep your eyes on the prize: How to make penalty contracts work
Christoph Buehren, Clausthal University of Technology: The Demand for Punishment to Promote Cooperation Among Like-Minded People
Jonathan Staebler, GESS/ University of Mannheim: I Can Feel You - How Experience Shapes Third-Party Punishment
Thursday, July 8, 5:00am - 6:00am PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Plenary Talk: Gender and Decision Making-- Ingvild Almas. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Hovo Manukyan
Thursday, July 8, 6:00am - 7:00am PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Social Event, Hangout: Interaction with Presenters. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Luis Avalos
Thursday, July 8, 7:00am - 8:00am PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Members Meeting. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Luis Avalos
Thursday, July 8, 8:00am - 9:00am PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Plenary Talk: Market Mysteries, Old and New-- Dan Friedman. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Swechha Chada
Thursday, July 8, 9:00am - 10:40am PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Session 1, Decision Theory 3. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Swechha Chada
King King Li, Shenzhen Audencia Business School, Shenzhen University: Investor's Memory Recall Bias: Theory and Field Experiment
Elif Osun, University of Maryland: Gender Differences in Preference to Give Advice
Carola Grebitus, Arizona State University: The influence of violating attribute cut-offs on utility for Medjool dates from Arizona
Session 2, Field Experiments 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Mouli Modak
Christian Koenig genannt Kersting, University of Innsbruck: Grit, Discounting, & Time Inconsistency
King King Li, Shenzhen Audencia Business School, Shenzhen University: To Go Electric or to Burn Coal? A Randomized Field Experiment
Joaquin Gomez-Minambres, Lafayette College: Menu-Dependent Food Choices and Food Waste
Hernan Bejarano, CIDE & Chapman, Economic Science Institute: Haggling for a Smoke: A Natural Field Experiment on Price Discrimination in
Mexico City's Informal Cigarette Markets
Session 3, Markets. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Matthew Gomies
Daniel Stephenson, Virginia Commonwealth University: Competition and Convergence in Complementary Contests
Yue Deng, George Mason University: Secondary Markets and the Opioid Crisis: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
Brett Williams, University of California, Santa Cruz: Opening the Book: Price Information's Impact on Market Efficiency in the Lab
Xiaomin Bian, Ohio state university: Exclusive Dealing with Committed Price
Session 4, Other-regarding Preferences 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Shan Gui
Marcos Nazareth Gallo, California Institute of Technology: Social Perceptions Predict Outcomes of In-Field Correspondence Studies
Paul Cheung, University of Maryland: Revealed Reciprocity
Session 5, Psychology 1. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Daniel Gomez-Vasquez
Felipe Montealegre, Universidad Nacional de Colombia: Negative shocks predict change in cognitive function and preferences: assessing the
negative affect and stress hypothesis
Santiago Sautua, Universidad del Rosario, Department of Economics: Emotional Influence on Information Processing in Decisions under
Uncertainty
ANTONIO ARECHAR, CIDE: Misinformation discernment around the globe: How shifting attention to accuracy can reduce misinformation
online in 16 countries.
Session 6, Public Goods 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Tianyi Li
Caleb Cox, Virginia Commonwealth University: Inequality and the Allocation of Collective Goods
Sabine Kroeger, Department of Economics, Laval University: Information regime changes and path dependence - An experimental analysis of
public goods contributions in heterogeneous groups
Jason Ralston, Whitman College: Plotting Prevenge: Punishment Strategies in a Public Goods Environment
Andrea Robbett, Middlebury College: Polarization and Group Cooperation
Thursday, July 8, 11:00am - 12:40pm PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Session 1, Finance. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Swechha Chada
Sascha Fuellbrunn, Radboud University: Privatizing gains and socializing risks: Does responsibility affect risky decision making for others?
Douglas Davis, Virginia Commonwealth University: Stress Tests and Information Disclosure: An Experimental Analysis
Huan Xie, Concordia University: Experimental Asset Markets with An Indefinite Horizon
Session 2, Game Theory. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Mouli Modak
Mouli Modak, Purdue University: Do Multiple Contacts Matter?
Joe Ballard, Florida State University: Dynamic Coordination with Switching Costs
Valon Vitaku, Texas A&M: School Choice: Biometrically-Informed Mechanism Design
Mir Adnan Mahmood, The Ohio State University: An Experimental Investigation of Global Games with Strategic Substitutes.
Session 3, Labor Market. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Matthew Gomies
Laura Gee, Tufts University: Salary Disclosure and Hiring: Field Experimental Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit Study
Elif Demiral Saglam, Austin Peay State University / HKS: Signaling Competitive Traits
Daniel Martin, Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management: A Robust Test of Prejudice for Discrimination Experiments
Rimvydas Baltaduonis, Gettysburg College: Overconfident or Just Playing to Type? Gender Norms, Contract Selection, and Performance
Session 4, Lying. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Shanshan Zhang
Eugen Dimant, University of Pennsylvania: Nudging Enforcers: How Norm Perceptions and Motives for Lying Shape Sanctions
Keh-Kuan Sun, Washington University in St. Louis: Lying Aversion and Vague Communication: An Experimental Study
Michael Thaler, Princeton University: The Supply of Motivated Beliefs
Alexander Brown, Texas A&M University: Direct revelation with lying aversion
Session 5, Other-regarding preferences 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Daniel Gomez-Vasquez
Ian Chadd, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute: Hidden Identity and Social Preferences:Evidence From Sexual Minorities
Mariana Blanco, Universidad del Rosario: How to make a criminal: Antisocial Behavior after negative shocks
Shakun Mago, University of Richmond: Anchor or Asset? The Role of Outside Obligations in Negotiations
Hernan Bejarano, CIDE & Chapman, Economic Science Institute: When the rich do (not) trust the (newly) rich: Experimental evidence on the
effects of positive random shocks in the trust game
Session 6, Psychology 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Tianyi Li
Mary Rigdon, Rutgers University: Prosocial Option Closes Entry Gap into Competition
Shuya He, University of Arizona: Don't tell anyone I lost to a girl! Gender stereotypes and hiding low performance
Stefan Trautmann, University of Heidelberg: Preferences for Precautionary Redistribution?
Thursday, July 8, 1:00pm - 2:00pm PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Social Event, Hangout: Interaction with Presenters. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Shan Gui
Thursday, July 8, 2:00pm - 3:00pm PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Social Event, Hangout: Interaction with Presenters. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Luis Avalos
Thursday, July 8, 4:00pm - 5:00pm PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Plenary Talk: An experiment on the Nash program: Comparing two bargaining implementations of the Shapley value--
Nobuyuki Hanaki. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Lan Zhou
Thursday, July 8, 5:00pm - 6:40pm PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Session 1, Environmental economics. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Lan Zhou
Armenak Antinyan, Wenlan School of Business, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law: Take me with you! Economic Incentives,
Nudging Interventions, and Reusable Shopping Bags: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial
Daniel John Zizzo, University of Queensland: Commitments and badges as nudges to low-carbon food shopping baskets
Lorenz Goette, National University of Singapore: The habit-forming effects of feedback: evidence from a large-scale field experiment
Christoph Drobner, Technical University Munich: Signaling pro-social behavior with pro-environmentalism
Session 2, Risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Yunwen He
Agnieszka Tymula, University of Sydney: Dynamic prospect theory - two core decision theories coexist in the gambling behavior of monkeys
Eungik Lee, NYU: Resolution of Uncertainty: Values versus Probabilities
Yuxin Su, Claremont Graduate University: The Intergenerational Transmission of Risk Preferences: Evidence from Field Experiments in China
and Korea
Yongchun Peng, Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, China: Risky Decisions under
Individual and Social Reference Dependence
Session 3, Search and time preference. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Bhagya Gunawardena
Xueting Wang, The University of Sydney: Present-biased time preference for monetary rewards - a meta-analysis
Gergely Horvath, Division of Social Sciences, Duke Kunshan University: Alleviating behavioral biases at job search: Do nudges work?
Chen Sun, Humboldt University Berlin: Measuring Preferences over Intertemporal Profiles
Maros Servatka, Macquarie Graduate School of Management: Time Costs and Search Behavior
Session 4, Financial decision making. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Wendan Zhang
Anirudh Dhawan, University of Technology Sydney: Getting burned by frictionless financial markets
Stephen Cheung, The University of Sydney: Drivers of the choice to self-manage one's investments
Elise Payzan-LeNestour, University of New South Wales: Craving for Money? Empirical Evidence from the Laboratory and the Field
Session 5, Communication. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Shuya He
James Fisher, USAA: Interacting Cascades: An Experiment on Inter-Group Information Spillovers
Jianxin Wang, George Mason University: Alcohol Consumption, Promise and Trust: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-field Experiment
Sixuan Chen, Nanjing University of Science and Technology: Honesty and leadership
Yuet Lyu, National Taiwan University: Monolingualism in the Lab
Thursday, July 8, 7:00pm - 8:40pm PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Session 1, Other-regarding preferences 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Lan Zhou
Michiko Ogaku, Nagasaki University: The Incentive Effect of Coarse and Refined Reporting: Theory and Experiment
Shu Chen, Shanghai International Studies University: Is socially responsible investment driven by altruism? A tDCS study
Jing Yu, Beijing Institute of technology: Selecting a public-spirited allocator: the role of cooperative preference and demographics
Yunwen He, Tsinghua University: Asymmetric Reciprocity
Session 2, Risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity 3. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Yunwen He
Tomohito Aoyama, Hitotsubashi University: Preference for randomization and validity of random incentive system: an experiment
Marcus Roel, Beijing Normal University: The Impact of Information on Goal-Setting and Performance: A Field Experiment
Filip Fidanoski, UNSW Business School: On the consistency of latent risk preferences across contexts
Session 3, Social dilemmas 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Bhagya Gunawardena
Xue Xu, School of Economics, Nankai University: Cooperation in infinitely repeated games with private monitoring
Yexin Zhou, Beijing Normal University: Framing effect and children's conditional cooperation under the inequality of endowment
Yohei Mitani, Kyoto University: Does Informing Public Actions Contribute to Successful Risk Mitigation? An Experimental Study of Strategic
Interactions and Voluntary Cooperation in the light of the COVID-19 Pandemic
Mengxing Wei, School of Economics, Nankai University: Psychological and Social Determinants of Cooperation and Punishment in Social
Dilemmas: Theory and Evidence
Session 4, Auctions. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Xiduo Chen
Lana Friesen, University of Queensland: Mind your Ps and Qs! Variable Allowance Supply in the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
Zhi Zhu, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China: The Default Effects of Online Rating: A Field Experiment
Zhi Li, Xiamen University: Alternative Carbon Emissions Permits Market Designs:  A Lab-in-Field Experiment in China
Session 5, Norms. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Shuya He
Manuel Munoz, New York University Abu Dhabi: The erosion of unity: How changes in social norms impact minority groups
Shuguang Jiang, Zhejiang University of Finance&Economics: Confucian Culture, Moral Reminder, and Gift Exchange
Jierui Yang, Tilburg University: Hot versus cold reciprocity
Session 6, School choice. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Wendan Zhang
Wooyoung Lim, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology: TIE-BREAKING AND EFFICIENCY IN THE LABORATORY SCHOOL
CHOICE
Siqi Pan, University of Melbourne: Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets
Natsumi Shimada, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University: An experimental study on strategic preference formation in
two-sided matching markets
Thursday, July 8, 9:00pm - 10:00pm PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Social Event, Topic session: Cross Country Studies-- Shirley Wang & Stefan Trautmann. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Xiduo Chen
Thursday, July 8, 10:00pm - 11:00pm PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Social Event, Topic session: Nudges & Policy-- Lionel Page. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Wendan Zhang
Thursday, July 8, 11:00pm - 0:00am PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Social Event, Hangout: Interaction with Presenters. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Shuya He
Friday, July 9, 1:00am - 2:40am PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Session 1, Cooperation 3. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Laura Manukyan
Alexandra Baier, Universtity Innsbruck: Ostracism and Theft in Heterogeneous Groups
Andreas Nicklisch, Hochschule fuer Wirtschaft und Technik: Social Norm Enforcement, Beliefs, and Victimization: Evidence from Syrian
Refugee Camps in Jordan
Bjoern Hartig, Royal Holloway, University of London: Size Matters! Only Big Threats Encourage Cooperation
Session 2, Covid-19 3. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Philip Melnikov
Tassilo Sobotta, Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg: Coalition formation in a third-party social dilemma
Christian Zihlmann, University of Fribourg (CH): Hindsight bias causally decreases trust in government: Evidence from the COVID-19 outbreak
Fernanda Leite Lopez de Leon, University of Kent: The effects of emergency government cash transfers on beliefs and behaviors during the
COVID pandemic: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Brazil
Session 3, Gender 3. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Silvia F. Castro
Yuki Takahashi, University of Bologna: Gender Differences in the Cost of Corrections in Group Work
Jakob Moeller, Wirtschafsuniversity Wien: Participation in voluntary competitions and gender discrimination
Adrian Munnoz, Universidad Autonoma de Madrid: Gender Differences in Dishonesty
Session 4, Industrial Organization 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Dominik Bruckner
Loukas Balafoutas, University of Innsbruck: Virtue signaling in markets for credence goods
Tobias Werner, DICE, University of Duesseldorf: Algorithmic and Human Collusion: Experimental Evidence
Session 5, Intervention/RCT 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Manela Karunadasa
Marius Dietsch, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz: Financial Education via Gamification: Evidence from a Large-scale Field Trail
Raisa Sherif, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Munich: Are pro-environment behaviours substitutes or complements?
Evidence from the field
Session 6, Labor Market 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Hovo Manukyan
Shahin Baghirov, Koc University: Managing Reputation in a Principal-Agent Problem
Miao Jin, Peking University: Consumption Peer Effects: Evidence from Hierarchy in the Workplace
Matthias Stefan, University of Innsbruck: Monetary and Social Incentives in Multi-Tasking: The Ranking Substitution Effect
Session 7, Lying 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Satarupa Mitra
Michel Tolksdorf, Technische University Berlin: Unethical behavior towards groups
Aljaz Ule, CREED, Amsterdam School of Economics: Dynamics of deception between strangers
Susanna Grundmann, University of Cologne: Measuring Individual Preferences for Truth-Telling
Session 8, Matching and Algorithm Aversion. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Eldar Dadon
Timm Opitz, Max-Planck-Institute for Innovation and Competition: Reciprocating Preferences in Two-sided Matching: An Experimental
Investigation
Peter Katuscak, RWTH Aachen University: Does expectation-based loss aversion explain preference misreporting in strategy-proof matching
mechanisms?
Wolfgang Luhan, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Enterpreneurship: Should a Robot be King? On the Acceptance of Algorithmic
Decisions
Caterina Giannetti, Georg-August-University Goettingen: Reducing the disposition effect with robo-advisers: A stock trading lab-in-the-field
experiment
Session 9, Motivated Reasoning and Ask Avoidance. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Haoran Yang
Maximilian Spaeth, University of Goettingen: Its me again... Ask Avoidance and the Dynamics of Charitable Giving
Claire Rimbaud, GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne: Avoiding Your Conscience: Belief-Dependent Preferences and Information Acquisition
Linh Vu, University of Amsterdam: Willful ignorance: a Meta-analysis
Session 10, Public Goods 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Monika Pompeo
Edward Cartwright, De Montfort University: Leadership in a public good game: Does the leader need to be pro-social or just say they are pro-
social?
Lan Zhou, Renmin University of China: Absolute versus Relative: Asymmetric Framing and Feedback Design in a Heterogeneous-Endowment
Public Goods Game
Milos Fisar, WU: Delegation and overhead aversion with multiple threshold public goods
Friday, July 9, 3:00am - 4:40am PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Session 1, Biases 3. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Laura Manukyan
Bouke Klein Teeselink, Yale School of Management: Does Losing Lead to Winning? An Empirical Analysis for Four Different Sports
Jan Mueller-Dethard, University of Mannheim: Can Agents Add and Subtract When Forming Beliefs? Evidence from the Lab and Field
David Albrecht, Maastricht University: Debt Aversion: Theory and Experiment
Session 2, Covid-19 4. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Philip Melnikov
Michal Krawczyk, University of Warsaw: Fear and rationality of decision-making in the face of the pandemic
Thomas Ritttmannsberger, University of Innsbruck: The effect of social norms on COVID-19 vaccination readiness: Evidence from a nation-
wide survey experiment
Marco Islam, Lund University: Motivated Risk Assessments
Session 3, Discrimination 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Silvia F. Castro
Darya Korlyakova, Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute: Misperceived Discrimination and Task
Performance
Regine Oexl, University of Innsbruck: Demographics and Discrimination
Margaret Samahita, University College Dublin: The inelastic demand for affirmative action
Session 4, Identity 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Dominik Bruckner
Florian Heine, Tilburg University: Prosocial Risk Taking and Intergroup Conflicts: Investigating in a Volunteer's Dilemma Experiment
Lenka Fiala, Tilburg University: Statistical Role Models
Arno Apffelstaedt, University of Cologne: Group Image Concerns
Florian Hett, Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz: Social identity and belief polarization
Session 5, Intervention/RCT 3. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Manela Karunadasa
Gwen-Jiro Clochard, CREST - Ecole polytechnique: Using Contact to Improve the Relationship between the Police and the Population
Daniel Salicath, University of Cologne: Information intervention to promote safe water consumption: An RCT in areas affected by groundwater
arsenic in India
Session 6, Lying 3. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Hovo Manukyan
Georgia Michailidou, New York University Abu Dhabi (NYUAD): Lie O'clock: Experimental Evidence on Intertemporal Lying Preferences
Timo Promann, University of Hamburg: You Lie? I Lie? How Social Norms and Reputational Concerns Affect Honesty
Alice Solda, Heidelberg University: Keeping Promises: The effect of Credibility on Cooperation in a Social Dilemma
Session 7, Macroeconomics. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Satarupa Mitra
Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, Universidad de Granada: Preventing (panic) bank runs
Stefanie J. Huber, University of Amsterdam: Animal Spirits and Endogenous Cycles: New Empirical Evidence
Cornelia Strauss, University of Giessen: Monetary Policy, Efficiency Wages, and Employment. Experimental Evidence on a Missing Link
Session 8, Risk aversion. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Eldar Dadon
Moritz Loewenfeld, Toulouse School of Economics: Does correlation really matter in risk taking? An experimental investigation
Johannes Lohse, University of Birmingham: Cognitive abilities and risk taking: the role of preferences
Session 9, Self Control and Expectations. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Haoran Yang
Pascal Kieren, University of Mannheim: Expectation Formation Under Uninformative Signals
Andrej Woerner, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich: Should individuals choose their own incentives? - Evidence from a Mindfulness
Meditation Intervention
Huseyn Ismayilov, ADA University: Commitment vs. Flexibility: The Role of Experience
Session 10, Social Norms 2. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Monika Pompeo
Christian Koenig genannt Kersting, University of Innsbruck: On the Robustness of Social Norm Elicitation
Yilong Xu, University of Heidelberg: Noblesse Oblige: Holding High-Status Individuals to Higher Standards
Andrea Isoni, University of Warwick: Voluntary Interaction and the Principle of Mutual Benfit
Session 11, Tax Morale and Corruption. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Anand Kumar
Francesca Federico, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia: Cooperation and Corruption
Alessandro Cascavilla, University of Bari: Family Affairs or Government's duty? The tax morality of a mobile society
Topi Miettinen, Hanken School of Economics and Helsinki GSE: The role of reporting institutions and image motivation in tax evasion and
incidence
Friday, July 9, 5:00am - 6:00am PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Plenary Talk: Framing and Attention - The Attentional Foundations of Framing Effects-- Ernst Fehr. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Laura Manukyan
Friday, July 9, 6:00am - 7:00am PDT (Los Angeles Time)
Social Event, After-conference good-bye hang out. Zoom Link
ESA Support Staff: Silvia F. Castro
Abstracts




We use an experiment online to investigate trust in experts depending on the expert's gender and the participants‘ characteristics. Participants play the
Monty Hall game, a decision game for which most participants have a false intuition about the payoff-maximizing action. Before making the final
decision determining whether they win the prize or not, each participant receives a recommendation from an expert. For some participants, the expert is
male (Oliver), for others the expert is female (Mary). The first batch of data collected show that overall a low proportion of participants (20%) chooses
to follow the recommendation of he expert. There is no significant difference the trust placed in the male expert and the female expert. However, the
analysis of the data, in particular of the open comments written by the participants suggests the mistrust in the experts has a dual cause: participants
question both the competence of the expert to provide a useful recommendation and the truthfulness of the expert (fearing they may aim at lowering
the participant's chances of getting the prize). More data will be collected shortly.
Author(s): Marie-Pierre Dargnies
Topic: Decision Theory: Other, Unknown: Unknown
Back to session: Advice
Client-Advisor Matching in the Finance Industry
Julia Rose
 Burgundy School of Business
ABSTRACT:
In an experimental study with 441 subjects from the general population and 126 financial professionals, we test a novel matching procedure to assign
advisors to clients. This matching is based on two simple self-assessed measures for risk-return preferences and the risk bearing capacity. Our findings
show that a matching based on similarity in those risk attitudes is not only preferred by clients, but also significantly increases the delegation
probability of investment decisions as well as overall client satisfaction compared to random matching. Additionally, we find that advisors are both
willing and able to incorporate clients' preferences in their investment decisions on the clients' behalf. A potential drawback of the matching
mechanism is that advisors have incentives to misrepresent their own attitudes if they compete for clients. The experimental results do not show
evidence of this effect in practice, providing further support for the applicability of the proposed mechanism.
Author(s): Julia Rose
Topic: Markets: Finance, Field Experiments: General
Back to session: Advice
Reducing Algorithm Aversion Through Experience
Jan Rene Judek
 Faculty of Business
ABSTRACT:
In the context of an experiment, we examine the persistence of aversion towards algorithms in relation to learning processes. The subjects of the
experiment are asked to make one share price forecast (rising or falling) in each of 40 rounds. A forecasting computer (algorithm) is available to them
which has a success rate of 70%. Intuitive forecasts made by the subjects usually lead to a significantly poorer success rate. Feedback provided after
each round of forecasts and a clear financial incentive lead to the subjects becoming better able to estimate their own forecasting abilities. At the same
time, their aversion to algorithms also decreases significantly.
Author(s): Ibrahim Filiz, Jan Rene Judek, Marco Lorenz, Markus Spiwoks
Topic: Decision Theory: Risk, Decision Theory: Other
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Algorithms already carry out many tasks more reliably than human experts. Nevertheless, some subjects have an aversion towards algorithms. In some
decision-making situations, an error can have serious consequences, in others not. In the context of a framing experiment, we examine the connection
between the consequences of a decision-making situation and the frequency of algorithm aversion. This shows that the more serious the consequences
of a decision are, the more frequently algorithm aversion occurs. Particularly in the case of very important decisions, algorithm aversion thus leads to a
reduction of the probability of success. This can be described as the tragedy of algorithm aversion.
Author(s): Ibrahim Filiz, Jan Rene Judek, Marco Lorenz and Markus Spiwoks
Topic: Decision Theory: Preferences, Decision Theory: Bounded Rationality
Link: www.ostfalia.de/cms/de/w/.galleries/forschung/fakw_WWP-21-02-The-Tragedy-of-Algorithm-Aversion.pdf?__disableDirectEdit=true
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Artificial vs. emotional intelligence in Prisoner's Dilemma
Ivan Barreda-Tarrazona
 Universitat Jaume I
ABSTRACT:
We conduct a laboratory experiment in which individual human participants play both one-shot and repeated prisoner's dilemma (RPD) games. In the
baseline, participants play with other human subjects, while in the treatment they are paired with an artificial intelligence (AI). We ex-ante create five
sessions with homogeneous human participants in terms of gender composition, altruism and reasoning ability (three for the “all human” condition and
two for the AI condition). In the two sessions corresponding to the AI treatment, participants play the aforementioned games against an artificial
intelligence trained upon data from the previous three all human sessions. In all games, we elicit players' beliefs regarding cooperation using an
incentive compatible method. Besides, after each individual decision, we collect self reported information on the main reason for it (rational or
particular emotion). Expectations of partner cooperation at the beginning of each task are not significantly different between treatments. However, trust
in the partner AI cooperating gets significantly lower in subsequent periods, particularly for the RPD tasks. This happens even if the AI has cooperated
significantly more than human partners in cases when human subjects did not expect cooperation. Also, decisions seem to be less emotion-driven in the
AI treatment, particularly in the last period of each task. Despite similar expectations of partner cooperation at the beginning of each task, we observe
that cooperation is actually significantly lower with an AI than with humans. This initial shock to cooperation significantly spreads to all periods of the
RPD tasks: cooperation ranges between 60% and 80% in the Humans treatment while it ranges between 20% and 40% in the AI treatment. Human
players seem to have tried to outwit the AI rather than cooperate with it.
Author(s): Ivan Barreda-Tarrazona, Ainhoa Jaramillo-Gutierrez, Marina Pavan and Gerardo Sabater-Grande
Topic: Decision Theory: Beliefs, Games: Repeated Games
Back to session: Artificial Intelligence
Expl(AI)ned: The Impact of Explainable Artificial Intelligence on Human Learning and Information Processing
Moritz von Zahn
 Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFW
ABSTRACT:
To overcome inefficiencies associated with the black-box nature of machine learning (ML) systems, researchers, practitioners, and regulators alike
increasingly call for explainability methods that allow different human stakeholders to understand better how and why systems generate specific
predictions. Focusing on lay users and local explanations, the paper at hand employs an experiment to outline how explainability shapes knowledge
transfers from the machine to users and influences users' information processing. We find that an asymmetric learning from machine explanations takes
place. Observing explanations that are in line with their prior beliefs causes participants to reinforce their predilections. However, no learning occurs
when explanations suggest that priors are incorrect. Additionally, we find that users tend to rely more on isolated intuitive explanations than the overall
prediction if they seem to be inconsistent. This leads to worse decision-making relative to an opaque system. Our results show that explainability can
be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it may lead users to question system outputs more frequently. On the other hand, it may entail selective
knowledge transfers justifying and reinforcing subjective beliefs. This emphasizes that explainability is no miracle cure to fairness and accountability
concerns associated with machine learning systems.
Author(s): Kevin Bauer, Moritz von Zahn, Oliver Hinz
Topic: Decision Theory: Learning, Games: Information
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Delegated Portfolio Management and Incentive Contract in Social Trading Networks: An Experiment
Edward Halim
 Nanyang Technological University
ABSTRACT:
We design an asset market experiment that incorporates the element of social trading, a social platform that enables investors to observe trading
performance of their peers and delegate their trading activity to top performing investors. Participants are randomly divided into two groups: the first
group consists of socially connected investors (social traders), and the second group comprises isolated investors (non-social traders). Social traders
can obtain information about the trading performance of their peers and are allowed to delegate part (or all) of their wealth to the top-two performers
within their group. We vary the extent to which the delegated investors (portfolio managers) are liable for the losses incurred from the investment. Our
result shows that while social trading may not yield greater welfare to the members; it enables the top performers to enjoy higher payoff than the rest of
the market (including the socially isolated). Delegated traders engage in less risk-taking when the symmetry between conferring bonus upon exceeding
a performance threshold and penalizing the agent for incurring losses, is maintained.
Author(s): Edward Halim, Yohanes E. Riyanto, and Nilanjan Roy
Topic: Markets: Finance, Markets: Other
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The effects of information provision on decisions over risky assets
Prachi Hejib
 University of East Anglia
ABSTRACT:
Investment platforms provide lots of information in the form of different summary statistics to help individuals make asset allocation decisions.
However, it is not always clear how these affect consumer decisions if some information is provided and some is not. This can be difficult to
disentangle in real life and can be concerning for both consumers and regulators as it may have unintended consequences. Understanding what drives
this behaviour and how investment plans can be designed to alleviate such problems is important. Our experimental framework aims to systematically
study how summary statistics can influence decision-making among risky assets. In the experiment, each participant faces 25 pairs of lotteries from
Loomes and Sugden (1998). The lotteries are represented by a bar, which shows how the earnings from that option depend on a draw from 1 to 100 and
its segments represent the corresponding payoffs (£0, 10, £20). This representation of the lotteries provides a complete description of the lottery, in that
it presents, for each possible state of the world, the corresponding payoff, if the lottery is chosen. In a stripped-down environment, we consider an
across-subjects 2x2 design in which we vary the presence or absence of two simple summary statistics; average returns (mean) and/or variability
(standard deviation) alongside the bar describing the lottery. The lotteries are specially chosen subset from Loomes and Sugden (1998) where more
than 50% of participants chose the lower expected value lottery of the pair. Though, our baseline results are highly likely to replicate those of Loomes
and Sugden (1998), we expect that the provision of information about expected returns is likely to increase the proportion of choices of the higher-
expected-value lottery. Summary statistics, by definition, contain no additional information, insofar as they are derived from the full record of historical
returns. Nevertheless, decision-makers may focus on these summary statistics, as being easier to understand or being more salient, and attend less to
information about the full distribution of returns – even if the full distribution of returns is relevant to their investment goals. References?Loomes, G.
and Sugden, R., 1998. Testing different stochastic specifications of risky choice. Economica, 65(260), pp.581-598.
Author(s): Prachi Hejib, Theodore Turocy, Stefania Sitzia
Topic: Decision Theory: Other, Decision Theory: Risk
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Information aggregation over separated markets. An experiment
Xiaoyu Zhou
 FAU Erlangen-- Nuernberg
ABSTRACT:
Experiments find that Arrow-Debreu markets can aggregate diverse information well when traders interact in the same market (e.g., Plott and Sunder,
1988; Plott, 2000; Choo et al., 2019). However, developments in finance suggest that traders can sometimes be excluded from certain market
interactions. Prominent examples include “dark pools” and over-the-counter (OTC) markets. The above examples can be characterised by distinct
separated markets where traders in each market are only able to participate and observe the activities in their respective markets. Nev- ertheless, the
separated markets are sometimes “connected” by intermediaries (e.g., large financial institutions) who are endowed with the unique opportunity to
trade and arbitrage across the different markets. These intermediaries can help promote market liquidity (e.g., Allen and Santomero, 2001), and through
their activities, potentially facilitate the transfer of information from one market to another. This raises pertinent question as to the information
transmission over the separated markets. Against this backdrop, this paper investigates the information aggrega- tion properties of Arrow-Debreu
markets over separated markets.We base our experiment on the seminar work of Plott and Sunder (1988). Our design involves two separated markets, I
and II, in which a series of state- contingent securities are traded. We consider two types of traders: Blue traders: can only trade in either market I or II
and Red traders: can trade in both markets I and II. To study information aggregation, nature first chooses the true state X, Y or Z with equal
probability. Then, blue traders in market I are informed about one of the states that can be ruled out whilst the blue traders in market I I are informed
about another of the states that can be ruled out. In contrast, the red traders receive no information about the true state. Given the above, each market
can only determine the true state from the information that is endowed in the other market. This allows us to investigate whether intermediaries (Red
traders) can facilitate the diffusion of information across markets even when they have no incentives to do so. The results indicate that Arrow-Debreu
market can be successful at aggregating information over separated markets. And it does not depend on the relative number of intermediaries (red
traders). We also find that red traders are more likely to hold correct beliefs, though this does not translate into higher profits. Taken together, we show
that Arrow-Debreu markets can even aggregate infor- mation well when information about the true state of the world is disperse over separated
markets. More importantly, we show that even when financial market intermediaries have no immediate incentives to reveal information, they may fa-
cilitate the transfer of information across different markets.
Author(s): Lawrence Choo; Todd R. Kaplan
Topic: Games: Information, Markets: Other
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Regulation of insider trading and short selling. Evaluating the joint effects of two market interventions.
Thomas Stoeckl
 Management Center Innsbruck, Department Business & Management
ABSTRACT:
Modern capital markets are subject to many interventions and regulations, some of which prevent traders from realizing their (full) trading intentions.
While we have a certain understanding about these regulations' individual effects, the picture is less clear about their joint effects. This paper considers
the interaction of two regulations, namely rules limiting short selling and rules limiting insider trading. We find that (i) traders submit larger limit
orders and trade more assets when short positions are possible. Furthermore, (ii) informed traders reduce their market activity when short-selling is
banned and---to a lesser extent---when their trading is sanctioned. (iii) Regarding market quality measures, we observe that mispricing and spreads are
lowest in markets with short selling and informed trading. Finally, (iv) informed traders' profits before punishment and redistribution are greatest in
markets where neither short selling nor informed trading are permissible. After accounting for punishment and redistribution, informed traders' profits
are significantly greater when informed trading is allowed than when it is banned.
Author(s): Merl, R., Stoeckl, T. & Palan, S.
Topic: Markets: Finance, Markets: Market design and Matching
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The decrease in confidence with forecast extremity: A survey of results and implications
Doron Sonsino
 Sarnat school of Business Administration, Center for Academic Studies, Or Yehuda and and Ben-Gurion University, Economics Department
ABSTRACT:
The risk-return tradeoff is one of the fundamental principles of finance, but surveys illustrate that even professional investors misperceive the risk-
return relation at the cross-section. Evidence regarding the perception of risk conditional on the expected return is rare. The current survey returns to
the results of five preceding forecasting experiments, showing that forecast-confidence deteriorates with the extremity of the forecast. The negative
(forecast-extremity) and (forecast-confidence) correlation shows across diverse samples and at the individual level. It reflects in longer 90% confidence
intervals for the target return, higher estimates of the perceived volatility of the return, and weaker belief in the accuracy of median forecasts. We
illustrate that the correlation shows for positive and negative forecasts, and relate the result to the familiar inclination of forecasters to contrarily hedge
their point predictions. Numeric simulations show that if the decrease in confidence with the expected return is steep enough, then more optimistic
Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) investors may exhibit smaller willingness to invest in the risky asset. Such rapid decrease in confidence is rare in
the experiments, but permutation tests prove that if the correlation between expected returns and perceived volatility is dissolved, the responsiveness of
CPT investors to the expected return would significantly increase. The results are discussed in light of anomalies documented in the behavioral finance
literature.
Author(s): Doron Sonsino
Topic: Decision Theory: Risk, Markets: Finance
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This paper systematically investigates what the role of different end times is on bubble formation and learning in a call market experiment. We
implement a repeated asset market with a high cash-to-asset ratio where each market is repeated 3 times with the same 6 subjects per market. We vary
the trading horizon between short (about 15 periods) and long (about 30 periods) horizons, as well as the end time between definite and indefinite
ending. Our results show that bubbles do not disappear in any of our treatments. No matter whether we implement long or short horizons, and whether
subjects exactly know when a market round ends, bubbles arise in later repetitions of the same market. We find that the mean prices are (weakly)
significantly lower in the long treatments than in the short treatments, but these mean prices are still more than twice as high as the fundamental value.
Author(s): Anita Kopanyi-Peuker, Matthias Weber
Topic: Markets: Finance, Unknown: Unknown
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Mental Capabilities, Heterogeneous Trading Patterns and Performance in an Experimental Asset Market
Steve Heinke
 University of Basel
ABSTRACT:
We develop and test a framework of mental information representation in an asset market setting. The model predicts heterogeneous trading behavior
as a consequence of two distinct mental capabilities: analytical skills and mentalizing, where the former involves quantitative, objective aspects of a
decision problem, and the latter an accurate assessment of others' behavior and intentions. Individual differences in capabilities induce specific,
differential trading patterns and performances, despite the availability of identical information. The most successful traders are strong in both
capabilities, while the general relation between success and mental capabilities is non-monotone. The experimental data strongly supports the
theoretical conjectures.
Author(s): Andreas Hefti, Steve Heinke, Frederic Scheinder,
Topic: Markets: Finance, Decision Theory: Learning
Link: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2832767
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Insider trading legislation and trader migration
Dominik Schmidt
 Management Center Innsbruck
ABSTRACT:
One argument frequently advanced in support of insider trading regulation is the claim that regulation promotes public confidence in the stock market
and preserves its integrity. There exists, however, contradicting evidence on traders' preference for markets with and without regulation. In this study,
we implement an experimental framework where two markets with varying combinations of regulatory regimes operate simultaneously to study
traders' preferences and migration behavior between the markets. We find that uninformed traders' participation is higher in markets without regulation,
when they can choose between markets with different regulatory regimes. Moreover, informed traders are more active in limit order submission in
unregulated markets, while uninformed traders do not condition their submissions on the regulatory regime. Both trader groups execute more
transactions in unregulated markets.
Author(s): Robert Merl, Stefan Palan, Thomas Stoeckl
Topic: Markets: Finance, Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices
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Market Shocks and Professionals' Investment Behavior - Evidence from the COVID-19 Crash
Christoph Huber
 University of Innsbruck
ABSTRACT:
We investigate how the experience of extreme events, such as the COVID-19 market crash, influence risk-taking behavior. To isolate changes in risk
taking from other factors, we ran controlled experiments with finance professionals in December 2019 and March 2020. We observe that their
investments in the experiment were 12 percent lower in March 2020 than in December 2019, although their price expectations had not changed, and
although they considered the experimental asset less risky during the crash than before. This lower perceived risk is likely due to adaptive
normalization as the volatility during the shock is compared to volatility experienced in real markets (which was low in December 2019, but very high
in March 2020). Lower investments during the crash can be supported by higher risk aversion, not by changes in beliefs.
Author(s): Christoph Huber, Juergen Huber, Michael Kirchler
Topic: Markets: Finance, Decision Theory: Risk
Link: osf.io/fgxpb/
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Analyzing concentration patterns in experimental asset markets.
Thomas Stoeckl
 Management Center Innsbruck, Department Business & Management
ABSTRACT:
In this paper, we discuss, contrast, and apply two approaches of quantifying concentration patterns among traders in experimental asset markets. The
calculation procedure considers the specific characteristics of asset market data and ensures that measures are comparable across studies with different
parameter settings. To illustrate the application and interpretation of the measures, we analyze asset holding concentration from five studies
investigating bubble formation in a multi-period setting. The results indicate that the concentration in asset holdings among investors increases
uniformly over time in all studies. The increase is particularly pronounced at the beginning and the last third of periods of the experiment. Moreover,
higher C/A-ratios imply higher level of concentration. In contrast, the relationship between concentration patterns and bubble measures is less clear.
Author(s): Stoeckl, T., Palan, N. & Palan, S.
Topic: Markets: Finance, Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices
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Having a say on insider trading regulation. An experiment studying traders' choice of regulation
Dominik Schmidt
 Management Center Innsbruck
ABSTRACT:
Today, most developed capital markets have regulations restricting insider trading in place. In the adoption process of insider trading legislation, many
stakeholders contribute their interests and often it is not clear whether these interests are in line with the interests of the people actually acting on
financial markets. This assertion is supported by accumulating evidence raising doubts as to the effectiveness of insider trading regulation, questioning
the dominance of the currently prevailing practice. In this paper, we study traders' choice of regulation in an experimental market setting, conditional
on traders' prospects of becoming an informed trader. We find that in markets where uninformed traders have no chance of receiving inside
information, elections turned out 15 times (47\%) against and 17 times (53\%) in favor of regulation. This result contrasts with the results of markets
where all traders have a chance of receiving inside information. In these markets, 26 (81\%) elections turned out against and six (19\%) elections in
favor of regulation.
Author(s): Stefan Palan, Thomas Stoeckl
Topic: Markets: Finance, Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices
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A wind tunnel test of wind farm auctions
Sander Onderstal
 University of Amsterdam
ABSTRACT:
Offshore renewable energy is rapidly becoming a dominant source of global energy supply. A government designing a wind farm auction faces both an
adverse selection problem and a moral hazard problem. We study the effectiveness of two instruments that the government may use to mitigate both
problems: a price guarantee and a price subsidy. The price guarantee mitigates the permit's risk which may attenuate the adverse selection problem in
that an efficient but risk averse bidder is less likely to lose against an inefficient but risk seeking competitor. The price subsidy attenuates the moral
hazard problem as the winning electricity producer faces stronger incentives to build the wind farm and operate and maintain it properly over its
expected lifetime. Governments are increasingly relying on auctions to grant offshore wind permits, yet auctions are not yet widespread. This makes it
timely to study the effects of auction-specific characteristics, including those that have not been used in practice yet. Therefore we study them using a
laboratory experiment. We will do so in a setting characterized by both a private and a common value element. The bidders vary in terms of marginal
effort costs about which they are incompletely informed. In the experiment, we will exploit a 2x2 experimental design. The experimental treatment
conditions are (1) whether or not the government offers a price guarantee, and (2) whether or not the government subsidizes the electricity produced.
We observe that the average government payoff is greater with price guarantee than without and that it is only greater with subsidy than without in the
case of a price guarantee. We conclude that the auction + price guarantee + subsidy is easy to implement and may revolutionize the way in which
windfarm locations are allocated.
Author(s): Marco Haan, Xinyu Li, Sander Onderstal, Jasper Veldman
Topic: Markets: Auctions, Games: Information
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Winner's and Loser's Curse in Single-Unit and Multi-Unit Auctions
Dirk Engelmann
 Humboldt University Berlin
ABSTRACT:
We show theoretically that naive bidding, ignoring the implications of winning the auction, leads not only to a winner's curse in a single-unit second-
price auction, but also to a corresponding loser's curse in a multi-unit auction where n-1 units are sold to n bidders at a uniform price equal to the
lowest bid if the distribution of valuations is symmetric. We experimentally study an application to a wallet auction. Average bidding behavior in the
single-unit auction is remarkably close to naive bidding, but average bidding in the multi-unit auction is even more timid than naive bidding would
suggest.
Author(s): Dirk Engelmann, Ben Greiner
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Cognitive Abilities and Spillovers between Auction Formats
Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel
 Technische University Berlin
ABSTRACT:
We study experimentally the relationship between cognitive skills and bidding behavior in first- (FPA) and second-price (SPA) sealed-bid private value
auctions. We employ a within-subject design such that a participant experiences either the format order FPA-SPA or the reverse order. This allows us to
study spillover effects across different formats in the context of auctions. We find a strong order effect in terms of bids and profits. The order effect
indicates spillovers between auction formats that cannot be captured by a simple notion of learning. In particular, subjects with low cognitive abilities
improve the quality of their bids in SPAs after experiencing FPAs, while medium-ability subjects' bid shading in the FPA deteriorates after
experiencing SPAs first. Low-ability subjects might not really understand optimal bidding in SPAs better after FPAs, but their adaptive heuristic seems
to be more suitable for a change in format than the one by medium-ability subjects.
Author(s): Thomas Giebe, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Martin Kocher
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Bargaining under the threat of a nuclear option
Franziska Heinicke
 University of Mannheim
ABSTRACT:
This paper addresses bargaining with a nuclear option. There are important real-world settings in which such an option is present and can be used to
cause considerable harm. Being in+K39 control of a nuclear option is commonly seen as the ultimate threat and therefore as being effective in putting
maximal pressure on the other party. However, going nuclear is often very costly to the nuclear-option holder herself and thus might not always be
credible. We study the effect of a nuclear option in an unstructured one-shot bargaining experiment to test whether a nuclear option can indeed improve
the bargaining position of the party holding the threat. We find that the command over a nuclear option increases the number of successful negotiations
-- but only for pareto-non-improving situations. The nuclear option does not benefit the nuclear-option holder in most cases but substantially reduces
the other party's payoff. The situation is particularly dire for the other party if she would have had more bargaining power but now is not able to utilize
it due to the threat of the nuclear option.
Author(s): Franziska Heinicke, Wladislaw Mill, Henrik Orzen
Topic: Games: Bargaining, Public Choice: Other
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Bargaining With Moral Agents
Jose Ignacio Rivero
 THEMA - CY Cergy-Paris University
ABSTRACT:
Overwhe+K39lmingly, the literature studying bargaining processes assumes that individuals engage in them with the sole purpose of maximising their
material well-being. Notwithstanding, recent theoretical developments (see Alger and Weibull (2013)) supported by a growing body of experimental
evidence (Capraro and Rand (2018), Miettinen et al. (2020), Alger and van Leeuwen (2021)) have put forth the notion that human beings also take
moral considerations into account when making decisions. In this paper I explore the consequences of introducing moral concerns of a Kantian flavour
in a simple one-shot bargaining game where a seller negotiates with a potential buyer. I allow for both complete and incomplete information. In this
latter version, the buyer is not informed of the quality of the product being bargained over, while the seller is. The game does not a priori rule out
coordination failures that may prevent socially desirable trade from taking place. In fact, when agents only care about their own material payoff (that is,
they are homo oeconomicus) the game features equilibria where no trade takes place. In the model with complete information, I find that allowing for
partial moral concerns dramatically modifies the game's outcome: when trade creates a positive surplus, coordination failures do not occur. The extent
to which the agents are morally concerned does not influence this, as long as they are not fully homo oeconomicus or fully moral. I also analyse a
version of the model with altruistic individuals (in the sense that they care about their counterpart's payoff and not about whether their decision is right
or wrong, as moral players do). I find that as the degree of altruism increases, the set of inefficient equilibria ``smoothly'' shrinks, while that of efficient
equilibria is enlarged. For a sufficiently high degree of altruism, only efficient equilibria remain. These results carry through to the incomplete
information version of the model where the expected value of the good is larger than its cost when quality is high. In contrast, when this is not case
(essentially capturing a “lemons” type situation) morality only increases the probability of full trade in mixed strategy equilibria. Finally, I allow for
the trade of low quality items to produce a negative social surplus. In this context, morality does not do away with all socially undesirable trade.
However, it does eliminate the most inefficient equilibria.
Author(s): Jose Ignacio Rivero
Topic: Social Behavior: Norms and Morals, Markets: Industrial Organization
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Social preferences through choices between menus of allocations: An experiment
Benoit Tarroux
 University Lyon 2 and GATE
ABSTRACT:
This paper aims to elicit social preferences through choice between menus of social allocations. We report the results of an experiment which consists
of the following two-stage choice problem. In a first stage, a decision-maker (DM) has to choose between menus of allocations between herself and a
recipient. This choice is private, i.e., the recipient does not observe the choice made by the DM and she does not know that the DM has to make such a
choice. In the second stage the DM has to choose an allocation in the menu she has selected in the first stage. We consider two treatments: in treatment
T1, the recipient observes the choice made by the DM and all the available allocations in the menu; in treatment T2, the only information given to the
recipient is her own payoff but she has no information about the available allocations and the final payoff of the DM. The choice of a menu allows us
to identify the importance that the DM places on social image and self-image (See Dillenberger and Sadowski (2012), Evren and Minardi (2015) and
Saito (2015) for theoretical investigation). To see this, consider a DM who prefers the allocation (16,4) (16 for herself and 4 for the recipient) to (12,8).
Suppose now that, in the first stage, she has the choice between the following menus: {(16,4);( 12,8)} and {(16,4)}. If she prefers {(16,4)}, then it
means that she is reluctant to choose (16,4) to (12,8) in the second stage. She reveals she cares about social image and/or self-image (in T1) and about
self-image (in T2), i.e., she reveals she is ashamed and/or guilty of being selfish. We can similarly identify the role of social-image and self-image for
an altruistic DM. Our experiment works as follows. In the first stage, subjects in position of DM face a series of choice between menus of social
allocations between themselves and a passive recipient (40 binary comparisons of menus). In the second stage, one of their choice is randomly picked
and they have to choose an allocation in the pre-selected menu. We run the two treatments T1 and T2 as defined above. The preliminary results from a
lab experiment (which was run in Lyon with 166 subjects in position of decision-maker) indicate that a significant part of our subjects care about their
social image. More precisely, on average, almost half of them seem to be ashamed of being selfish in T1. That is, they exhibit a preference for a selfish
allocation (s) to a more equal one (e) and a preference for {s} to {s,e} (and a preference for {s,e} to {e}). We find that 37% of subjects on average has
such a preference pattern in T2 and the proportion of subjects preferring larger set is larger than in T1. This indicates that self-image seems to matter.
Author(s): Fabrice Le Lec and Benoit Tarroux
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Willful Ignorance and Reference-Dependence of Self-Image Concerns
Vasilisa Petrishcheva
 Duesseldorf Insitute for Competition Economics
ABSTRACT:
Based on theoretical predictions, I conduct a laboratory experiment to explore whether (a) self-image concerns are reference-dependent and (b) loss
aversion applies to self-image concerns. I let subjects work on an IQ test, a self-image relevant task, and induce an exogenous shift in complexity
designed to put them at either gain or loss in self-image. Then, I elicit their willingness to acquire feedback. Taking into consideration potentially
asymmetric belief updating, I analyze whether subjects who experience loss in self-image are more likely to acquire feedback compared to those with a
loss in this domain.
Author(s): Vasilisa Petrishcheva
Topic: Decision Theory: Beliefs, Games: Information
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The rise and fall of context effects
Paolo Crosetto
 INRA - GAEL
ABSTRACT:
In this paper we provide choice-process experimental evidence that the attraction, compromise and similarity effects are a short-term phenomenon, that
disappears when individuals are given time and incentives to revise their choices. These effects are the most prominent example of context effects, and
they appears when manipulating the options in a choice set. While widely replicated, the effects are usually tested in hypothetical or payoff-irrelevant
situations and without following the choice process. We run a laboratory experiment where we incentivize choice, vary the difference in utility between
options and track which option participants consider best over time. We find that the effects are a transitory phenomenon that emerge only in the early
stages of the choice process to later disappear. Participants are fast then slow: they first choose the focal, dominant options and then progressively
revise their choices until choice shares come to correspond to price differences only. We expand our analysis by considering differences in utility
among options and differences in the presentation of options (numerical or graphical). We also consider differences in the choice processes followed by
individuals (intuitive vs. deliberative). This allows us to ascribe more precisely the role of fast and slow cognitive process in the emergence and
disappearance of context effects.
Author(s): Paolo Crosetto, Alexia Gaudeul
Topic: Decision Theory: Preferences, Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices
Link: ideas.repec.org/p/gbl/wpaper/2019-06.html
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We investigate a novel channel for default bias: information avoidance. In an online experiment with 2,300 participants, we vary the degree of
information provided, and the presence of a default when choosing between two compiled donation options worth $100. Both options consist of several
charities each, but charities as well as the corresponding donation differ. We construct the options such that one option is better aligned with
participants' preferences. We alter the availability of information about the options, i.e., the charities that are part of an option and the corresponding
donation. Information can either be revealed in a stepwise manner, or it is completely available up-front. We find that a pre-selected default induces
subjects to reveal less information. Even when all information is provided up-front, we observe default bias, and choices are worse aligned with
individuals' preferences. Subjects with a self-selected default status make subpar decisions, as they are reluctant to revise their choices even if they
reveal information. Information avoidance is also applied strategically: subjects with a randomly determined, seemingly favorable default reveal
substantially less information when they stick to the pre-selected option.
Author(s): Katharina Momsen, Sebastian O. Schneider
Topic: Applied Economics: Charitable Giving, Social Behavior: Other
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Non-numerical and social anchoring in a ratings
Yigit Oezcelik
 University of Liverpool
ABSTRACT:
Ratings have become an important part of our everyday lives. When making a purchase, deciding where to eat or even which doctor to visit, many of
us consult ratings. However, how accurate and trustworthy are consumer-provided ratings? Decades of research in behavioural economics has shown
that human decision-making is imperfect and prone to errors and biases. The anchoring effect is among the most commonly studied behavioural biases.
This paper investigates whether ratings are prone to the anchoring bias. If ratings are affected by the bias, this might hamper their informativeness with
detrimental consequences for buyers and sellers. In this paper, we present an (online) experiment in which we investigate the anchoring bias in a rating
environment. Hereby, we diverge from the literature by focusing on visual (non-numerical) anchors and also consider a social anchoring since ratings
are provided in social settings. Early analysis of results indicates anchoring effects. As expected, ratings are highest under a high anchor, followed by
the social anchor and lowest in the low anchor treatment. Surprisingly, in all treatments the ratings are higher than the rational rating.
Author(s): Yigit Oezcelik, Michel Tolksdorf
Topic: Decision Theory: Bounded Rationality, Games: Information
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The pigeonholing effect - On subscription traps and context-dependent preference reversals
Frieder Neunhoeffer
 University of Amsterdam, Ca' Foscari University Venice
ABSTRACT:
This paper explores a novel menu effect in the context of subscriptions that violates the transitivity principle of rational choice theory. Providers
typically capitalize on arranging offers such that a longer but costlier option is chosen over the cheaper but shorter alternative. We find that sizing the
shorter subscription down to single-use raises its attraction. This suspects that the presence of a single-use option prompts rational evaluation based on
a realistic estimate to use the subscription again. Instead, when both alternatives represent time spans, an irrational mind may discern them along the
same category - referred to as pigeonholing - with the consequence that other comparative criteria come to the fore. Two-dimensional models, present
in most behavioral theories, fail to explain this type of preference reversal. Inspired by the intuition of transaction utility and the availability heuristic,
we propose a generalization of salience theory to capture the effect of pigeonholing.
Author(s): Frieder Neunhoeffer
Topic: Decision Theory: Bounded Rationality, Decision Theory: Preferences
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Escalating commitment to a failing course of action - A re-examination
Henrik Orzen
 University of Mannheim
ABSTRACT:
We report the results from an experiment inspired by a seminal study (Staw, 1976) that introduced the notion of “escalation of commitment”, a variant
of the sunk cost fal-lacy. This topic has received much attention outside of economics, and we investigate whether the escalation phenomenon can be
reproduced using standard protocols es-tablished in experimental economics. The focus is on how decision makers respond to a signal about a previous
investment depending on (i) whether or not they were respon-sible for that investment, (ii) whether the signal is positive or negative, and (iii) whether
or not the signal is associated with a loss or gain. We characterize theoretical conditions under which escalation—increased follow-up investments after
receiving a negative signal—may occur. Our data indicates that subjects react differently to nega-tive feedback when this feedback is linked to a
financial loss and when they have been responsible for the initial investment. We also observe gender effects.
Author(s): Nikolai Martens and Henrik Orzen
Topic: Decision Theory: Bounded Rationality, Decision Theory: Risk
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Context Effects in Strategic Environments
Amnon Maltz
 University of Haifa
ABSTRACT:
Context effects have been studied extensively in consumer choice but little is known about their impact in strategic environments. This paper provides
new evidence that adding "irrelevant strategies," such as a dominated action or one that is completely identical to an existing strategy, has significant
impact on players' actions and the game's outcome. We argue that these findings are important for many real-life strategic interactions. The article
experimentally examines three context effects in a simple setting of two-player simultaneous-move games: the attraction effect, the compromise effect
and what we dub as the duplicates effect (the effect of adding a dominated strategy, an extreme strategy and an identical strategy, respectively). We ask
whether players whose strategy set is extended alter their preferences over the unchanged strategies and do the opponents anticipate this behavioral
bias. Within the realm of coordination games, we find positive answers in the case of the attraction and duplicates effects. More generally, we suggest
that an (irrelevant) added strategy may serve as a coordination device. The compromise effect is not found although it does seem to be anticipated. In
games in which one player has a dominated strategy, the effects generally disappear.
Author(s): Ayala Arad and Benjamin Bachi and Ayala Arad
Topic: Games: Other, Games: Coordination
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Does Losing Lead to Winning? An Empirical Analysis for Four Different Sports
Bouke Klein Teeselink
 Yale School of Management
ABSTRACT:
Berger and Pope (2011) show that being slightly behind increases the likelihood of winning in professional and collegiate basketball. We extend their
analysis to large samples of Australian football, American football and rugby matches, but find little to no evidence of such an effect for these three
sports. When we revisit the phenomenon for basketball, we do find supportive evidence for National Basketball Association (NBA) matches from the
period analyzed in Berger and Pope. However, we find no significant effect for NBA matches from outside this sample period, for collegiate matches,
and for matches from the Women's NBA. High-powered meta-analyses across the different sports and competitions do not reject the null hypothesis of
no effect of being slightly behind on winning.
Author(s): Bouke Klein Teeselink, Martijn J. van den Assem and Dennie van Dolder
Topic: Applied Economics: Other, Games: Contests
Link: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3669174
Back to session: Biases 3
Can Agents Add and Subtract When Forming Beliefs? Evidence from the Lab and Field
Jan Mueller-Dethard
 University of Mannheim
ABSTRACT:
One major paradox in economics is the co-existence of over- and underinference to new information. In this paper, we propose that both phenomena
can be jointly explained by a common paradigm: the violation of a counting heuristic. To test this, we draw on evidence from both the lab and the field.
First, we conduct three preregistered bookbag-and-poker-chip experiments with 1800 participants. In a setting in which subjects repeatedly observe
binary signals to learn about an underlying state of the world, we exogenously manipulate the number of same-directed signals that gets interrupted by
a single opposite-directed signal. This design allows us to identify when people over- versus underinfer and to employ precise tests on underlying
mechanisms. Our experimental findings show that agents underinfer after a sequence of same-directed evidence. Whenever such a sequence is
interrupted by a contrary signal, individuals strongly overinfer and update their expectations about four times more than Bayes presumes. These effects
are independent of the signals' diagnosticity and do not rely on extreme priors. Next, we apply our experimental insights to financial markets. Using a
long time-series of daily U.S. stock returns, we investigate return reactions after earnings surprises. Consistent with our experimental data, we show
that market reactions after opposite-directed earnings surprises are significantly more extreme than after same-directed ones. These differences are not
corrected immediately and persist for up to three months until prices converge. As mechanism, we identify that agents selectively allocate their
cognitive resources. They overinfer when the new information is inconsistent with their prior since it indicates that their beliefs deviate from reality,
while they underinfer when the information is consistent since it indicates that their beliefs are “good enough”. Overall, our results provide novel
insights to the co-existence of both over- and underinference as well as why this is the case.
Author(s): Pascal Kieren, Martin Weber
Topic: Decision Theory: Beliefs, Markets: Finance
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Borrowing and saving decisions are among the most important and economically significant choices people face in their lifetime. An unwillingness to
save may have severe implications such as insufficient retirement savings. In the same way, borrowing too much or too little can have negative
economic consequences. Debt aversion, defined as unwillingness to take on debt even if economically beneficial, has received increased attention by
researchers lately, for its adverse effects on financial decision-making such as failure to invest in tertiary education (Field, 2009; Caetano et al., 2019)
and energy-efficient technologies (Schleich et al., 2021) or credit self-rationing of entrepreneurs (Nguyen et al., 2020). In this paper, we propose a
formal model of debt aversion, and use a novel experiment to elicit and to jointly estimate debt aversion with preferences over time, risk and losses. In
the experiment participants can accept or reject different debt and saving contracts, defined over real monetary payments. Using participants' choices,
we can identify whether they systematically prefer saving contracts over debt contracts, controlling for time preferences, present bias, risk aversion and
loss aversion. To this end, we employ maximum likelihood estimations to structurally estimate the preference parameters of our model of debt
aversion. We find that participants are on average debt averse, thus establishing debt aversion as dimension of individual preferences in its own right,
that is distinct from other relevant preferences, for instance loss aversion. On the population level, we estimate around 86 percent of individuals to
exhibit debt aversion. Further, testing the relation of debt aversion and individual characteristics, we find that debt aversion is negatively associated
with cognitive ability, and positively associated with participants' savings. Moreover, we demonstrate robustness of debt aversion to a wide array of
alternative modeling specifications and influencing factors.
Author(s): Thomas Meissner, David Albrecht
Topic: Decision Theory: Preferences, Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices
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This paper reports a cheap talk deception experiment in which the underlying game is random, either of common or conflicting interest. A first
hypothesis is that when the uncertainty about the underlying game is more vague (specifically, when the message receiver does not know the
probabilities of the game types), then the message will be more focal. While this hypothesis receives little empirical support, the realization of the
game type itself has a strong effect on the Sender's strategy and beliefs. Common-interest realizations generate not just more truthful messages, but
also greater expectation that the messages will be followed. This is puzzling, as it implies that the Sender expects Receiver behavior to depend on
information the Receiver clearly does not know. More puzzling still, this effect is persistent: when the Sender plays the game again as a Receiver
without receiving feedback, her beliefs about and reaction to the message received are strongly influenced by the (transparently irrelevant) realization
of the previous interaction. The results suggest that the strategic requirements for a strategy to be focal may sometimes be quite weak. It also has
implications in line with a literature on spillovers and behavioral contamination across repeated interactions.
Author(s): Eli Spiegelman
Topic: Social Behavior: Communication, Decision Theory: Bounded Rationality
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Optimal (un-)coordination under uncertainty: testing information design in the laboratory
Andreas Ziegler
 University of Amsterdam
ABSTRACT:
When persuading multiple interacting receivers, senders can adapt their communication strategies to the strategic environment of the receivers. I test
whether the optimal communication strategy involves public (private) signals when the strategic environment of the receivers features strategic
complements (substitutes). This prediction arises in information design (Bergemann & Morris, 2019), and can guide i.e. governmental information
release. In a laboratory experiment, I test comparative static predictions on (i) how the optimal structure depends on the receivers' strategic
environment and (ii) whether obedience, which captures receivers' incentives to trust signals, is predictive of receivers' following behavior. 78% of
recommendations are followed by receivers and receivers trust signals more strongly when incentives to follow increase, consistent with theoretical
predictions. Contrary to theoretical predictions, I find that public communication strategies perform at least as well as private strategies, independent of
the strategic environment of the receivers. As theoretically predicted, public information structures that employ common signals across all receivers
perform well with strategic complements. However, public structures do not perform worse than private structures also with strategic substitutes, as
receivers are more likely to follow signals from public rather than private structures.
Author(s): Andreas Ziegler
Topic: Games: Information, Social Behavior: Communication
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Habitual communication
Konstantinos Ioannidis
 University of Amsterdam
ABSTRACT:
Communication is typically modeled as a strategic game of asymmetric information. A key finding is that when preferences diverge, communication
becomes less informative. I present evidence that habit formation affects the informativeness of communication. In a 2 by 2 between-subjects treatment
design, subjects play overall 60 rounds of a cheap talk sender-receiver game with either (fully) conflicting, partially aligned or (fully) common
interests. The 60 rounds are divided in two parts of 30 rounds each. Treatments vary in (i) whether sender and receiver start with having conflicting or
common interests in all 30 rounds of part one and (ii) whether they subsequently move on to having partially aligned interests throughout all the
remaining 30 rounds or only occasionally so (randomly in 10/30 rounds). Communication under partially aligned interests is more informative for
subjects who started with common interests in part one, but only if they face the new environment randomly. This effect persists over time. With
partially aligned interests, overcommunication is only observed for subjects who started with the common interest environment.
Author(s): Konstantinos Ioannidis
Topic: Games: Information, Social Behavior: Communication
Link: www.konstantinosioannidis.com/
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Consumer willingness to pay a price premium for bio-based products: Do certifications matter?
Rocco Caferra
 University of Bari
ABSTRACT:
The present work, based on an artefactual field experiment conducted in Italy, demonstrates the existence of a “green premium,” referring to increased
consumer willingness to pay (WTP) for bio-based over conventional products, and a “certified green premium,” referring to an additional increase in
consumer WTP for certified bio-based products over and above other bio-based products. Moreover, it shows that, across different product typologies
(i.e. hand soap, food bags, colored pens), demand for conventional products is generally more elastic than demand for bio-based and certified bio-based
products. Accordingly, the results suggest that the introduction of an instrument mix combining an eco-label based on a certification of sustainability
with a tax on conventional products and a subsidy on certified sustainable goods may support the market uptake of certified sustainable bio-based
goods. In this way, regulatory and policy tools might increase the application of circular bioeconomy strategies. Keywords: artefactual field
experiment; bio-based products; circular bioeconomy; sustainability certification; willingness to pay. JEL: C93; P23; Q58
Author(s): Piergiuseppe Morone; Rocco Caferra; Idiano D'Adamo; Pasquale Marcello Falcone; Enrica Imbert; Andrea Morone
Topic: Applied Economics: Other, Applied Economics: Other
Back to session: Consumer Behavior
Cheaper or eco-friendly products: what do consumers prefer? An experiment in the transport sector
Mario Intini
 University of Bari Aldo Moro, Italy
ABSTRACT:
The importance of preserving the environment by limiting CO2 emissions is a crucial issue today. One sector that contributes greatly to the increase in
CO2 emissions is transport. In this paper, we assess the importance that consumers attach to the environment when they buy a car. Cars are
characterized by a long lifespan and associated production and operating costs, specific per type of car. It is well known that consumers pay particular
attention to their choice about these aspects. Using a laboratory experiment, we want to find out whether consumers prefer eco-friendly products more
than cheaper and non-eco-friendly ones. Furthermore, we analyze whether the results are different if we consider individual versus social choices. We
find that the electric car is preferable to the petrol car, especially when the charging position is well located and there is the possibility for rapid
recharging. Conversely, consumers do not seem to be sensible to the degree of eco-friendliness: they do not choose the more ecological of two electric
cars with different environmental impacts. Concerning the experimental methodology applied, we find a different behavior between “paid” and
“unpaid” groups and between social and individual choices. Finally, we note that if there is a form of public economic incentive, consumer choices are
more eco-friendly.
Author(s): Sabrina Armenio, Angela S. Bergantino, Mario Intini, Andrea Morone
Topic: Decision Theory: Preferences, Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices
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Default vs. Active Choices: An Experiment on Electricity Tariff Switching
Ayse Tugba Atasoy
 RWTH Aachen University
ABSTRACT:
In distinct decision environments, consumers fail to financially optimize their decisions. In liberalized electricity markets, consumers frequently do not
optimize their electricity choices and stick with the default providers instead, despite the ability to choose among an increasingly large set of electricity
suppliers and benefit from lower cost options. In this paper, we study the effect of different contextual features of the choice environment (i.e., default
and active choice enforcement) and search costs (i.e., high and low) on the quality of electricity contract choices, with the help of a randomized
controlled laboratory experiment. We provide evidence that the default contract rule lowers the decision quality compared to the active decision rule in
both search cost environments. Default rules lower the quality of contract choices especially for the individuals with lower cognitive ability. Contrary
to the expectations, we observe that the number of alternatives has no effect on the quality of electricity choices. Our findings have important
implications for regulatory rule setting in the electricity market.
Author(s): Ayse Tugba Atasoy, Reinhard Madlener
Topic: Markets: Industrial Organization, Applied Economics: Other
Link: www.fcn.eonerc.rwth-aachen.de/global/show_document.asp?id=aaaaaaaaaqotejo
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We study to what extent consumers forego personal gains to avoid or reduce the harm their choices impose on others. In the absence of regulation, such
voluntary compensation provides a way for consumers to internalize negative externalities on their own. However, the tangibility of consumption
externalities is often reduced by diffusion of both the harm created and the re- sponsibility in creating the externality. We conduct a laboratory
experiment to investigate how the presence of diffusion affects voluntary compensation. We find that subjects are generally willing to compensate at
least some of the harm their consumption creates for other subjects. Diffused responsibility for the externality, however, reduces compensation levels
and leads to larger overall net externalities as compared to a baseline condition without diffusion. Diffusion of the harm caused by consumption, on the
other hand, does not change compensation choices and externalities. Overall, while the introduction of voluntary compensation reduces the harm
created by consumption, the net externality still remains high across all treatments.
Author(s): Frauke Stehr, Peter Werner (Maastricht University)
Topic: Social Behavior: Norms and Morals, Social Behavior: Other
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Productivity Shock and Conflict: The Role of Loss Aversion
Biljana Meiske
 Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
ABSTRACT:
This paper studies the consequences of a productivity shock on conflict behavior al-lowing for loss aversion. In the context of the Hirshleifer-
Skaperdas conflict game, I show theoretically that, if agents hold expectation based loss preferences a la Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), both positive
and negative productivity shocks lead to changes in conflict behavior. Particularly, a negative productivity shock is expected to lead to an increase in
conflict investments among loss-averse agents (and to a decrease among gain-seeking ones), and the vice versa applies in case of the positive
productivity shock. Furthermore, in absence of a productivity shock, conflict investments are predicted to increase in loss aversion. An experiment (N=
496) was conducted to test these predictions. Experimental results show that while negative productivity shock (channeled through loss aversion) does
have predicted effects, a positive productivity shock fails to reduce conflict among loss-averse participants (whereas it does lead to an increase in
conflict investments among gain-seeking participants).
Author(s): Biljana Meiske
Topic: Decision Theory: Preferences, Decision Theory: Preferences
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Tournaments are often used to improve performance in innovation contexts in which teams perform non-routine tasks. Tournaments may not only be
effective because they provide monetary incentives but also because they render teams' identity and social image concerns salient. This study provides
causal evidence on the relative importance of these behavioral aspects vis-a-vis monetary prizes in a non-routine task. Using a natural field experiment
with more than 1,700 participants, we exogenously vary salience of team identity, social-image concerns, and whether teams face monetary incentives.
We find that increased salience of team identity alone does not improve team performance. Social image due to a public ranking affects mostly top-
performing teams, whereas additional monetary incentives improve outcomes for all teams across the performance spectrum. Further, the introduction
of tournaments does not reduce teams' willingness to explore original solutions and does not crowd out intrinsic motivation to perform similar tasks in
the future.
Author(s): Florian Englmaier, Stefan Grimm, Dominik Grothe, David Schindler, and Simeon Schudy
Topic: Field Experiments: General, Applied Economics: Labor Market
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Fierce Competitors and Drop-Outs: Contests with Loss-Averse Agents
Ayse Gul Mermer
 University of Amsterdam, CREED
ABSTRACT:
Competition is often presumed to enhance performance, yet empirical evidence points out a puzzling phenomenon. High-ability players are aspired by
competition and expend effort aggressively (workaholics) while low-ability players expend very little or no effort (drop-outs). What is the driving force
behind the observed bimodal behavior? What are the implications for the design of optimal incentive mechanisms? In this paper, I study all-pay
contests in the presence of expectation-based loss-averse players. I show that the predictions of the model align well with the observed behavior: high-
ability players, holding high expectations, overexert effort while low-ability players, holding low expectations, withhold or withdraw effort in
comparison to the standard predictions. Expectation-based loss aversion serves as a key driver of this bifurcated behavior. Moreover, I characterize the
optimal prize structure. I find that the optimal prize structure hinges on the interaction of the following two countervailing forces. An additional prize
motivates drop-outs to exert effort, while it de-motivates workaholics due to decreased value of larger prizes. Which of these two forces dominates,
and thus the optimal allocation of prizes, depends on the interplay between the number of competitors, the ability dispersion of competitors, and the
degree of loss-aversion. In the presence of loss-averse individuals, awarding multiple prizes might become optimal in cases where a single prize is
predicted to be optimal under standard economic assumptions.
Author(s): Ayse Gul Mermer
Topic: Games: Contests, Applied Economics: Labor Market
Link: sites.google.com/site/aysegulmermer/research
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Resilience and Cooperation
Francesca Pancotto
 University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
ABSTRACT:
Natural disasters put an enormous strain on civic capital, which can result in a decrease in trust and cooperation in the affected communities. However,
the existing level of civic capital can buffer the effects of the disaster, determining completely different dynamics even in neighboring regions. In order
to investigate the determinants of long-term resilience to natural disasters, we designed a 2x2 lab in the field experiments con- ducted in Marche and
Emilia-Romagna, two Italian regions that were af- fected by major earthquakes in 2016 and 2012, respectively. We collected data in neighboring and
comparable municipalities that were affected or not by earthquakes and we compared inhabitants' prosocial choices in a Public Good Games and a
Distribution game. Our results show that people affected by the earthquake were more prosocial, but the relation- ship between behaviors, residence
and civic capital is not linear. We also study the determinants of cooperation among all participants and find out that cooperation is determined by
individual preference for fariness of the group of our participants as well as by the norm of civic capital that belong to the cultures of the regions where
we run our experiments. Studying more in depth civic capital, we find that it is not directly affected by the dramatic event and appears to be a long term
feature embedded in the cultures of the underlying communities. On the contrary, preference for fairness is directly affected by the amount of damage -
and not the mere residence in the area of the earthquake - that the individual has suffered, indicating a second level interaction of this preference with
cooperation, while stressing how the request for redistribution is an important factor through which the event can affect the trust of people in the
institutions. Short term redistribution preference could disappear with time and leave space for distrust in institutions, if they were ineffective. Finally,
in ac- cordance with other studies about the North-South institutional divide in Italy, better pre-quake institutions might be more capable of managing
the external shock and the following recovery as more embedded communities are expected to respond more pro-actively
Author(s): Francesca Giardini ; Francesca Pancotto ; Simone Righi
Topic: Social Behavior: Norms and Morals, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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Multigame contact and cooperation
Vincent Laferriere
 University of Lausanne
ABSTRACT:
Multigame contact refers to cases where an individual engages in two or more strategic interactions with the same other individual. By improving a
player's ability to punish, multigame contact is thought to foster cooperation (Bernheim & Winston, 1990). Previous experimental studies find mixed
evidence on the positive effect of multigame contact on cooperation. Using results from a laboratory experiment, we investigate if and how multigame
contact affects cooperation. We compare cooperation rates and subjects' behavior when they play two indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas either
with the same partner, or with two different partners. Our novel experimental design allows us to compare cooperation rates and behaviors varying the
number of partners and the expected length of a repeated game. In agreement with theoretical accounts, we find that multigame contact has systematic
effects on behavior: subjects link the strategies in the two games when they play with the same partner. However, in contrast to the theoretical accounts
we find no systematic effect on average cooperation rates. Multigame contact is a double-edged sword: although it helps subjects reaching
simultaneous cooperation in both games (full cooperation), it also makes cooperation only in one of the two games less likely.
Author(s): Joao Montez, Catherine Roux, Christian Thoeni, and Vincent Laferriere
Topic: Games: Repeated Games, Games: Other
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The ontological roots of human cooperation
Daniela Ruetzler
 University of Innsbruck
ABSTRACT:
Understanding the ontological roots of human cooperation toward strangers is important to understand better the human ability to cooperate and in
social dilemmas and maintain public goods. Using a novel experimental framework, we examine with a large sample of 964 children, aged 3 to 6,
when the ability to cooperate in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game evolves and how it depends on three fundamental pillars of human cooperation,
direct and indirect reciprocity as well as third-party punishment. We find that third-party punishment exhibits a striking positive effect on cooperation
and even gets stronger with age. Yet, direct and indirect reciprocity do not increase cooperation levels. Thus, our results support predictions following
from a gene-culture coevolution approach.
Author(s): Zvonimir Basifa, Angelo Romano, Claudia Zoller, Daniela Glyzle-Ruetzler, Parampreet C. Bindra, Matthias Sutter
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Sustaining Cooperation with Correlated Information
Yongping Bao
 University of Bremen
ABSTRACT:
We investigate cooperation in the indefinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma when players receive correlated public signals of their actions in an
experiment. In one treatment, public signals are perfectly correlated if both players choose the same action, otherwise independent. In another
treatment, public signals are always independent. Theoretically, the implemented correlation structure allows for perfect cooperation based on a simple
grim-trigger strategy which conditions on the public signals. Our experimental results show that a substantial fraction of subjects use this strategy in
the treatment with correlated signals. However, correlated signals do not result in more cooperative actions as behavior is more lenient if signals are
independent.
Author(s): Yongping Bao, Fabian Dvorak, Sebastian Fehrler
Topic: Games: Repeated Games, Games: Information
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Cooperation in infinitely repeated games under the shadow of inequality
Huanren Zhang
 University of Southern Denmark
ABSTRACT:
We use a large experiment to investigate the effect of payoff inequality on cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas with different
continuation probabilities. Our novel experimental design provides empirical benchmarks based on counterfactual behaviors where players face exactly
the same monetary incentives where payoff asymmetry is not a concern. The experimental results show that inequality from mutual cooperation
significantly decreases cooperation, while inequality from mutual defection does not have a significant effect. Inequality from mutual cooperation is
also found to undermines the gains from increased continuation probability.
Author(s): James Bland, Olivier Bochet, Nikos Nikiforakis, Huanren Zhang
Topic: Games: Repeated Games, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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Perceptions of conflict: parochial cooperationand outgroup spite revisited
Ro'i Zultan
 Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
ABSTRACT:
Experimental team games provide valuable data to help understand behavior in intergroup conflict. Past research employing team games suggests that
individual participation in conflict is driven mostly by parochial cooperation, rather than outgroup spite. We argue that motives in conflict depend on
whether conflict is framed and perceived at the group or individual level. In a controlled laboratory experiment, we manipulate perception of the
conflict level by varying the framing of the conflict, keeping the objective strategic aspects of conflict fixed. While parochial cooperation is the main
motivation under an individual frame (replicating prior results), outgroup spite emerges as an important motivation when conflict is perceived at the
group level. Furthermore, under an individual frame intragroup communication and chronic prosociality are related only to parochial cooperation, but
are similarly related to both parochial cooperation and outgroup spite under a group frame. We conclude that perceptions of conflict are crucial for
understanding the motivations that guide individual behavior in intergroup conflict. While experimental team games naturally focus on the strategic
aspects of conflict, it is possible to extend the experimental paradigm to incorporate the perception of conflict. We discuss how these insights shed new
light on past results, and how they may inform future work.
Author(s): Ori Weisel and Ro'i Zultan
Topic: Social Behavior: Group Behavior, Games: Contests
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Information is a powerful tool for influencing behavior. It is of particular interest to individuals who want to manipulate others. While previous
literature on cooperative settings concentrates on exogenous uncertainty, this project examines endogenous information manipulation as a strategic
decision. Specifically, with a laboratory experiment, I investigate endogenously arising uncertainty of information transmission in a well-known
cooperative setting with both freeriding and payback possibilities—the Public Good Game with punishment. The analysis extracts the effect of
information manipulation on welfare, cooperation, and punishment decisions. Additionally, the design allows for a first investigation of information
manipulation behavior in this rich setting.
Author(s): Christie Grimm
Topic: Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource, Social Behavior: Lying and Cheating
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Cooperating when the end is near: the impact of cognitive ability and task complexity
Simona Cicognani
 Utrecht School of Economics
ABSTRACT:
We study the relation between cognitive ability, task complexity and cooperation in finitely repeated social dilemmas. To do this, we implement a
laboratory experiment in which we replicate the design of Embrey et al. (2017, The Quarterly Journal of Economics), by adding two main novelties: i)
a final cognitive reflection test and a personality questionnaire; ii) the comparison between two different stage-games, which differ in complexity. The
experiment has a 2 × 2 factorial between-subject design. The first treatment variable is the stage-game played. In the Prisoner's dilemma -PD condition,
participants face a finitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma, whereas in the Traveler's dilemma -TD condition they face a finitely repeated Traveler's
dilemma. In both conditions, the stage-game is repeated eight times, in thirty supergames. As in Embrey et al. (2017), this long horizon allows us to
study how cooperation unravels with experience. The intuition behind adding the Traveler's dilemma, which is equivalent to playing a Prisoner's
Dilemma when choices are restricted to only two, is to investigate how cooperation evolves in a more complex decisional setting. Our behavioral
hypothesis is that cooperation is less likely to occur in the more difficult stage-game, i.e., in the TD condition. The second treatment variable is
represented by the implementation of incentivized control questions. Namely, participants face two conditions: Incentives or No Incentives. In the
Incentives treatment, at the beginning of the experiment, subjects face a series of six control questions. They know that a correct answer to each control
question is worth 0.50 Euros added up to their final earnings. After answering to all control questions, they are provided feedback on each question,
and in case of wrong answer, the correct answer is indicated, together with a brief explanation taken from the instructions. The amount of money
earned from the incentivized control questions is clearly indicated on the computer screens at the end of the feedback provided. In the No Incentives
scenario, participants do not receive additional money in case of correct answers to the control questions, but are provided with feedback as in the
Incentives case. Differently from Embrey et al. (2017), whose experimental protocol did not incorporate control questions, we want to control for
participants' understanding of experimental instructions of the stage-games. Furthermore, the motive of including an incentivized type of control
questions is to test whether these lead to a higher level of understanding and to different behavioral patterns in the game played over the several
repetitions. The experiment involved 128 participants, divided into 8 sessions. It was conducted at the Bologna Laboratory for Experiments in Social
Sciences (BLESS) and programmed with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were students from the University of Bologna, recruited
through ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Each session started with a first part in which the PD/TD game was played, in the 2 × 2 factorial betweensubject
design previously outlined. The length and number of supergames was indicated in the instructions, so that it was known to every participant.
Moreover, participants were provided information on the complete history of play up to that moment in the game (their choices and their partner's
choices, together with their payoffs). They knew that they were randomly matched into pairs for a supergame. The first part was followed by a second
part with a dictator game and a third part in which we elicited risk preferences through the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task procedure BRET (Crosetto and
Filippin, 2013). Finally, we proceeded with a socio-demographic questionnaire, a cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 2005), and the Hexaco
Personality Inventory (Ashton and Lee, 2009). Our results indicate that cooperation increases with experience, with no evidence of unraveling even in
the last supergames, when subjects have gained substantial experience with the game. In terms of treatment effects, we observe that cooperation is
easier to achieve and sustain in the Prisoner's Dilemma as compared to the cognitively more demanding Travelers' Dilemma. This is robustly valid
across all rounds and supergames. The incentivization of Control Questions seems to produce a positive short-term effect on cooperation, in the early
supergames played. Furthermore, we find that subjects with higher cognitive abilities (captured by the Cognitive Reflection Test), and subjects with a
better understanding of the instructions tend to cooperate more. Generosity and risk attitudes, as measured in the Dictator Game and in the Bomb Risk
Elicitation Task, respectively, do not correlate with cooperation at the individual level. Yet, Emotionality reduces cooperation, whereas Agreeableness
is positively associated to cooperation rates. Finally, we estimate how Cognitive Reflection is linked to four possible strategies implemented: i) Always
Defect, ii) Always Cooperate, iii) Grim Trigger; iv) Threshold Strategies, and how Low vs. High cognitively able subjects learn how to play strategies
over rounds and supergames. Keywords: Finitely repeated social dilemmas; Cognitive abilities; Personality traits. JEL Codes: C72; C73; C92.
Author(s): Maria Bigoni, Simona Cicognani
Topic: Decision Theory: Learning, Games: Repeated Games
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Ostracism, or exclusion by peers, has been practiced since ancient times as a severe form of punishment against transgressors of laws or social norms.
The purpose of this paper is to offer a comprehensive analysis on how ostracism affects behavior and the functioning of a social group. We present data
from a laboratory experiment, in which participants face a social dilemma on how to allocate limited resources between a productive activity and theft,
and are given the opportunity to exclude members of their group by means of majority voting. Our main treatment features an environment with
heterogeneity in productivity within groups, thus creating inequalities in economic opportunities and income. We find that exclusion is an effective
form of punishment and decreases theft by excluded members once they are re-admitted into the group. However, it also leads to some retaliation by
low-productivity members. A particularly worrisome aspect of exclusion is that punished group members are stigmatized and have a higher probability
of facing exclusion again. We discuss implications of our findings for penal systems and their capacity to rehabilitate prisoners.
Author(s): Alexandra Baier , Loukas Balafoutas , and Tarek Jaber-Lopez
Topic: Social Behavior: Group Behavior, Games: Repeated Games
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Social Norm Enforcement, Beliefs, and Victimization: Evidence from Syrian Refugee Camps in Jordan
Andreas Nicklisch
 Hochschule fuer Wirtschaft und Technik
ABSTRACT:
In the period following war and violent conflicts, how do individuals succeed in living together as part of a functioning society again? Social norms
and their enforcement through, for instance, peer punishment can promote cooperation. Yet, punishment may also backfire. We ask whether the
experience of war affects prosocial behavior and peer punishment among refugees incorporating to the analysis the expected cooperation rate of other
participants. We conduct two one-shot experiments, namely a dictator game and an altered version of the prisoners' dilemma with a subsequent peer
retaliation stage, with Syrians living in Jordan. To quantify their level of war exposure, we create a victimization index that accounts for personal war
experiences. We have two main findings. First, victimization does not correlate with prosocial behavior which is determined by participants' social
preferences. Second, victimized participants who cooperate are more likely to punish a cooperator if they have negative cooperation expectations about
the other player as well as victimized participants who defect if they have positive cooperation expectations. These findings show that victimization
from war can negatively affect how peer punishment enforces social norms when beliefs are accounted for.
Author(s): Nora El-Bialy, Elisa Fraile Aranda, Andreas Nicklisch, Lamis Saleh, Stefan Voigt
Topic: Decision Theory: Beliefs, Applied Economics: Economic Development
Back to session: Cooperation 3
Size Matters! Only Big Threats Encourage Cooperation
Bjoern Hartig
 Royal Holloway, University of London
ABSTRACT:
Subjects play a repeated stranger-matching prisoners' dilemma game with opt-in fee for both players framed as escrow account payments. After a
game, all fees can be consensually returned or unilaterally destroyed. With low fees, cooperation breaks down at a similar rate as without fees.
However, cooperation rates remain stable with high fees. The effect is primarily driven by cooperators remaining active and willing to cooperate, not
by defectors dropping out or turning to cooperation. Destruction of the fees is rare and never triggered by defectors, but occurs slightly more with high
fees. Fees have no effect on participation rates.
Author(s): Bjoern Hartig, Zhou Xiaoyu
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Unknown: Unknown
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Expectations and Trust in Government during the COVID-19 Pandemic
Shambhavi Priyam
 Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
ABSTRACT:
This paper studies how expectations about the COVID-19 pandemic vary over time in two countries with differing levels of trust in their federal
governments. Data for this study is collected online from USA and India. It looks at how factors like trust in government, perception about peers, and
experiencing sickness in close circles relate to expectation about returning to pre-COVID-19 state in each country. The results show significant
differences between outcomes of the two countries, and trust in government being predictive of expectations related to health, employment, and
education.
Author(s): Shambhavi Priyam
Topic: Applied Economics: Other, Applied Economics: Labor Market
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What motivates people to volunteer during a pandemic?
Dominik Meier
 University of Basel
ABSTRACT:
The Covid-19 pandemic has led to a wave of solidarity across the globe. Local communities quickly mobilized to provide support for people who
belong to the risk group. We study one example of this behavior, namely volunteering to buy and deliver groceries for people who belong to the risk
group or for people who are in quarantine. We have data from an app in Switzerland that coordinated these deliveries, i.e., the app matched people who
wanted their groceries delivered with people close by who are willing to deliver those groceries on a voluntary basis. The app went in service just as
the first wave hit Switzerland. Over the course of about 9 months, more than 26'000 people registered to deliver groceries. Over the same time period,
almost 68'000 successful deliveries were recorded. We ask what observed characteristics can explain why some people volunteer their time and
potentially risk an infection to support those in need and discuss how the results relate to the larger volunteer motivation literature. We use negative
binomial regression and extended cox models to analyze how observed characteristics (e.g., age, gender, Covid deaths and cases, percentage of elderly
people by location) relate to the number of deliveries made by a person. Looking at the demand side, we find that communities with a higher
percentage of elderly people place more deliveries. On the supply side we find that the percentage change in daily deaths (averaged over 7 days) is
associated with the probability of a person making a (further) delivery. The direction of this association depends on the number of deliveries a person
already made: it is positive for the first few deliveries a person made but eventually turns negative. We also find a positive association between the
probability of a person making a (further) delivery and the absolute number of daily deaths. Again this association depends on the number of deliveries
a person already made, but now in the other direction: the more deliveries a person already made, the stronger this relationship becomes.
Author(s): Dominik Meier
Topic: Applied Economics: Charitable Giving, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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Adoption of digital contact tracing (DCT) apps can provide critical relief for public health authorities in ring-fencing outbreaks of infectious diseases,
especially when infection incidence is high. We conduct a large-scale randomized online experiment (N = 1,115,404) on social media to encourage
adoption of the German DCT app during the COVID-19 pandemic. Our intervention provides locally-targeted feedback and regional comparisons on
county-level incidence rates, in addition to the standard promotion video used by the German government. Providing the information increases view-
rates and click-through rates of the ad by 30% compared to a regular promotion video for the app. Highlighting that one's county is above the state
average increases ad viewing and click-through rates by an additional 15%. Thes effects are largely driven by higher initial attention to the ad, i.e. the
extensive margin. However, we observe an overall negative relationship between the effectiveness of the treatment and local incidence rates, indicating
an adverse pattern of heterogeneity. We test the same interventions in separate study using a representative online survey (N = 6,060) and observe
small but statistically significant treatment effects on favorability towards the contact tracing app.
Author(s): Ximeng Fang, Lorenz Goette, Zihua Chen
Topic: Applied Economics: Other, Field Experiments: General
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Married individuals more likely to comply with protective health measures against COVID-19: evidence from a large
multinational sample
Astrid Hopfensitz
 Toulouse School of Economics
ABSTRACT:
Marriage and parenthood are important life course events that impact our behaviors and our values. Here, we study whether marriage and parenthood
influence compliance with protective health measures against COVID-19. Based on data collected among 46,450 respondents in 67 countries, our
results reveal a non-significant effect of parenthood, but a robust and significant effect of marriage, among both men and women and across a large
range of different cultures. This marriage effect on compliance is higher for men (approximately 5%) than for women (approximately 2%) – although,
on average, women report a 7% higher compliance rate than men. A decomposition of this marital gap on compliance reveals that individual risk
perceptions play a minor role, while pro-social characteristics linked to morality and social belonging explain more than 38% of the marital gap. We
discuss how these findings can be used to improve the effectiveness of international public health campaigns aimed at promoting protective health
measures around the world.
Author(s): Sylvie Borau, Helene Couprie and Astrid Hopfensitz
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences
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Narratives on COVID-19 and Policy Opinions: A Survey Experiment
Luca Corazzini
 University of Venice
ABSTRACT:
Narratives impact people's opinions on relevant policy issues, and their political context may influence these effects. Indeed, some specific contexts
may be more easily swayed by certain stories that provide explanations for current social and economic phenomena. We explore this issue by
considering the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic as a natural experiment that creates the ideal conditions for existing narratives to gain momentum and
spread. In particular, we run a survey experiment in the US by exposing subjects to two media-based popular explanations on the causes of the
COVID-19 pandemic. The Lab narrative attributes the upstart of the pandemic to human error and scientific misconduct in a laboratory in China, while
the Nature narrative describes the genetic and biological causes of the virus. We find evidence that subjects' beliefs on the origins of the disease are
influenced by the narrative they are presented with. Moreover, the Lab narrative leads subjects living in Republican-leaning states to express less
favorable opinions about trade openness and the relevance of climate change relative to those living in Democratic-leaning states. Thus, our findings
provide support for the idea that recalling stories that are part of larger narratives can lead to divergence of opinions on crucial issues leading to an
increase in policy polarization. Finally, we explore the underlying features of social contexts associated with US states' political orientation, that
moderate the impact of narratives on policy opinions.
Author(s): Armenak Antinyan, Thomas Bassetti, Luca Corazzini, Filippo Pavesi
Topic: Social Behavior: Communication, Social Behavior: Norms and Morals
Link: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3764436
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Willingness to get vaccinated against COVID-19: an experimental study on a Polish representative sample
Joanna Rachubik
 University of Warsaw
ABSTRACT:
In many countries, a significant percentage of the population opts out of vaccinations, even mandatory ones, partly inspired by anti-vaccine
movements. A reluctance to vaccinate has been particularly spectacular in recent months in the form of a significant number of people who do not want
to be vaccinated against COVID-19. On a variety of dimensions, social campaigns can emphasize the many arguments that potentially raise
vaccination acceptance - that it is safe, effective, developed, and recommended by doctors and scientists, free of charge, or available in limited
numbers (therefore psychologically more valuable). The effectiveness of these messages is not measured systematically and precisely enough. To
address this issue, we conducted a survey in February and March of this year on a large, representative sample of adult Poles (n=6213). We presented
respondents with different sets of information about vaccination on COVID. After reading the information packet, respondents indicated whether they
would be willing to be vaccinated. Then, we asked respondents to justify their answers, indicate what or who would change their opinion, and indicate
their attitudes toward conspiracy theories promulgated by anti-vaccinationists. We also have a number of socioeconomic variables describing the
respondents. An analysis of the determinants of individual response choices indicates that changing attitudes toward COVID-19 vaccines is
problematic. None of our statements disclosed to the respondents systematically altered the frequency of responses to the question about willingness to
vaccinate. Moreover, 2/3 of those not willing to be vaccinated indicated that they would not change their opinion even if the vaccine was confirmed to
be safe and effective after the first months of vaccination. Demographic variables had a strong influence on responses: men, older respondents, those
living in cities, with higher education, better off and willing to vote for the Left, Civic Coalition, Poland 2050, rather than for Law and Justice or
(especially) the Confederation, were more likely to be vaccinated. On the other hand, the willingness to vaccinate was lower among those who believed
in virus-related conspiracy theories, of whom there were surprisingly many. Furthermore, among the significant explanatory variables were trust in
science, doctors, and the European Union (but not the government). In summary, our results call into question the relevance of ad hoc public
campaigns focused on vaccination alone, especially as long as, given the inadequate supply of the vaccines, they can only be a source of frustration for
people who would be willing to be vaccinated but rightly expect to have to wait months for their turn.
Author(s): Michal Krawczyk, Raman Kachurka, Joanna Rachubik
Topic: Decision Theory: Preferences, Field Experiments: General
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COVID-19 vaccines may also reduce personal financial fragility - a field study in Israel
Hurwitz, Abigail
 The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
ABSTRACT:
Covid-19 pandemic had strongly affected public health and financial status of individuals around the world. A year after Covid-19 outbreak,
vaccination rates are increasing, with Israel being the first country to achieve high vaccination rates. Yet, unemployment rates are recovering very
slowly in most countries, as uncertainty regarding the development of both the pandemic and economic circumstances remain high. The current paper
investigates the impact of vaccination process on personal financial fragility, that is, the ability to meet an unexpected mid-size expense within a month
(Clark et al., 2020 ). Israel was the first country in the world to execute an extensive vaccination procedure. In a period of only 2.5 months, more than
50% of the Israeli population was vaccinated. To examine the impact of being vaccinated on personal financial fragility, we developed and fielded two
internet studies in Israel, approaching the same participants. The first study, fielded just before vaccines were offered to individuals aged 50 years old
and under. The second study, about two months later, was fielded at a point in which it was possible for any Israeli adult to easily receive a vaccine.
Using a within subject design, we find that financial fragility decreased significantly among vaccinated individuals, comparing to those not vaccinated.
In addition, financial fragility decreased significantly more among people who estimate a decrease in their subjective probability of attracting the
Covid-19 virus. We further find that our result is mostly derived from women. The result holds after controlling for various socio-demographics and
attitudes. We offer and test several potential explanations for our findings: changes in emotions (anger; anxiety; happiness); income; and health status.
Specifically, we control for self-reported health status, showing that for the most part it does not significantly affect financial fragility. We also control
for self-reported financial damage duo to the Covid-19 outbreak. We find that participant reporting higher financial damage also report significantly
higher increase in personal financial fragility. Moreover, we find support in our data for the hypothesis that getting a vaccine affected emotions, mostly
among women. Specifically, we find that among vaccinated women anxiety and anger decreased, while among non-vaccinated women anxiety and
anger increased. We find no evidence for changes in happiness. Medical literature provides evidence to the effectiveness of vaccines in preventing
Covid-19 infections. Vast literature has demonstrated that from an economic point of view, Covid-19 damages the most vulnerable in society. We
contribute to this literature by showing that vaccines additionally affect reported personal financial fragility, partly, by reducing anxiety and anger.
Author(s): Hurwitz, Abigail; Lahav, Eyal
Topic: Decision Theory: Other, Field Experiments: General
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Altruism in the time of COVID-19: We are all in this together, but who is we?
Adriana Carolina Pinate
 Gran Sasso Science Institute
ABSTRACT:
Theory posits that in situations of existential threat, selfish motivations will be outweighed by altruistic ones, and cooperation will be parochial. Yet,
the global character of the COVID-19 pandemic makes unclear which level of group inclusiveness individuals will privilege. In an online experiment,
participants from the U.S. and Italy chose to allocate a monetary bonus to a charity active in COVID-19 relief efforts at the local, national, or
international level, or to keep the bonus for themselves. We found that personal exposure to COVID-19 increased donations relative to those not
exposed, even as levels of environmental exposure (numbers of cases locally) had no effect. Only one-third of individuals acted entirely selfishly.
Donors predominantly benefitted the local level (state in the U.S., region in Italy); donations toward country and world levels were half as large. Social
identity was a moderating factor in both countries. These results confirm and qualify existing theories.
Author(s): Gianluca Grimalda; Nancy R. Buchan; Orgul D. Ozturk; Adriana C. Pinate; Giulia Urso; Marilynn B. Brewer
Topic: Applied Economics: Charitable Giving, Applied Economics: Charitable Giving
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A pandemic event like the spread of COVID-19 stresses the health care systems in many countries due to the high numbers of patients. Thus, there is a
great need for an effective vaccine against diseases like COVID-19 worldwide. However, if there is a vaccine it will be limited in the beginning and
those countries who can afford it will buy as much as they can to protect their own citizens. This so-called “vaccine nationalism” can prolong the
pandemic due to an inefficient distribution of the vaccines. While countries with a broad access to vaccines will benefit due to a slowdown of the
pandemic in their region, this strategy will cost lives, give the virus further opportunity to mutate and evade vaccines and will undermine a global
economic recovery. Many low-income countries do not have the financial capabilities to compete on the vaccine markets with high-income countries,
so that they could be outsiders in this market and are dependent on help. In these situations, the call for solidarity of rich countries with developing
countries is present to help the poor countries to slow the spread of the pandemic. When a few countries do not help while at least some countries
support countries in need, those who do not give could benefit from the help provided by others because this can help to stop the spread of the virus
globally without bearing the costs. Countries may opt to be free-riders in these situations, hoping to benefit from the efforts of others while choosing
not to make any effort themselves. Therefore, there are some ongoing international efforts to coordinate a global COVID-19 response like COVAX, a
coalition of some high-income countries to support low-income countries getting access to a vaccine. This coalition established by the WHO and other
international institutions aims to provide equal access to vaccines globally by pooling resources. Theoretical studies predict a rather pessimistic
outcome regarding international agreements in such situations: If an agreement of a coalition maximizes the members' benefits while individual agents
have a strong incentive to free-ride, only a few participants will form a coalition without sanctions on non-members of the coalition (Barrett 1994,
2016; Nordhaus 2015). I analyze this finding by means of a laboratory experiment: The basic idea is that cooperative agreements can be achieved
through the formation of coalitions of members committed to help a third-party in need – with or without sanctions on free-riding agents outside the
coalition. I use a social dilemma game in which four decision-makers can cooperate for the sake of an affected but inactive third-party – a so called
"third-party social dilemma”. Gains from cooperation only go to a third-party, there are no individual monetary benefits for active participants.
Cooperative behavior can be exploited by other participants, so that the social welfare maximizing outcome is hard to achieve. I test whether a
coalition of participants that want to help the third-party can overcome this dilemma situation. The study analyzes two mechanisms that can enhance
cooperation: Coalitions with a binding agreement (a so called "coalition of the willing") and a coalition with a binding agreement that also triggers
sanctions on free-riding participants outside the coalition. In the first treatment, participants can signal their willingness to join a coalition conditional
on the number of members. Members of the coalition cannot free-ride, while non-members can choose their contribution to a public good. In the
punishment treatment non-members of the coalition are sanctioned when they do not choose full cooperation and at least one participant joined the
coalition and opted for the sanctioning institution. The more participants enter the coalition the severe sanctions on non-members are. Results show
that participants are willing to join a coalition to help a third-party. But there are no stable coalitions without sanctions. Instead, if the coalition triggers
sanctions on free-riding participants outside the coalition, almost all groups reach full cooperation.
Author(s): Tassilo Sobotta
Topic: Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource, Social Behavior: Norms and Morals
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Hindsight bias causally decreases trust in government: Evidence from the COVID-19 outbreak
Christian Zihlmann
 University of Fribourg (CH)
ABSTRACT:
People often believe ex-post that an outcome was obvious from the very beginning, a tendency called hindsight bias. While theory predicts that
hindsight bias distorts ex-post evaluations of others' actions, causal evidence on such an effect is absent. In an incentivized experiment in March and
April 2020 with 778 participants, we show that during the first wave of COVID-19 in the United States, people systematically misremember their own
past belief about how to best fight coronavirus: In April 2020, at the peak of the first wave, participants think they were already supporting stricter
measures at the onset of the first wave in March 2020, even though they did not. Further, our experimental design allows us to exploit experimentally
induced variation in the extent of hindsight bias to document a causal effect of hindsight bias on trust in the government. As the COVID-19 pandemic
unfolded, stronger hindsight bias causes significantly lower trust in the government.
Author(s): Holger Herz, Deborah Kistler, Christian Zehnder, Christian Zihlmann
Topic: Public Choice: Voting and Rent Seeking, Decision Theory: Beliefs
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The effects of emergency government cash transfers on beliefs and behaviors during the COVID pandemic: Quasi-
Experimental Evidence from Brazil
Fernanda Leite Lopez de Leon
University of Kent
ABSTRACT:
This paper estimates the impacts of emergency cash transfers on individuals' behaviour and beliefs about the coronavirus. It focused on the impacts of
‘Auxilio Emergencial' (AE), a large-scale cash-transfer aimed at low-income individuals in Brazil, that has helped more than 67.2 million individuals.
The data comes from an online survey conducted among 2,382 individuals during the first peak of the pandemic, in August-September 2020. The AE
primarily goal was to help individuals navigate their financial situations during the pandemic. We also hypothesize that the cushion provided by the
cash-transfer operated by changing individuals' beliefs about the seriousness of the pandemic and information consumption. To identify the effects of
the cash-transfer, we exploit the AE income eligibility criteria, that arguably generates quasi-experimental variation in individuals' access to the cash-
transfer. We targeted ‘likely eligible' participants, and compare outcomes based on individuals' AE eligibility status. In the regressions, we control for
an extensive set on demographic and economic covariates to account for confounder effects. We find that the AE eligible were 5.5 percentage points
less likely to contract COVID, exerted higher assessments (15-20%) for chance of death if contracted covid and have shown more covid
misconceptions. We do not detect differences in precaution behavior (e.g. hand washing, social distancing), except that AE eligibles seem to have
worked less hours and were less likely to leave the house to go to work. Overall, our findings indicate modest but positive impacts of ‘Auxilio
Emergencial' in helping individuals to financially cope during the pandemic. We also exploit the logistic aspect of AE payments to test how
(exogenous) financial pressure affect coronavirus related beliefs. We find that AE recipients that received the aid instalment recently, were significantly
more likely to trust health experts, and to rank them above President Bolsonaro.
Author(s): Fernanda Leite Lopez de Leon, Bansi Malde
Topic: Applied Economics: Other, Social Behavior: Other
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Fear and rationality of decision-making in the face of the pandemic
Michal Krawczyk
 University of Warsaw
ABSTRACT:
The new coronavirus has been referred to as the worst global crisis since WWII. While actions of governments and individuals (notably implementing
social distancing) may slow down the spread of the virus, saving lives, they come at great psychological and economic costs. Both the governments
and individuals are thus facing a challenge of making reasonable judgments and decisions when facing a fearsome threat. In this project we investigate
to what extent the framing of various puzzles of judgment and decision-making under risk in terms of COVID affects the ability and willingness to
stick to the normative, proscribed (“rational”) solutions. In an online experiment involving two student samples and a representative sample of adult
Poles (total n=4200), we compare the prevalence of these deviations to those observed in two logically equivalent but less emotionally taxing, neutral
framings (related to unemployment and to common cold). We find that prevalence of rational judgments depends on the treatment and it does so in
interactions with the specific types of puzzles: COVID framing does not universally lead to more or less rational choices.
Author(s): Raman Kachurka, Michal Krawczyk, Joanna Rachubik
Topic: Decision Theory: Bounded Rationality, Decision Theory: Risk
Back to session: Covid-19 4
The effect of social norms on COVID-19 vaccination readiness: Evidence from a nation-wide survey experiment
Thomas Ritttmannsberger
 University of Innsbruck
ABSTRACT:
Introduction & Background Recent surveys show that large parts of the German population do not intend to get vacci- nated against COVID-19,
jeopardizing the goal of reaching herd immunity. While mandatory vaccination would be the most effective way to circumvent this problem, it was
ruled out for political reasons in Germany as in most other countries. Looking for non-coercive ways to increase vaccination intentions, it seems
promising to take advantage of social norms, given that vaccination is perceived as a social contract (Korn et al. ,2020). Theory suggests that
individuals' behavior and beliefs are influenced by the behaviors and beliefs of others (Mutz, 1998). This is also supported by a recent survey-
experiment by Bicchieri et al. (2020), that shows that social norms substantially impact people's willingness to comply with precau- tionary measures
against the spread of the COVID-19 virus. In the context of vaccination, this suggests that individuals' vaccination intentions are higher if others (are
perceived to) vaccinate too, and lower if (perceived) uptake rates in society are low (Hershey et al., 1994). Many cross-sectional studies have linked
social norms to vaccination behavior, yet, without being able to establish a causal link (for a review see Brewer et al., 2017). It is crucial to develop a
better understanding of how social norms influence vaccination behavior, particu- larly as (possibly false) beliefs about low vaccination willingness
may potentially lead to low vaccination readiness. Method We conduct an information provision experiment (IPE) with a national representative
sample of the German population to determine whether social norms influence the intention to vaccinate against COVID-19. Therefore, we elicited
social norms in a first survey (from the 24th of March to the 1st of April, 2021), and run the second survey, where we implement the IPE in the first
half of April, 2021. We randomly assign respondents to two different groups (treatment or control group). In both groups we first ask respondents about
their perception of the social norm. Afterwards, we present participants in the treatment group with the result (the social norm) from the first survey,
while subjects in the control group receive no additional information. Finally, we ask subjects in both groups about their intentions to get the COVID-
19 vaccine. The study is IRB-approved and pre-registered at the American Economic Association. Preliminary Results & Discussion We can only
report very preliminary results from the first survey here: To date, we find that the intention to get the COVID-19-vaccination in the German general
population is 69.70%, while subjects believe that the intention to vaccinate is at 63.69%. Hence, we expect enough room for belief-updating in the
information-provision experiment and look forward to see whether social norms impact COVID-19 vaccination readiness. References Bicchieri, C.,
Fatas, E., Aldama, A., Casas, A., Deshpande, I., Lauro, M., Parilli, C., Spohn, M., Pereira, P., and Wen, R. (2020). In science we (should) trust:
expectations and compliance during the covid-19 pandemic. Brewer, N. T., Chapman, G. B., Rothman, A. J., Leask, J., and Kempe, A. (2017).
Increasing vaccination: Putting psychological science into action. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 18(3):149–207. Hershey, J. C., Asch, D.
A., Thumasathit, T., Meszaros, J., and Waters, V. V. (1994). The roles of altruism, free riding, and bandwagoning in vaccination decisions.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 59(2):177–187. Korn, L., B¨ohm, R., Meier, N. W., and Betsch, C. (2020). Vaccination as a
social contract. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 117(26):14890–14899. Mutz, D. C. (1998). Impersonal Influence: How Perceptions
of Mass Collectives Affect Polit- ical Attitudes. Cambridge Studies in Public Opinion and Political Psychology. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Author(s): Silvia Angerer, Daniela Glyzle-Ruetzler, Philipp Lergetporer & Thomas Rittmannsberger
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I conduct a field experiment in combination with two longitudinal surveys (N = 434) to study the dynamics of risk assessments in times of COVID-19.
Both surveys take place two weeks apart and elicit the perceived risk of COVID-19 related to different activities as well the engagement in those
activities over time. In between the two surveys participants (students aged 18-29) are offered a gift card as an incentive to visit a local café. My main
treatment variation are different values of that gift card (15 SEK vs. 100 SEK). Not surprisingly, I find that students who received a high incentive to
visit the cafe (the 100kr gift card) are significantly more likely to do so than students who received a low incentive. More importantly, however, I also
find that two weeks after survey 1, students in the high incentive treatment perceive the risk of COVID-19 associated with a café visit significantly
lower than students who received the 15 SEK incentive. The data indicates that the divergence in risk perceptions happens just before participants visit
the café suggesting that it is a consequence of motivated reasoning rather than ex-post belief updating. The result appears robust to alternative
explanations.
Author(s): Marco Islam
Topic: Decision Theory: Beliefs, Decision Theory: Risk
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Evaluating creativity in a creative field: how cognitive ability, 2D:4D and risk preferences influence creativity
Maria del Pino Ramos Sosa
 Universidad Loyola Andalucia
ABSTRACT:
This paper conducts a field experiment aimed to check the correlation between creativity, risk aversion and the ratio between the length of the second
and fourth digit (2D:4D). Data were collected from 183 subjects during the festival “La notte della Taranta”, the biggest concert in Europe dedicated to
traditional music held in the south of Italy. By making use of experiments and a questionnaire, we analyzed the link between creativity and subjects'
individual characteristics. We found that subjects with high cognitive ability performed better in the creativity test. No significant relationship was
found between creativity and the frequency of choosing risky options by the subjects, although the relation is negative, contributing to the mixed
results found in the literature. In addition, we found no relation between creativity and 2D:4D for both hands
Author(s): Giuseppe Attanasi (Universite C?�te d'Azur, France), Michela Chessa (Universite C?�te d'Azur, France), Adriana Pinate (Gran Sasso
Science Institute, Italy), M.P. Ramos-Sosa (LoyolaBehLab, Universidad Loyola Andalucia, Spain)
Topic: Field Experiments: General, Psychology and Biology: Cognition
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Teams Do Not Outperform Individuals in a Simple Creative Task
Marina Schroeder
 Leibniz University Hannover
ABSTRACT:
We compare the performance of teams with that of individuals in a simple creative task—generating a title for a short video. We assess the quality of
titles using the click rate as well as the subjective assessment of the fit between the title and the video. Whereas teams are costlier to organizations, we
find no significant differences in the performance of teams relative to individuals. As a result, in the task we use in this paper, allocating creative work
to individuals is more efficient than allocating it to teams.
Author(s): Uri Gneezy, Katharina Laske and Marina Schroeder
Topic: Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices, Social Behavior: Group Behavior
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Does Communication Help to Coordinate on Early Adoption of Innovation?
Ayse Gul Mermer
 University of Amsterdam, CREED
ABSTRACT:
Innovation is at the core of growth and welfare, while a compelling empirical finding is that firms tend to take up innovative technologies at a slower
pace than the technological progress justifies. One potential channel resulting in delays in adoption is the free-riding incentives in competitive
environments, where lessons from the investment are public goods. We investigate whether communication could serve as an instrument to combat this
market failure. To do so, we employ a model in which players are deciding when to make risky investments. The lessons from these investments are
public goods while the firm making the earliest investment is paying the irreversible cost of investment. We theoretically find that introducing
communication leads to earlier investment times, and increasing the number of firms results in delays in equilibrium. In a laboratory experiment, we
explore the effect of communication on adoption times. We find that, on average, the delay of adoption is significantly lower when there are there 2
firms, while insignificantly so when there are 4 firms. We report that, when there are 4 firms, communication takes place in the majority of cases
helping subjects to coordinate on early adoptions at the first half of our experiment, while it fails to do so as subjects get experienced, sweeping away
the beneficial effect of communication at the aggregate level. We further find that, when there are 2 firms, communication takes place only half of the
time, and opting for communication is used as a signaling mechanism by subjects to coordinate on asymmetric equilibrium.
Author(s): Ayse Gul Mermer, Sander Onderstal, Joep Sonnemans
Topic: Social Behavior: Communication, Games: Coordination
Link: sites.google.com/site/aysegulmermer/research
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How teams can overcome free riding in strategic experimentation
Katharina Bruett
 University of Amsterdam
ABSTRACT:
Experimentation is at the core of innovation. This project studies collaborative experimentation in teams. I focus on the inherent two-dimensional free-
riding problem; Agents create a payoff as well as an informational externality, which booth induce free riding. This theoretically results in inefficiently
low experimentation. In particular, agents' experimentation being observable decreases experimentation because of a discouragement effect through
changes in beliefs. In a laboratory experiment, I study how distinct elements of the experimentation environment affect strategic experimentation. I
vary (i) the observability of experimentation and (ii) whether agents work on joint or separate projects. Teams largely overcome the free-riding
problem. Both observability of experimentation and experimenting jointly increase experimentation levels. There is no lack of sophistication in
updating beliefs that drives this, neither do subjects disregard the effect their experimentation has on others. Instead, the data can be best explained by a
combination of myopia and the salience of group membership.
Author(s): Katharina Bruett
Topic: Games: Information, Social Behavior: Group Behavior





We study whether other-regarding preferences depend on the ethnic background of others with a representative sample. More specifically, we run
experiments in Germany and the Netherlands and ask the participants to do allocation tasks between themselves and a majority or minority recipient.
With individual-level and aggregate-level structural estimation, we find no significant discrimination in social preferences against the minority group.
However, when we group the sample by their attitudes towards ethnic diversity in finite-mixture estimation, we can see that people with a negative
attitude are more likely to be selfish than those with a positive attitude. When the recipient is Turkish or Moroccan, the effect is larger.
Author(s): Yi Sheng; Sigrid Suetens
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Methodology: Lab, Field and External Validity





We conduct a correspondence study to assess the extent of labour market discrimination between British and non-British (EU) nationals in the UK
hospitality sector during the Brexit implementation period. We send fictitious CV's to help-wanted ads and explore the roles of applicant quality,
nationality and residency, and whether these interact with details of the job advertised, or with regional characteristics. The timing of our study
provides a unique window into hiring decisions during a time of political uncertainty and potentially increased anti-immigrant sentiment in the UK.
Overall, our findings suggest that EU job applicants faced few obstacles in the UK hospitality sector during the Brexit negotiations. The limited
discriminatory behaviour that we observe varies spatially and is mostly evident in lower invitation premia for high quality applicants from Eastern
Europe.
Author(s): Michalis Drouvelis, Johannes Lohse , Rebecca McDonald, Hamideh Mohtashami Borzadaran
Topic: Field Experiments: General, Applied Economics: Labor Market





Models of statistical discrimination typically assume that employers make rational inference from (education) signals. However, there is a large amount
of evidence showing that most people do not update their beliefs rationally. We use a model and two experiments to show that if employers are
conservative, in the sense of signal neglect, there is more discrimination than when employers are rational. Such irrational statistical discrimination
demotivates high-skilled workers from disadvantaged groups from pursuing education as they anticipate employer conservatism. In line with the
theory, our data show that excess discrimination caused by employer conservatism is especially important when signals are very informative. Out of
the overall hiring gap in our data around 40% can be attributed to rational statistical discrimination, a further 40% is due to irrational statistical
discrimination, and the remaining 20% is unexplained or potentially taste-based.
Author(s): Friederike Mengel
Topic: Applied Economics: Labor Market, Games: Other
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Social Exclusion
Gonul Dogan
 University of Cologne
ABSTRACT:
I test whether social exclusion affects performance. In the workplace, social exclusion could stem from one's characteristics unrelated to work or low
effort. Since social exclusion is psychologically costly, irrespective of the cause of social exclusion, being excluded is predicted to decrease subsequent
performance, and the threat of exclusion is predicted to increase performance. I test these in laboratory and online experiments. Social exclusion
increases performance if it is informative about one's relative effort, however, social exclusion has no effect on performance when it is due to an
arbitrary exclusion criteria. The increase in performance after exclusion only emerges as a result of reduced effort under the threat of exclusion. Finally,
if exclusion criteria is probabilistically determined, performance is not affected by the threat of exclusion nor exclusion itself.
Author(s): Gonul Dogan
Topic: Games: Information, Psychology and Biology: Other
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Misperceived Discrimination and Task Performance
Darya Korlyakova
 Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute
ABSTRACT:
There is a long-standing concern that if a discriminated group reduces effort in response to expected discrimination, these expectations reinforce
negative stereotypes about productivity of the group and perpetuate inequality. So far, this concern has been empirically tested by studying correlations
between beliefs about discrimination against one's own group and job-related attitudes or behavior. The literature has found that individuals who
perceive higher discrimination are less satisfied with their job, less committed to the organization, more likely to be absent at work, and more intended
to leave the firm (e.g. Ensher, Grant-Vallone, & Donaldson, 2001; Jones, Ni, & Wilson, 2009; Foley, Kidder, & Powell, 2002). In these studies, beliefs
about discrimination are usually non-incentivized and behavior is often self-reported. Despite the abundance of correlational research, the causal
evidence is lacking on how expectation of facing discriminatory treatment by employers affects minorities' behavior. We attempt to fill this gap by
conducting an online experiment in the US with a diverse sample of 2000 African Americans. We randomly assign our participants to two groups and
elicit their prior beliefs about discrimination against African Americans in a previous survey. In the treatment group, subjects are subsequently
informed about the actual frequency of discrimination against African Americans. The information-provision stage is omitted for the control group. To
study the effects of revised expectations about discrimination against own racial group on effort, we present our participants with a Math task. We
inform subjects that the overall task earnings will be divided between them and a White person by the impartial observer, another White respondent.
The observer may know both individuals' races and task performances. As additional outcome variables, we (i) collect subjects' posterior beliefs about
discrimination against own racial group, (ii) elicit their preference for a race-blind allocation of the Math task earnings and (iii) measure participants'
willingness to exaggerate their own task performances. We find that the vast majority of our participants (96.2%) initially overestimate discrimination
against African Americans. Misperceptions prevail across all demographic groups and they are large in magnitude. A median subject believes that 35
percent of White respondents allocated at least the same amount to an African American person as to a White person. The actual percentage of such
White respondents, based on the previous survey results, is 87 percent. Information provision causes significant and economically meaningful shifts in
subjects' beliefs about discrimination against African Americans. From an ex-ante perspective, it is unclear how changes in expected discrimination
should affect minorities' effort. In principle, shifting downward minorities' beliefs about discrimination against them could motivate them to perform
better, because now a fairer reward for their effort is expected. At the same time, minorities who receive favorable news about their possible
discrimination may feel less in need of compensating their race disadvantage by impressing the impartial White observer with their hard work. Hence,
their performance may decrease compared to the untreated subjects. Our findings corroborate the second prediction. Treated individuals attempt fewer
Math problems; the information effects on task performance are negative but insignificant. Pre-specified heterogeneity analysis by gender reveals that
negative information effects on effort are driven by males, who attempt and solve correctly significantly fewer Math problems compared to their
untreated counterparts. The treatment does not seem to move other outcomes. Overall, our findings do not support the common worry that minorities'
inflated expectations about discrimination induce them to underperform. Nevertheless, these results should be seen only as the first step in exploring
experimentally the important link between perceived discrimination and minorities' effort. References Ensher, E. A., Grant-Vallone, E. J., &
Donaldson, S. I. (2001). Effects of perceived discrimination on job satisfaction, organizational commitment, organizational citizenship behavior, and
grievances. Human Resource Development Quarterly, 12(1), 53-72. Foley, S., Kidder, D. L., & Powell, G. N. (2002). The perceived glass ceiling and
justice perceptions: An investigation of Hispanic law associates. Journal of Management, 28(4), 471-496. Jones, J. R., Ni, J., & Wilson, D. C. (2009).
Comparative effects of race/ethnicity and employee engagement on withdrawal behavior. Journal of Managerial Issues, 195-215.
Author(s): Darya Korlyakova
Topic: Applied Economics: Labor Market, Applied Economics: Other
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Demographics and Discrimination
Regine Oexl
 University of Innsbruck
ABSTRACT:
A first step in understanding the underlying mechanisms of taste-based discriminatory behavior is to identify who engages more often in such behavior.
We provide correlations between a wide variety of individual characteristics and discriminatory behavior as well as xenophobic attitudes. In particular
for gender, we show that results change, depending on whether we control for several characteristics or not. This shows the importance of looking at
including a number of demographic characteristics as controls before claiming that a certain gender discriminates more or less than another.
Author(s): Anna Rita Bennato, Glenn Dutcher, Regine Oexl
Topic: Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences, Applied Economics: Charitable Giving
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The inelastic demand for affirmative action
Margaret Samahita
 University College Dublin
ABSTRACT:
We study the drivers of preference for affirmative action (AA) in two pre-registered online experiments (N=1,700). Participants act as employers who
hire from a pool of workers using either the standard rule, hiring the two most productive workers, or the AA rule, where one of the two hired workers
must be female. We implement three treatments to disentangle the preference for AA stemming from i) presumed gender difference in productivity, ii)
presumed gender difference in institutional barriers, or iii) other non-material motives. First, we exogenously vary employers' beliefs by providing
information about no gender gap in productivity. Second, we communicate the employers' choice to a later group of workers, thus reversing the
working-hiring order and changing the institutional barriers faced by female workers. Finally, we remove the employers' incentive, thus potentially
making AA choice cheap talk. We do not find significant differences in hiring rule choice across treatments, despite the information and reverse-order
treatments significantly altering beliefs about gender difference in productivity. Our results suggest that AA choice reflects a more innate preference for
advancing female workers that is inelastic to its perceived cost.
Author(s): Demid Getik, Marco Islam, Margaret Samahita
Topic: Applied Economics: Labor Market, Applied Economics: Labor Market
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I study the optimal design of monetary incentives in economic experiments. I define a problem of minimizing experimental budget for a given level of
power and significance by varying the level of monetary incentives across treatments. I prove that this problem has a solution in several common
experimental settings. I illustrate the properties of the solution using some existing experiments. In some cases, providing low monetary incentives for
a large number of subjects is optimal. In other cases, somewhat counter-intuitively, providing high monetary incentives for a relatively small number of
subjects turns out to be cost-efficient. I discuss the implications of my results for the design of new economic experiments, as well as replications.
Author(s): Aleksandr Alekseev
Topic: Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices, Methodology: Lab, Field and External Validity
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The role of attention in checking decisions
Yefim Roth
 University of Haifa
ABSTRACT:
Mainstream economics and experimental decision making rests on the “Read, Understand and Believe” (RUB) assumption (Erev, 2020). That is the
subjects of the experiments are assumed to read the experimental instructions, understand and also believe them. The current paper investigate the
validity and necessity of the RUB assumptions in online experiments. Specifically, we whether subjects who read the instructions based on a simple
reading comprehension attention test, differ from those who do not read instructions in checking experiments (Roth, 2020; Roth, Wänke, & Erev,
2016). Based on a large number of studies and experimental conditions (N_Total=2500) we show that the attentive participants (those who pass a
simple attention check) behave very similarly to physical lab participants, while the inattentive majorly differ (exhibit lower maximization rates).
Interestingly, even using highly qualified participants does not eliminate this bias. The paper conclude with some boundary conditions, showing that in
long shot experiments the difference in behavior of the attentive and inattentive participants disappears.
Author(s): Roth Yefim, Yakobi Ofir
Topic: Methodology: Lab, Field and External Validity, Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices
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Individuals make choices based on their beliefs about future events; hence, eliciting beliefs is crucial to understand human behavior. In the field,
eliciting beliefs is usually done using visual aids to facilitate such task among low educated populations. Our study compares the traditional visual aids
(e.g., beans and beads) with manual sliders to measure probabilities as a proxy of subjective beliefs. To do so, we conduct four survey experiments:
two in Nigeria, one in Honduras and one in Spain, which tests the differences in distribution, time spent and violations of probability properties
between beans and sliders. Our findings suggest that the use of slider yields the same mean responses, but lower variance of probabilities. The slider
also results in more accurate responses when converting frequencies into probabilities. Overall, we do not find significant differences in violations of
probability properties and time spent under each type of visual aid. These results suggest that sliders can be considered as a more accurate and
statistically efficient tool to elicit subjective probabilities in the field.
Author(s): Lorenzo Estepa Mohedano, Diego A. Jorrat, Victor Orozco, Ericka Rascon Ramirez
Topic: Applied Economics: Economic Development, Applied Economics: Charitable Giving
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Increasing the external validity of social preference games by reducing measurement error
Daniel Navarro-Martinez
 Pompeu Fabra University
ABSTRACT:
An increasing number of studies call into question the external validity of so-called social preference games, which are one of the foundations of
modern behavioral and experimental economics. In this paper, we show that these games have a low correlation with single prosocial behaviors in the
field, but this correlation can be substantially increased by aggregating behaviors to reduce measurement error. We tracked people's daily prosocial
behaviors for two weeks using a day-reconstruction method; the same people also played three different social preference games on six different
occasions: dictator game, dictator game with taking option and public goods game. We show that, as more prosocial behaviors and game rounds are
sampled and aggregated to reduce measurement error, the games become much better predictors of average prosociality. The predictive power of the
games is further increased by using statistical methods designed to reduce measurement error. These findings suggest that social preference games
capture important underlying dispositions of real-world prosociality, and they could be successfully used to predict aggregated prosocial inclinations.
This has crucial implications for the external validity and applicability of games.
Author(s): Xinghua Wang, Daniel Navarro-Martinez
Topic: Methodology: Lab, Field and External Validity, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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Leading-by-example: legitimizing pay disparity through risk
Simon Siegenthaler
 University of Texas, Dallas
ABSTRACT:
Experimental research has repeatedly demonstrated the prevalence of coordination failure and inefficient equilibrium behavior in team production
games. We report on a new set of laboratory and online experiments showing that when leaders make their contributions before other team members
do, teams achieve efficient coordination. The efficacy of leadership is, however, undermined when introducing pay inequality between the leader and
the other team members. We hypothesize that pay inequality is more acceptable when leaders are subjected to bigger strategic risks than team
members. The results confirm this intuition, as teams do play more productive equilibria in the initial rounds of interaction. However, in later rounds,
as repeated interaction mitigates strategic risk and thus the justification for pay disparity becomes weaker, some team members lower their efforts and
coordination breaks down.
Author(s): Aurelie Dariel, Nikos Nikiforakis, Simon Siegenthaler
Topic: Games: Coordination, Games: Repeated Games
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Anti-migration sentiments and fairness perceptions
Christian Koch
 University of Vienna
ABSTRACT:
Recent years have seen a surge in populism and anti-migration sentiments around the world. While numerous explanations have been suggested why
people may reject migrants, anti-migration sentiments may still be surprising from an economics viewpoint as migration is often associated with large
economic gains. We propose a novel experimental design analyzing rejection of migrants in the lab. We focus on the interaction of economic incentives
and people's fairness perceptions. Recent contributions on fairness highlight how much those perceptions depend on procedural elements or moral
wiggle rooms and we explore whether these elements may play a role in the migration context.
Author(s): Christian Koch, Jean-Robert Tyran, Linda Deszoe
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Public Choice: Voting and Rent Seeking
Back to session: Fairness and Reciprocity




This paper studies how the number of people who trust affects reciprocity. Data from three different sources (observational data from crowdlending,
data from the lab and data from online experiments) suggest that the number of people who trust significantly undermines reciprocity. The results are
robust when including experimental treatments controlling for the proportional damage to each trustor, or treatments controlling for inequality between
trustors. Behavioral economic nudges appealing to trust and trustworthiness significantly affected reciprocity. The effect of trust appeals was larger if
more people trusted. The findings have important implications for agency problems which are not confined to bilateral interactions.
Author(s): Jan Schmitz
Topic: Applied Economics: Other, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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Viable Nash Equilibria: An Experiment
Daehong Min
 New York University Abu Dhabi
ABSTRACT:
This paper examines the usefulness of Kalai (2020)'s measure of the "viability" of a Nash equilibrium. We experimentally study a class of
"participation" games, which differ in the number of players, the success threshold, and the payoff to not participating. We find that Kalai's measure
captures well how the viability of the "everyone-participates" (eP) equilibrium depends on the success threshold; the measure does not capture other
elements of the game which affect the likelihood that the eP equilibrium is played.
Author(s): Duk Gyoo Kim, Daehong Min, John Wooders
Topic: Games: Other, Games: Other
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Stochastic Choice and Noisy Beliefs in Games: an Experiment
Evan Friedman
 University of Essex
ABSTRACT:
We conduct an experiment in which we elicit subjects' beliefs over opponents' behavior multiple times for a given game without feedback. We find that
the large majority of individual subjects have stochastic belief reports, which we argue cannot be explained by learning or measurement error. Using
both actions and beliefs data, we test directly the assumptions, or axioms, underlying equilibrium models with “noise in actions” (quantal response
equilibrium) and “noise in beliefs” (noisy belief equilibrium). We find that, while both types of noise are important in explaining observed behaviors,
there are systematic violations of the axioms. We discuss possible explanations and some implications for modelling stochastic choice in games.
Author(s): Evan Friedman, Jeremy Ward
Topic: Games: Other, Decision Theory: Beliefs
Link: www.dropbox.com/s/a0x3bnqwdeyuv68/SCNB.pdf?dl=0
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Asymmetric Guessing Games
ZAFER Akin
 American University in Dubai
ABSTRACT:
This paper theoretically and experimentally investigates the behavior of asymmetric players in guessing games. The asymmetry is created by
introducing k > 1 replicas of one of the players. Two-player and restricted N-player cases are examined in detail. Based on the model parameters, the
equilibrium is either unique in which all players choose zero or mixed in which the weak player (k = 1) imitates the strong player (k > 1). A series of
experiments involving two and three-player repeated guessing games with unique equilibrium is conducted. We find that equilibrium behavior is
observed less frequently and overall choices are farther from the equilibrium in two-player asymmetric games in contrast to symmetric games, but this
is not the case in three-player games. Convergence towards equilibrium exists in all cases but asymmetry slows down the speed of convergence to the
equilibrium in two, but not in three-player games. Furthermore, the strong players have a slight earning advantage over the weak players, and
asymmetry increases discrepancy in choices (defined as the squared distance of choices from the winning number) in both games.
Author(s): ZAFER AKIN
Topic: Games: Other, Games: Repeated Games
Link: mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/103871/1/MPRA_paper_103871.pdf
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A Natural Experiment on the Value of Strategic Unpredictability: Sign Stealing in Baseball
Aleksei Chernulich
 New York University Abu Dhabi
ABSTRACT:
What is the strategic value of being unpredictable? In soccer, what advantage does the kicker gain by being unpredictable in the direction of the kick?
In tennis, what edge does the server forgo if the receiver can anticipate the direction of the serve? What advantage does the batter gain if he knows the
type of pitch that will be delivered? The degree to which a kicker, server, or pitcher has an incentive to be unpredictable will determine the degree to
which players have an incentive to learn to be unpredictable and, more generally, to play a mixed-strategy equilibrium. This paper uses data from
major league baseball to estimate the strategic value of being unpredictable, exploiting the fact that the Houston Astros engaged in "sign stealing" in
the 2017 season. We find that the strategic value of being unpredictably is economically significant.
Author(s): Aleksei Chernulich, Romain Gauriot, and John Wooders
Topic: Games: Other, Games: Contests
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In this paper, we study the effects that loss contracts---prepayments that can be clawbacked later---have on group coordination when there is strategic
uncertainty. We compare the choices made by experimental subjects in a minimum effort game. In control sessions, incentives are formulated as a
classic gain contract, while in treatment sessions, incentives are framed as an isomorphic loss contract. Our results show that loss contracts reduce the
minimum efforts of groups and worsen coordination between group members, both leading to lower payoffs. However, these results depend strongly
on the group's gender composition; groups with a larger proportion of women are better at coordinating and exert more effort.
Author(s): Steffen Ahrens, Lea Bitter, Ciril Bosch-Rosa
Topic: Games: Coordination, Applied Economics: Labor Market
Link: papers.boschrosa.com/NegativeEffort.pdf
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The paper presents an experiment designed to study how people play a two-person two-stage dynamic game with incomplete information and
uncertainty, a strictly competitive game related to real-world Casino games (Black Jack and Texas hold'em Poker), and to study the effect of different
experimental description methods on equilibrium and level-k play. To identify players' strategic sophistication, a Bayes level-k analysis is introduced.
The experimental data shows that around half of the subjects are strategic thinkers and the Bayes level-k thinking dominates in strategic play.
Furthermore, the comparison between the direct-response description and the strategy-method description reveals that subjects behave strategic play
less in the strategy-method description.
Author(s): Miguel Costa-Gomes, Zhibo Xu
Topic: Decision Theory: Bounded Rationality, Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices
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Is there really nothing to see here? On gender differences in preferences
Christian Thoeni
 University of Lausanne
ABSTRACT:
Over the past decades experimental economics has produced a large corpus of stylized facts on risk, time, and social preferences. This data permits to
look for systematic gender differences in preferences. While there is some evidence for gender differences, as e.g. in risk preferences, the question
about their relevance for gender differences in outcomes remains debated. A major pillar in this literature is Janet Hyde's gender similarities
hypothesis, which posits that gender differences are either nonexistent or too small to have explanatory power for differential socio-economic
outcomes between men and women. In this article I challenge the empirical basis of the gender similarities hypothesis in preferences. First, I show that
there is a misconception about the relevance of small effect sizes. Second, I show that the current literature on gender effects substantially
understimates gender differences in preferences.
Author(s): Christian Thoeni
Topic: Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences, Decision Theory: Preferences
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More recently, an emerging literature has suggested that the willingness to speak in public is an important determinant of leadership preferences.
Although it's so important for career prospects and for leadership positions, research shows that two-thirds of the population have fear of public
speaking to varying degrees. In particular, women have reported higher fear of public speaking compared to men. Most of the existing literature have
focused on willingness to speak in public in a traditional face-to-face environment. However, Covid-19 has changed the way and platforms we
communicate. It has increased the usage of video conference platforms than before. Nowadays, employees have been attending work meetings via
video conferences. People have been interviewing through video calls for new jobs. This technology has given us flexibility but besides all this ease,
there may be some negative effects on our daily life. For example, in a recent survey, %45 of female business leaders say that it is difficult for women
to speak up in virtual meetings. Is there really any gender difference in public speaking on video conferences? Are women more averse to speak in
public on online platforms than men? In this study, we analyze gender differences in willingness to speak on video conferences. We conduct two field
experiments to analyze whether in online settings incentivized men and women show the difference in preferences for speaking in public. In the first
experiment, we define public speaking aversion as a binary preference and for the second experiment as a continuous preference. The first field
experiment which we conducted on Zoom involved more than 500 students who could gain extra twenty points for the final exam if they present their
homework in front of the class while keeping their cameras on during the presentation. The second experiment which we conducted on Microsoft
Teams involved more than 400 students who could earn money if they give a five-minute presentation in front of the class. Although we find a relation
between leadership orientation and public speaking aversion, we do not find any significant gender differences in public speaking aversion in both
experimental settings.
Author(s): Sefa Erkus
Topic: Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences, Field Experiments: General
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Do gender differences in the promotion of own ideas lead to gender differences in support received?
Nathalie Roemer
 Leibniz University Hannover
ABSTRACT:
We study whether gender differences in the promotion of own ideas can explain the underrepresentation of females in innovation-related fields. We
conduct an online experiment in which innovators generate creative ideas and write a text in which they promote their ideas to potential supporters.
Supporters face binary choices between ideas and are incentivized to choose the higher value idea. Between treatments, we vary whether supporters are
provided with written promotion, information on the idea and on the gender of the innovator. We show that support received by women is affected by
the information provided.
Author(s): Nathalie Roemer, Marina Schroeder
Topic: Applied Economics: Labor Market, Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences
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Many occupations are highly segregated with respect to gender. In predominantly male or female professions, there is often discrimination against the
under-represented gender. This perpetuates gender imbalances. The discrimination could be due to perceived job-specific productivity differences
between men and women. Alternatively, it could result from the belief that teams whose members have the same gender perform better. We investigate
the two possible explanations in a novel experiment that varies the initial gender composition of the teams. We employ three tasks that differ with
respect to gender stereotypes. We find that women are picked more often for the “female task” and men for the “male task.” We also observe a
preference for heterogeneous teams, especially in the task with complementarities, but also in the gender-stereotypical tasks. Elicited expectations
about the choices of others reveal that subjects expect the gender stereotypes of tasks but that they underestimate the preference for heterogeneity.
Author(s): Urs Fischbacher; Dorothea Kuebler; Robert Stueber
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Closing the gender STEM gap - A large-scale randomized-controlled trial in elementary schools
Simone Haeckl
 UiS University of Stavanger
ABSTRACT:
We examine individual-level determinants of interest in STEM and analyze if a digital web application for elementary-school children can increase
children's STEM interest with a specific focus on narrowing the gender gap in STEM. Coupling a randomized controlled trial with lab experimental
and survey data, we can analyze the effect of the digital intervention and shed light on the mechanisms. We confirm the hypothesis that girls
demonstrate lower interest in STEM as compared to boys overall. Moreover, girls have less pronounced competitive preferences and math confidence
than boys at the baseline. The treatment increases girls' interest in STEM and decreases the gender gap via an increase in STEM confidence and
competitive preferences. Our findings suggest that an easy to implement digital intervention may have the potential to foster gender equality for young
children and may contribute later in life to a reduction of gender inequalities in the labor market such as occupational sorting and the gender wage gap.
Author(s): Kerstin Grosch, Simone Haeckl, Martin G. Kocher
Topic: Field Experiments: General, Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences
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An Experiment on Gender Representation in Majoritarian Bargaining
Diogo Geraldes
 Utrecht School of Economics
ABSTRACT:
Women are largely underrepresented in political and business decision making bodies across the world which has led to widespread calls for equitable
representation. To investigate the effect of gender representation in collective decision making, we experimentally manipulate the composition of triads
ranging from all female (FFF), female majority (FFM), male majority (MMF), to all male (MMM). Subjects negotiate via majority rule the division of
a common fund. We find that increasing female representation results in more inclusive splits, and thus, higher chances of unanimous agreements while
minimal winning coalitions (MWCs) increase monotonically in the number of males. MWCs are disproportionately more likely to be same-gender in
MMF, which leads to a gender gap in earnings compared to FFM. When provisional MWCs form prior to a final agreement, excluded men are more
proactive than excluded women in attempting to break the coalition by making alluring offers, which partially explains why mixed-gender MWCs are
less frequent in MMF compared to FFM.
Author(s): Diogo Geraldes (Utrecht School of Economics) | Andrzej Baranski (NYUAD) | Ada Kovaliukaite (NYUAD) | James Tremewan
(University of Auckland)
Topic: Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences, Games: Bargaining
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Gender differences in performance: the role of social incentives
Michalis Drouvelis
 University of Birmingham
ABSTRACT:
The provision of social incentives, where performance benefits a charitable cause, has been frequently used in modern organizations. In this paper, we
quantify the impact of social incentives on individuals' performance under two incentive schemes: piece rate and tournament. We introduce social
incentives by informing individuals that 50% of their earnings will be donated to a charity of their own choice. Our findings indicate that, in the
presence of social incentives, women increase their performance by approximately 23% and 27% in the piece rate and tournament payment schemes,
respectively. These effects are sizeable and significant. We further examine whether social incentives influence women's willingness to compete and
find no evidence about this due to women's lower willingness to take risks, in general.
Author(s): Michalis Drouvelis
Topic: Applied Economics: Charitable Giving, Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences
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Predictably competitive: What faces can tell us about competitive behavior
Helena Fornwagner
 University of Innsbruck
ABSTRACT:
Competition for limited resources is ubiquitous in social and economic life and has sparked a large body of research on the determinants of competitive
behavior. While we know a lot about the role of contextual factors and personality traits, no link has been established between competitive behavior
and physical appearance. In this study, we document for the first time a strong positive association between attractiveness, measured through ratings of
headshots from experimental participants, and the competitive behavior of female participants in the form of opting for a tournament payment scheme
in a real-effort task. We also show that individuals are better than chance at predicting the competitiveness of experimental participants, just by looking
at their headshots. These findings significantly advance our understanding of the factors that underlie competitive attitudes and of the role of
observable physical characteristics as telltale signs of behavior.
Author(s): Loukas Balafoutas (University of Innsbruck), Helena Fornwagner (University of Regensburg), Brit Grosskopf (University of Exeter )
Topic: Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences, Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices
Link: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3810616
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Women undercontribute their ideas to a group relative to equally knowledgeable men. Because it reduces group efficiency and women's visibility in a
group, literature proposes behavioral interventions to promote women's contribution. However, a contribution can result in correcting others. In a
setting where the right answer is not necessarily clear as in most group work, correcting others can induce their negative feelings and hinders the
effectiveness of such interventions. This paper examines women's cost of correcting male group members and its consequence to the group efficiency
in a setting where the correctness of the correction is only partially observable. I design a quasi-laboratory experiment where participants first try a
joint task with several other participants, select their partner from those participants, and then work on the joint task with the partner they have
selected. Being selected into teams is important in group work because one's output depends on team members. I show that the main determinant of
group members' partner selection is a given participant's contribution to the joint task, they correctly believe women and men are equally good at the
joint task, there is no gender difference in the contribution or propensity to correct others. However, \textit{when comparing participants with the same
contribution}, both male and female group members are significantly less likely to select as a partner a participant who has corrected their action. In
addition, male group members (and also female group members, but to a much lesser extent) react more negatively to a correction that corrects their
wrong action. Bayesian updating based on overconfidence does not fully explain the results: even group members who are told that they are not good at
the joint task react negatively to a correction, albeit to a lesser extent. Although I do not find that male or female group members react more negatively
to women's correction relative to men's correction, these findings suggest that behavioral interventions to increase women's contribution must be
tailored very carefully and that corrections, which should increase group efficiency in theory, do not necessarily do so in a real-world due to non-
rational frictions.
Author(s): Yuki Takahashi
Topic: Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences, Social Behavior: Group Behavior
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In light of the persistence of gender gaps in labor market outcomes, policy measures have been implemented to encourage women to enter highly
competitive, male-stereotypical and well-paid jobs. However, there is reason to believe that women experience backlash from entering such male
domains and from “acting male”. In this research project, we conduct an experiment to investigate whether neutral spectators put women at a
disadvantage in a male-stereotypical domain when income inequalities arise and competition is voluntary.
Author(s): Simone Haeckl, Jakob Moeller, Anita Zednik
Topic: Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences, Social Behavior: Norms and Morals
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Gender Differences in Dishonesty
Adrian Munnoz
 Universidad Autonoma de Madrid
ABSTRACT:
Dishonesty has an enormous impact in any facet of our society. It can cause even billions of annually loses in workplaces, so the efforts to understand
dishonest behavior have grown nowadays. One of the main questions yet to be answered is whether there might be gender differences in dishonesty:
Do men behave more dishonestly than women? Although the literature points towards a positive answer to that question, there is still no clear
consensus about it. In the current work, we studied gender differences in dishonesty in a large sample (2452 participants) using a new paradigm
recently developed by Pascual-Ezama et al. (2020) based on a variation of the classic “die-under-cup” task. This new paradigm allows us to
individually identify different dishonesty profiles, and look for gender differences among them. The results show no significant differences in
dishonesty between men and women when there is no reward. However, with small rewards men are more prone to behave dishonestly compared to
women. Also, the most “radically” dishonest individuals that cheated maximizing the reward tend to be men. Overall, different dishonesty profiles
show different gender modulations. The results provide novel insights showing that gender differences might be shaped by diverse factors rather than
just differences associated to gender.
Author(s): Adrian Munnoz Garcia, Beatriz Gil-Gomez de Lianno and David Pascual Ezama
Topic: Social Behavior: Lying and Cheating, Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences
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Ingroup Bias in a Social Learning Experiment
Wenbo Zou
 University of California, Davis
ABSTRACT:
Does social learning and subsequent private information processing differ depending on whether the observer shares the same group identity as the
predecessor? In this paper, we conduct a lab experiment to answer this question, in which subjects first observe a social signal and then receive a
private signal. We find that subjects put greater weights on the social signal if they share with the predecessor the same group identity that is induced in
the experimental environment. We also provide suggestive evidence that such ingroup bias cannot be explained by an ingroup-outgroup difference in
beliefs of the predecessor's rationality. Moreover, heterogeneous effects of group identity exist in weights given to the subsequent private signal:
Compared to when the predecessor is an outgroup, those who have learned from an ingroup put a greater (lower) weight on the private signal if it
contradicts (confirms) the social signal. We conjecture that such group effects are consistent with that group identity is a framing device that can be
easily replaced by alternative decision heuristics.
Author(s): Xue Xu, Wenbo Zou
Topic: Decision Theory: Beliefs, Decision Theory: Learning
Back to session: Identity 1
Does choosing who you are explain how you behave?
Evgeniya Chabanova
 University of Mainz, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main
ABSTRACT:
A large body of evidence shows that the social identity individuals perceive is related to their behavior. However, it remains unclear whether the
individual choice of identity also causally explains how people act. By using a novel laboratory experiment, we pin down the causal effect of how the
choice of identity translates into economic behavior. We find that individuals choose to identify with groups whose characteristics are more similar to
theirs and whose social status is higher. We then show that differences in these chosen identities also causally explain variation in dictator game
behavior: a higher perceived similarity between dictator and recipient causes dictator to behave more prosocially when interacting with the recipient
from this group. Surprisingly, we also find that while people are not willing to identify with lower status groups, they are nevertheless willing to
comfort recipients from these groups by offering more equal splits.
Author(s): Kevin Bauer, Evgeniya Chabanova, Florian Hett
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Social Behavior: Other
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In-group versus Out-group Preferences in Intergroup Conflict: An Experiment
Subhasish Modak Chowdhury
 University of Bath
ABSTRACT:
Individuals participating in a group conflict have different preferences, e.g., maximizing their own payoff, maximizing the group's payoff, or defeating
the rivals. When such preferences are present simultaneously, it is difficult to distinctly identify the impact of those preferences on conflict. In order to
separate in-group and out-group preferences, we conduct an experiment in which human in-group or out-group players are removed while keeping the
game strategically similar. Our design allows us to study (i) how effort in a group conflict vary due to in-group and out-group preferences, and (ii) how
the impact of these preferences vary when the two groups have explicitly different social identities. The results of our experiment show that the
presence of in-groups enhances concern about individual payoffs. A further presence of out-groups moderates the concern for individual payoffs
through an additional concern for own group payoffs. The negative effect of the in-group preferences and the positive effect of the out-group
preferences are weaker when group members have a common social identity.
Author(s): Subhasish M. Chowdhury; Anwesha Mukherjee; Roman M. Sheremeta
Topic: Games: Contests, Social Behavior: Group Behavior
Link: ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/105690.html
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I don't belong here! A simple model on intergroup cooperation and an experimental test with stigmatized individuals
Maria Jose Vazquez
 ETEA Foundation, Development Institute, Universidad Loyola Andalucia
ABSTRACT:
People tend to identify with their group and often cooperate more with ingroups than with outgroups, i.e., the so-called intergroup bias or ingroup
favoritism. However, outgroup favoritism is often observed as well, especially among low-status, negatively stereotyped groups. While it is known that
even trivial assignment of individuals to groups (“minimal” groups) can trigger intergroup bias, the channels that lead to group identification and
subsequent intergroup bias remain obscure. What is one's ingroup when there are multiple alternative sources of group identity? In this paper, we
introduce and test a simple multiplicative model on intergroup bias in cooperation that can capture both ingroup favoritism and outgroup favoritism.
The model defines a group's utility (GU) for the individual as the interaction between the perceived value of the group and its self-relevance (i.e., how
important the group is for the individual, due to self-identification or any other factor). Perceived value gives the sign of the effect of a group identity
on the individual's utility whereas self-relevance defines the strength of such an effect. In intergroup encounters, the individual compares the GU of the
groups involved and favors the group with higher GU. We experimentally test the model using a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game (played with
anonymous ingroup and outgroup counterparts in random order, without feedback) with a sample of users of a mentoring program comprising
negatively stereotyped, stigmatized young adults (S; n=112) as well as non-stigmatized ones (NS; n=82). The experiment allows us to study the effect
of three channels which are hypothesized to modulate a group's perceived value and/or self-relevance: minimal grouping, perceived similarity, and
repeated interaction history. In the game, the ingroup is an anonymous randomly selected participant from the same program center (i.e., a minimal
group based on administrative reasons), whereas the outgroup belongs to another center. Ingroup perceived similarity is proxied by the probability that
the ingroup counterpart is (also) S or NS, from 0% to 100% probability. Ingroup interaction history is proxied by the time the participant had been in
the program center prior to the experiment, from 0 to 74 weeks. We find opposite effects of the three variables on intergroup bias for S vs. NS
participants. For S [NS] individuals without prior interaction history with the ingroup, i.e., the “most minimal” grouping, we observe outgroup
[ingroup] favoritism. For S [NS] individuals, a longer interaction history with the ingroup is associated with more ingroup [outgroup] favoritism,
regardless of ingroup similarity. For S [NS] individuals, ingroup perceived similarity increases outgroup [ingroup] favoritism. Our model can explain
the observed patterns: the perceived value of the S [NS] identity is negative [positive] and repeated interaction with the ingroup increases [reduces] the
ingroup's perceived value among S [NS] individuals. Similarity does not seem to impact the ingroup's perceived value; if anything, it operates through
self-relevance.
Author(s): Antonio M. Espin, Maria J. Vazquez-De Francisco & Pablo Brannas-Garza
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Field Experiments: General
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Intergroup conflicts often involve individuals who voluntarily make personal sacrifice and take great risk to provide public goods. We investigate
prosocial risking and intergorup conflicts by extending the Volunteer's dilemma along two dimensions: risk-taking and intergroup competition. We
argue that intergroup competition engenders a sense of group identity and motivates group members to contribute to public goods in the absence of
leadership. To identify such motivational change, We come up with the group competition treatment, where two groups compete for a public good in a
sequential move. We find experimental evidence that intergroup competition significantly increases the volunteering rate of providing a public good
and can mitigate the negative impact of risk on intra-group cooperation. In response to intergroup competition, males are more likely to volunteer when
volunteering involves risk of failures, while females are responsive only if volunteering guarantees the success of public goods production. Risk
aversion influences volunteering in ways that are inconsistent to the expected utility theory. The role which individual heterogeneity may play in the
evolution of parochial altruism is explored and discussed to understand the observed heterogeneous treatment effects of risk aversion and genders.
Author(s): Florian Heine, Arjen van Witteloostuijn, and Tse-Min Wang
Topic: Games: Contests, Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource
Link: fheine.weebly.com/uploads/6/2/5/1/62510193/prosocial_risk_taking_and_intergroup_conflicts.pdf





I study whether the reason why role models change people's behavior is because they communicate that a person of a specific identity has been able to
succeed. I use an online experiment to isolate the effect of providing such information about past successful participants (‘statistical role models') on
subjects' decision to enter a risky, yet relatively high-paying math task, and their subsequent performance on the task. I set my study in the context of
gender stereotypes regarding mathematical ability, systematically manipulate the salience of stereotypes associated with the task, and test the
mechanisms that drive participation and performance in these settings. I find that while the information and stereotype treatments successfully
manipulate beliefs about aggregate gender success rates, this does not affect any of the measures associated with individual task choice or success
(self-confidence, math ability, and effort), leaving both outcomes of interest unaffected.
Author(s): Lenka Fiala
Topic: Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences, Applied Economics: Labor Market
Link: static1.squarespace.com/static/57e8e1e18419c20a8e26051b/t/6001cb634ab6a76aec4e0aa7/1610730341596/JMP_Jan15.pdf
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Group Image Concerns
Arno Apffelstaedt
 University of Cologne
ABSTRACT:
Do people care about the image of groups to which they belong? Do Christians care whether Christians as a group are perceived as moral? Do students
of Harvard feel pride when they tell others that Harvard graduates are known for being exceptionally philanthropic? Would they feel shame if instead
they had to report that Harvard graduates are exceptionally selfish? Social image concerns – the extent to which people care about what others think of
them – have been shown to be an important driver of economic as well as moral behaviors. In many instances however, people act not just as
representatives of themselves but also as representatives of groups they belong to. Inferences about whether her in-group is moral, smart, or generous,
may affect the well-being and behavior of the individual as much as inferences about herself. In this paper, we identify and quantify (for the first time)
the extent to which people have concerns about the social image of their in-group. We present an experimental paradigm that allows us to separate
group image concerns from individual image concerns. Our experiment provides several metrics for the strength of group image concerns: first, we
measure how much money people are willing to forgo to give their group a better image. Second, we use a money-metric approach to measure people's
willingness to report both good and bad things about their group – provided that these reports cannot reveal anything about the individual herself.
Using this measure, we are able to quantify the extent to which individuals associate shame and pride with their in-group's image. The experiment is
currently underway. First results will be presented at the conference.
Author(s): Arno Apffelstaedt, Goenuel Dogan, Fabian Hoffmann
Topic: Social Behavior: Group Behavior, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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Social identity and belief polarization
Florian Hett
 Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz
ABSTRACT:
We study the role of social identity and 'groupiness' for the polarization of political beliefs using an online experiment with a representative sample of
the US population, deployed the week before the 2020 US presidential election. In our online experiment, approximately 1,000 participants have to
predict both the outcome of the 2020 presidential election and policy-sensitive statistics a year after the election conditional on its outcome. To update
their initial predictions, individuals receive or can select articles on the respective topics from different news sources. We ask whether (i) people update
their beliefs in reaction to consuming information in a biased way, (ii) display a bias in their demand for information, and (iii) whether groupiness as
measured by other-other allocation games is associated with both these effects.
Author(s): Kevin Bauer, Yan Chen, Florian Hett, Michael Kosfeld
Topic: Decision Theory: Beliefs, Social Behavior: Other
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The influence of information-processing style on economic results of individual agents in conditions of fundamental
uncertainty
Alexander Neverov
 Institute of PsychoEconomic Researches
ABSTRACT:
The problem of relation between cognition, economic behavior and institutional framework is one of the most important question in economic
psychology today. Modern science knows that real economic agents have cognitive limits. Many researches show that the information asymmetry is a
very important part of the economic behavior determination. Equally important that the institutional framework influence on choices. However, the
detection to influence the information-processing styles on institutional framework of economic situation as researches goal is not common yet. We
used combine design: the lab experiment on decision-making and the eye-tracking technology to solving this task. Our research includes the two
stages. In the first step, we highlighted the styles of working with information. In the second step, a 10-iteration economic decision-making process lab
experiments under conditions of fundamental uncertainty were implementing. The 35 participants took part in first step. The each participant read a
volume of economic information about the rules of 10-iteration economic decision-making process lab experiment. The rules consisted in the format of
one A4 paper, 14-point Times New Roman, on a computer screen, with the 367 logical elements. The content of the information was a formalized rule
of forthcoming economic activity. All information was relevant for future economic situation. The working time with the information was not limited.
Information during processing was dividing into 12 blocks, according to the semantic load of each of them. The measurements were carrying out on a
screen with a resolution of 1920×1080 image with instructions on Russian or English 1094×773 pix using Tobii Pro Studio Enterprise Edition v3.4.8.
By gender, respondents were divided into Male = 16, Female = 19. The average age of the participants was ± 23.2 years. We used the standard filter “I-
VT filter” for the unloading data. After the first stage, the data analysis was realizing. We made a clustering, which based on the total duration on the
development of information and on the structure of the transition from one event (information assimilation stage) to another. This parameter indirectly
indicates the speed of information processing and its assimilation as knowledge, i.e. the speed of the process of forming the image of economic
activity. The clustering's results have showed the four information-processing styles. The first style is characterized by emphasis in working with
information on the transition from one semantic unit to another (more than 50% of all events), with symmetry in the distribution of zones of sustained
attention and switching attention beyond information (25.29% and 24.14%, respectively). This style is characterizing by the largest number of
transitions within the information field and the high quality of concentration on information. The latter suggests that this style is characterizing by high
selectivity in working with information, probably that associated with the selection of information according to pre-selected criteria (the targets). The
second style demonstrated a tendency to an average level of switching with an increase in concentration of attention on semantic blocks. At the same
time, the number of distractions from information in the process of work decreases (19.37%). The second style has an average level of attention switch
ability with the least time spent on switching. It is characterizing by the least amount events, but at the same time, the greatest duration of distraction
from the information field. The third style demonstrated the smallest share of saccades – 43.23%, with relative equality of fixations (concentration of
attention) and distraction from information (30.33% and 26.44%, respectively). This style is characterizing by a greater “stuck” on the information
blocks and a less pronounced generalization and synthetic nature of the information field. This suggests that this style is closest to the analytical type of
work with information. The fourth style has the largest share of concentration and the least share of distraction from information (35.83% and 14.84%,
respectively). This style is distinguishing by the highest level of concentration of attention within the information field, but relative to the first type - it
is somewhat less focusing on the selectivity of working with information. This style is characterizing by a higher motivation for future economic
activity with a smaller share of conscious goal-setting regarding future activities. In second step of our study, we suggested that selection of
information process is one of the main factors in economic decision making in conditions of information redundancy. That is why we chose the next
way of research. The decision making process was held under the time pressure, because the amount of information required a considerable amount of
time, but time to each period was limit ten minutes. In total, there were 10 iterations of the sales or buying of goods. The results of our experiment
showed that the group of subjects of the first style of working with information demonstrates a high proportion of bankrupts when making and
implementing economic decisions (almost a third). At the same time, the respondents of this group in half of the cases show the average level of the
results of the quality of the economic decisions taken. However, only almost one in five was able to show high efficiency at the end of the game.
Representatives of the second style do not differ in the presence of highly efficiency ones, and the share of bankrupts, as well as in the first style, is
almost a third. They have the highest share of average efficiency (67%). The respondents of the third style rank second in terms of average efficiency
(60%), with the remaining 40% being equally dividing between highly efficiency and bankrupt. The most successful were the respondents who clearly
expressed the characteristics of the fourth style of working with information. They do not have bankrupts and demonstrate the highest efficiency
indicators. Representatives of this style were not only able to maintain their starting conditions, but also improved them in almost half of the cases
(44%). Aware of the limitations imposed by the design of the experimental sessions, their results still suggest a certain relationship between the
information handling style, on the one hand, and the final efficiency of the economic agent, on the other.
Author(s): Alexander Neverov, Dmitry Vaskov, Armen Airapetian
Topic: Psychology and Biology: Cognition, Decision Theory: Ambiguity
Link: http://www.cper.ru
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People's decisions result from a preference-driven stochastic process in which the valuations of the options are compared in the brain. Also, they are
distorted by inconsistency in human behavior, recently demonstrated to come from endogenous fluctuations in the midbrain. The aim is to propose an
experimental approach for disentangling preferences from inconsistency. Since preferences should not change depending on how they are measured,
the mutual consistency of preferences revealed by choices and subsequent willingness to pay/accept (WTP/A) elicitations is explored here. To infer
about consistency, the model accounts for two possible sources of preference reversal in choice and WTP/A: (1) contingent WTP/A valuation does not
provide true WTP/A (tWTP/A) for options offered in prior binary choices; (2) even if tWTP/A values are equal for two options, there could be a
systematic bias towards one course of action in binary choice. To address (1), range-WTP/A elicitation method of asking participants for two prices is
used to account for participants' uncertainty in reporting WTP/A (with tWTP/A uniformly distributed in the interval between these two prices). When
calculating the probability that tWTP/A is greater for a given course of action (X) than for an alternative (Y), two error probabilities are parametrized
in the model: (?) probability that tWTP/A(X) < tWTP/A(Y) conditional on range-WTP/A(X) > range-WTP/A(Y) and (?) probability that tWTP/A(X) >
tWTP/A(Y) conditional on range-WTP/A(X) < range-WTP/A(Y). To address (2), probability of choosing X over Y for tWTP/A(X) = tWTP/A(Y) is
parametrized in the model to allow bias towards X (if >0.5) or Y (if <0.5). An unbiased decision maker chooses X over Y if tWTP/A(X) > tWTP/A(Y).
Accounting for the uncertainty of tWTP/A values and for bias, a decision maker chooses X over Y with (bias-adjusted) probability that tWTP/A(X) >
tWTP/A(Y). Therefore, that probability is fitted to choice data to find the model parameters through maximum likelihood estimation. Next, for every
choice, the probability of consistency and the probability of choosing X over Y conditional on consistency are calculated, where the latter refers to a
preference-driven stochastic process of choosing X over Y. For illustration, a within-subject experiment to explore the effect of increased working
memory load (IWML) on self-control in food choice is presented. Twenty-six participants (including ten participants who underwent choice session in
the fMRI scanner) made (i) the incentivized series of choices between self-control (X) and temptation (Y) in food consumption, where food item X
was earlier rated as healthier and less tasty by a participant, compared to item Y, followed by (ii) range-WTP elicitations of all the items presented in
the choice session (employing range-BDM procedure). Every choice (out of sixty) and every range-WTP elicitation were made twice: in high and in
low WML condition. Probability of consistency and probability of self-control conditional on consistency were calculated for every choice in both
conditions. Participants who improved consistency upon IWML, were poorer in self-control under IWML. For participants with diminished
consistency upon IWML, self-control was strengthened under IWML. The findings suggest that IWML strengthened preference of high over low
calorie foods, while � for some participants � IWML also deteriorated cognitive processing of taste evaluation, which resulted in poorer consistency
and improved self-control under IWML. These findings cannot be obtained from choice data (due to inability to disentangle IWML effect on
consistency from IWML effect on self-control) or from range WTP data directly combined with choices (without modelling (1) and (2) one cannot
conclude about consistency due to preference reversal in choice and WTP).
Author(s): Xaukasz Tanajewski
Topic: Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices, Psychology and Biology: Neuroeconomics
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How Choice Complexity in Liberalized Markets Hurts the Demand for Green Electricity
Manuel Grieder
 Zurich University of Applied Sciences (ZHAW)
ABSTRACT:
Many countries have liberalized their residential electricity markets or are considering to do so. Liberalization provides consumers with more freedom
of choice but also leads to higher choice complexity as consumers face a much larger number of different electricity contracts to choose from. We
hypothesize that consumers react to this increased choice complexity in liberalized markets by applying simplified decision strategies that allow them
to reduce cognitive effort. In particular, we predict that with increasing size of choice sets, consumers focus more on simple price attributes of
electricity contracts and less on the relatively complex environmental attributes, leading to a decrease in the demand for green electricity. In two online
experiments conducted in a representative (n=610) and a student sample (n=1,212) in Switzerland, we find that indeed when faced with a larger choice
set participants focus more on prices and choose cheaper electricity contracts containing less renewable and more conventional energy than when faced
with a smaller choice set. In addition, we also find evidence that a tax on conventional energy is a more effective policy instrument for shifting demand
towards renewables than behavioral instruments in the form of social norm interventions. Our results suggest that a liberalization of the household
electricity market has to be carefully managed such that consumers are not overwhelmed and do not shift their demand to cheaper but less
environmentally-friendly energy sources.
Author(s): Rebekka Baerenbold, Manuel Grieder, Renate Schubert
Topic: Applied Economics: Other, Psychology and Biology: Cognition
Link: dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3628373
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Experimental Evidence on the Relationship between Perceived Ambiguity and Likelihood Insensitivity
Luca Henkel
 University of Bonn
ABSTRACT:
What determines likelihood insensitivity in choices under ambiguity? This paper investigates ambiguity perception - the extent to which a decision-
maker has difficulties assigning a single probability to each possible event - as a potential determinant, a mechanism that is proposed by multiple prior
models. I test this mechanism with an experiment where I separately elicit a measure of likelihood insensitivity from choice behavior and a belief-
based measure capturing ambiguity perception. The latter measure is validated using an exogenously induced increase in the degree of ambiguity. I find
that increases in ambiguity perception caused by the exogenous increases in ambiguity lead to increases in likelihood insensitivity. Further, ambiguity
perception and likelihood insensitivity are significantly positively correlated. Taken together, these findings provide strong support for an ambiguity
perception based explanation of likelihood insensitivity.
Author(s): Luca Henkel
Topic: Decision Theory: Ambiguity, Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices
Link: uni-bonn.sciebo.de/s/hSkwr4URWOruK6l
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An Experimental Analysis of the Prize-Probability Tradeoff in Stopping Problems
Yair Antler
 Tel Aviv University
ABSTRACT:
We experimentally examine how individuals stop risky processes such as the evolution of prices when they have commitment power. We find types
who consistently choose stopping rules with large potential losses and small potential gains to induce a high winning probability (L-types), although
such choices entail a considerable downside risk. A smaller proportion of types choose stopping rules with the opposite characteristics. While the latter
pattern is consistent with cumulative prospect theory, the former pattern is inconsistent with prominent decision theories. We suggest that L-types solve
the prize-probability tradeoff in a qualitative manner, putting more emphasis on the winning probability.
Author(s): Yair Antler, Ayala Arad
Topic: Decision Theory: Ambiguity, Decision Theory: Bounded Rationality
Link: 5018ee9c-1913-4ae8-95a9-1de9d52b4c1f.filesusr.com/ugd/60b4e9_fc441306b0ff4580926b37ff3f22a349.pdf
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We design a new experiment to measure the effect of time pressure on performance in cognitive tasks as well as individual preferences for working
under time pressure. In the experiment, participants first solve adding-numbers games under different time limits and then choose their own payment
schemes. Our within-subject design allows us to look into individual heterogeneity in the ability to perform under time pressure. Results from our
experiment could shed light on the use of time pressure as an incentive device and lay the groundwork for future research into the ability to deal with
time pressure as an individual trait that is relevant for education and labor market outcomes.
Author(s): Thomas Buser, Roel van Veldhuizen, Yang Zhong
Topic: Applied Economics: Labor Market, Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences
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How to Fight Multi-market Cartels: An Experimental Comparison between the American and the European Leniency
Programs
Francois Cochard
 UNIVERSITE DE FRANCHE-COMTE
ABSTRACT:
In this paper, we report the results of an experiment aiming at comparing the American (Amnesty Plus) and the European leniency programs enforced
by the competition authorities to fight multi-markets cartels. When a firm has been convicted due to the detection of a cartel, leniency means that the
firm may obtain partial or full immunity if it cooperates and brings in evidence about this cartel. The US strengthened leniency programs for cartel in
multimarket settings in order to incite the members of a first cartel previously detected and convicted to reveal their membership in cartels on other
markets. With regard to the European program, Amnesty Plus may have a pro-collusive effect by encouraging the cartels' formation, as it reduces the
expected cost from conviction. Our results do not confirm this procollusive effect. However, we show that the incentive to report is significantly higher
under Amnesty Plus, both before and after a first cartel has been detected.
Author(s): Karine Brisset, Francois Cochard, Eve-Angeline Lambert
Topic: Markets: Industrial Organization, Markets: Other
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A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation into the Welfare Consequences of Late Payments
Matthew Walker
 Durham University Business School, UK
ABSTRACT:
We analyse how late payments affect market entry and price competition. Buyers first send a signal to potential suppliers about their intended payment
date. Suppliers then decide whether to incur a fixed and irreversible cost to enter into price competition. After the seller and winning bid is determined,
the buyer chooses the ex-post payment date, which may or may not coincide with the ex-ante date promised. We show that in theory, if firms value
payment made or received late below its nominal value, payment delays feed into higher consumer prices and reduced competition. This outcome
depends on the distribution of discount factors in the population, which we interpret as a proxy for a firm's financial strength. Reneging on a promise to
pay on-time entails a cost for the buyer. If this cost is not set carefully, a welfare loss arises. We find support for the main predictions of the model in an
experiment. The probability that a buyer follows an on-time payment strategy responds to the size of the cost of reneging and free-riding behaviour
emerges among weak buyers when the fine is not set high enough. We provide further experimental evidence that seller over-entry can distort payment
behaviours in the market. Our findings have implications for the horizontal effects of payment practices and for the design of regulatory interventions
to deter late payments.
Author(s): Matthew Walker, Kyle Hyndman
Topic: Markets: Industrial Organization, Games: Information
Link: mjwalker19.github.io/
Back to session: Industrial Organization 1
The Economics of Label Credence Goods
Felix Holzmeister
 University of Innsbruck, Department of Economics
ABSTRACT:
Many vertically differentiated credence goods involve the use of labels as an institution to communicate attributes of the products sold. Typical
examples of label credence goods are products that are differentiated by process-attributes, e.g., whether foods has been produced organically or not, or
whether electricity has been generated with green technologies. In a laboratory experiment with more than 1,300 participants, we examine the
determining factors of efficiency in label credence goods markets. While theory predicts that reputation building, verification, and monitoring increase
market efficiency, we find that reputation increases efficiency only in monopoly treatments, and verification only in competition treatments.
Monitoring, however, has a significant and sizeable effect on efficiency across various institutions. Contrary to the model predictions we find that seller
competition drives down prices, significantly reduces the share of green products traded, and cuts market efficiency to levels below the no-trade
benchmark.
Author(s): Blanco, Esther; Holzmeister, Felix; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Walzl, Markus
Topic: Markets: Industrial Organization, Markets: Other
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Virtue signaling in markets for credence goods
Loukas Balafoutas
 University of Innsbruck
ABSTRACT:
Many economic transactions are plagued by asymmetric information and misaligned incentives between two contracting parties. This is particularly
true in markets for credence goods, where the buyer is often unable to assess the suitability of a purchased good or service. As sellers who exhibit
other-regarding preferences will act in ways that better serve the buyers' interests, the latter will often look for cues or signals that allow them to
distinguish between other-regarding and self-interested sellers. At the same time, if sellers are aware that signals of moral character are used by buyers
as a means of selecting their interaction partners, they may attempt to generate them strategically. This generates a virtue signaling environment. We
study theoretically how sellers' past actions in a donation task may act as signals of their moral character in a credence goods market. We derive
conditions under which such signals are used by sellers and perceived as credible by buyers. The model's predictions are tested in a laboratory
experiment.
Author(s): Loukas Balafoutas, Alexandros Karakostas, Daniel Zizzo
Topic: Markets: Industrial Organization, Social Behavior: Norms and Morals
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Algorithmic and Human Collusion: Experimental Evidence
Tobias Werner
 DICE, University of Duesseldorf
ABSTRACT:
This paper investigates the competitive effects of self-learning pricing algorithms. There exist growing concerns among academics and regulators that
those algorithms could learn to collude tacitly on non-competitive prices and thereby harm consumers. First, I show that algorithms learn to collude
with each other in a simulated market environment where they face a perfectly inelastic demand function. Next, I conduct laboratory market
experiments with human participants and self-learned algorithms. Across different treatments, I vary the market size and the share of firms that use an
algorithm for their pricing decisions. I provide evidence that collusion becomes more prominent as more firms in the market use self-learned pricing
algorithms. This increase in price levels is driven by the strategies that algorithms learn to enforce collusion. Furthermore, self-learned algorithms
manage to cooperate with human players if both populate the same market. My results indicate that algorithmic collusion is an obstacle for markets
compared to traditional markets and should therefore be taken seriously from a regulatory perspective.
Author(s): Tobias Werner
Topic: Markets: Industrial Organization, Games: Repeated Games
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Behavioral Barriers and the Socioeconomic Gap in Child Care Enrollment
Henning Hermes
 NHH Bergen / Department of Economics
ABSTRACT:
Child care is an essential tool to support child development and to mitigate educational inequality early in life. While children from families with lower
socioeconomic status (SES) tend to benefit more from child care, their enrollment rates are substantially lower. We investigate whether alleviating
behavioral barriers in the early child care application process reduces this SES gap. In a randomized controlled trial with more than 600 families with
infant children in Germany, we implement a behavioral intervention that provides parents with information about child care and application assistance.
Nine months after the intervention, treated lower-SES families are 21 percentage points more likely to apply for a child care slot, and 16 percentage
points more likely to be enrolled in child care. The treatment has no effect on higher-SES families. In consequence, it closes the SES gap in application
probability entirely, and halves the SES gap in enrollment. Treatment effects are particularly strong for families who plan to enroll their child at
relatively young age and for parents who believe that returns to child care with respect to child development are high. Analyses of supply-side
constraints indicate that treatment effects are concentrated in areas with high competition for child care slots. In sum, we demonstrate that the
socioeconomic gap in child care enrollment is substantially determined by behavioral barriers, implying that policies aimed at mitigating these barriers
may foster equality of opportunity early on.
Author(s): Henning Hermes, Philipp Lergetporer, Frauke Peter, Simon Wiederhold
Topic: Applied Economics: Other, Field Experiments: General
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Unraveling Soft-Commitment: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment on Recycling
Pau Balart
Universitat de les Illes Balears
ABSTRACT:
Taking advantage of the implementation of a novel recycling system in Palma (Spain) that allows to record individual real-time data on the usage of
bio-waste containers, we run a field experiment involving 1,533 households to test the effectiveness of soft-commitments in fostering recycling. We
offered to a random set of households the possibility of signing a non-binding commitment on recycling practices and found that it had a positive
impact on recycling habits. Soft-commitment increases regular participation in biowaste recycling by 7 percentage points. This represents a 23-28\%
increase relatively to the control group of households that participated in the intervention but to whom the soft-commitment was not offered. We also
show that the effect of soft-commitment persists almost one year after having been offered. Using a two-part model, we show that soft-commitment
increases the amount of household that participates in recycling (extensive margin) but, conditional on recycling, it does not affect the proportion of
weeks that they recycle (intensive margin).
Author(s): Eduard Alonso , Pau Balart, Lara Ezquerra , Innigo Hernandez-Arenaz
Topic: Field Experiments: General, Social Behavior: Group Behavior
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The Can Challenge: Exploring the Best Way to Incentivise Recycling Behaviour
Michael Brock
 UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA
ABSTRACT:
This field experiment implements two possible incentive mechanisms to assess how likely each is for yielding greater levels of engagement in
recycling as a service. The first is a piece-rate system, similar to that already used in many European countries. The second uses a lottery-based system,
its selection reinforced by evidence from experimental literature within behavioural economics showing lotteries can be very effective in stimulating
effort through the competitive environment it creates (Davis & Reilly, 1998; Konrad, 2009). We also recognise an opportunity to model subject
behaviour using the Bass Model (Bass, 1969) from the marketing literature. This enables us to gather a deeper understanding of the diffusion process
among individuals for adopting the recycling service and make further predictions that could be generalised to other environments. The most important
factors that are found to influence recycling can be classified as social, psychological, and economic factors (see for example the meta-reviews by
Kninkmeyer, 2017; Miafodzyeva and Brandk, 2013; Varotto and Spagnolli, 2017). Our study focuses on both the economic factors and location
settings. Regarding the former, we look specifically at the effectiveness of probabilistic rewards versus piece-rate incentives in increasing the
engagement in the recycling behaviour, with a specific focus on drinks cans. Economic factors can come in the form of positive rewards that
individuals receive for their participation in recycling activities. Incentives such as prizes, lottery tickets, vouchers, monetary rewards, sponsoring a
party. have been shown to increase the engagement in recycling (consider having all references except for Diamond and Loewy here as citation only
Iyer and Kashyap 2007). Luyben and Bailey 1979 found that monetary rewards increased the amount of recycled papers more than just having access
to the recycling facility. In two related studies Geller et al. (1975) and Wtimer and Geller (1976) found that individual raffles were more effective than
group ones in increasing the amount of paper recycled, and that both were more effective than no reward at all. Recycling in one context has been
shown not to carry over to other contexts. For example, people recycle less while on holidays (Barr et al., 2010), at university (Scott, 2009) or in the
workplace (Marans and Lee, 1993, Lee et al. 1995). Despite this, recycling in the workplace, compared to the domestic one, has received little
attention. What is more, recycling in university dormitories is classified in the meta-analysis by Oke (2015) as recycling in the workplace. Only a
handful of those studies are run in work offices like those in our study, and the majority of them employ surveys as an investigative method (Marans
and Lee, 1993, Lee et al. 1995). Our study offers valuable insights into how Norfolk County Hall's employees respond to monetary incentives. The
field experiment involved a Monitoring Phase (MP) in which can recycling was simply monitored, and an Incentive Phase (IP) in which recycling was
not only monitored but also monetarily incentivised. We implemented the experiment in two different environments: a residential environment (RE),
and a workplace environment (WE). Participants in RE were households living in two different social housing areas in Norwich. Participants in WE
were Norfolk County Hall employees. In MP we monitored for 10 weeks the number of cans recycled that participants were instructed to place in the
special bins prepared by the experimenters. participants. This data serves as a benchmark to evaluate the effectiveness of the monetary incentives
implemented in IP. IP consists of three treatments: the No-Incentive treatment (NI), the Pay-per can treatment (PPC), and the Lottery treatment (L).
Overall, our results can be partly explained by demographics differences across locations. In RE we believe that the low level of income of this group
to be the main determinants for this result. Casual chats with residents and the large number of can recycled by some flats, suggests that monetary
rewards are the main reason for engaging in recycling. Some residents found cash payment to be particularly appealing (A couple told us that they
wanted to buy a car with the money from can recycling! They were very serious about it, to the point that they were collecting cans also from the
streets to increase their “revenues”). The possibility of raising some money with this activity might explain why in the absence of incentives recycling
is almost non-existent, and also why the Lottery scheme was not as successful, as residents might have found it too risky to bear the cost of recycling
without the certainty of that behaviour being rewarded. The analysis of the diffusion process confirms this conjecture, as monetary rewards seem to act
as extrinsic motivator, In WE both incentive schemes prove very successful. Unlike in RE, we do not believe that monetary rewards were the main
drivers. First, the baseline treatment and no-incentive condition demonstrate a good level of engagement. Second, the money raised in the incentive
treatments was given to the floor managers rather than paid to the single employee. The higher level of proximity in WE compared to RE might instead
be the reason behind the success of our interventions. As explained earlier, proximity makes behaviour highly observable and this can increase the
social pressure into the desired recycling activity. As a result of this proximity, monetary rewards can also stimulate competition across floors into who
recycles the most, particularly so in the L treatment, in which engagement levels can be indirectly inferred by knowing who has won the contest. This
might also explain why this incentive scheme was more successful than the PPC one. The engagement in recycling behaviour, in principle, is
comparable to the conscious adoption of a public service available to all citizens across all demographic groups. The adoption of a product or a service
(public or private) concerns primarily the consumer behaviour and ultimately marketing literature. Among many, Menese and Palacio (2005) compare
recycling to the adoption of a product and enforce the need of establishing successful marketing strategies to incentives the recycling behaviour. We
follow a similar reasoning and we borrow the Bass model to interpret our experimental data and analyse the engagement in recycling from a service
adoption perspective. The Bass diffusion model, while extensively employed in the marketing literature, we believe that it has never been used to
understand the diffusion mechanic and the role of proximity in recycling behaviour. The Bass model analysis supports the interpretation of our results.
In RE we find a sharp difference in the diffusion process between the baseline and the incentive treatments. By contrast in WE the difference is very
mild. Diffusion in the workplace can be explained in the MP by recycling habits at home influencing recycling in the workplace. However not only is
this not consistent with findings in the literature (McDonald, 2011), it does not even explain differences in the diffusion processes across floors
between NI and both incentive treatments, PPC and L. However, compared to the NI, in all respects equal to MP, we observe a much stronger diffusion
process. This can only be explained by the introduction of incentives in other floors that not only stimulates recycling in those floors but also has a
positive influence on the floors that were not monetarily incentivised. What does then explain the recycling behaviour observed in the MP? And what
explains this sort of “spin-off” effect observed in the IP? The MP can be considered in itself a novelty. Even though no monetary incentive is present, a
behavioural incentive to recycle is perhaps introduced, by simply introducing a new recycling scheme. The introduction of this new scheme is
comparable to an innovation introduced on the market regarding a product or product's features, in line with the ground elements of the Bass Model.
The innovation itself positively (on average) affects the diffusion of a product or a service. We believe that this can partly explain what we observe in
the baseline period in WE. However, novelty alone cannot explain the increase in recycling witnessed in the subsequent NI treatment, that can instead
be more plausibly explained by the prolonged physical closeness that characterises the WE environment. Close daily proximity in a workplace makes
interactions among individuals more likely compared to residential areas, increasing the chances of informational exchanges by word of mouth. The
novelty of the MP feeds in the diffusion mechanism and is supported by the observability of the recycling behaviour. The proximity among individuals
and the observability of their behaviour seem a suitable explanation for the spin-off effect observed in WE. In the RE environment the novelty of the
MP is not as effective as in WE. This is possibly due to the lower level of proximity among participants, which makes the recycling behaviour less
observable, but more importantly, to the lack of monetary rewards. Overall, our analysis brings forward important insights relevant for the literature
and the design of recycling policies. First, we contribute by analysing the experimental evidence through the Bass model, which, to the best of our
knowledge, has never been employed in this particular setting. The Bass model provides a robust analysis of the adoption of the service and serves also
as a benchmark for future analogous investigations. It is common in the literature to employ the estimated Bass parameters of an industry sector (or of
a specific product) to estimate the potential adopters of products or services that haven't yet been launched in the market. Thus, our estimations are
suitable to provide a forecast of the diffusion process of the recycling service within different environments and conditions. Our second main
contribution lies in the inclusion of different environments in our field experiments. A large portion of the literature has focused on household
behaviour, a smaller portion on university students and only a handful of studies on recycling in the workplace. To the best of our knowledge, these
studies have mainly employed surveys, rather than field experiments with monetary rewards as we do. The use of monetary rewards to incentivise pro-
social behaviour has been criticized in the literature (e.g. Varotto and Spagnolli, 2017) on several grounds and can be considered as a limitation of our
work. Specifically, pro-social behaviour is sustained only when monetary incentives are in place but reverts to normal when they are removed. It might
negatively affect intrinsic motivations to recycling because of the strong association between reward and behaviour. It is costly and not a viable way
from an economic perspective. Whilst we are aware and not necessarily disagree with this, we believe that in workplaces it is possible to design non-
monetary incentive systems that mimic the monetary ones in the way they work. The results in WE suggest that the success of the recycling scheme
was enhanced by the incentives, but we found evidence that the driver was not the income arising from those rewards. We therefore could design
mechanisms that stimulate the same behavioural response but do not offer monetary rewards. This could be for example the introduction of a contest in
which different teams (e.g. divisions) in a company compete for a symbolic prize, a trophy, won by who recycles the most. This type of mechanism
could also be introduced in University departments and involve staff, both academic and non, as well as students. These interventions could be
implemented alongside informational campaigns around recycling, and this would further weaken the link between behaviour and rewards. Other types
of interventions could still include monetary rewards designed so to reward rather than the amount recycled the act of recycling. These could be for
example random checks into recycling bins to reward those that have recycled the most. This type of incentives follows a random reinforcement
schedule that has been shown in behavioural psychology to be the most successful in producing a permanent behavioural change. The success of the
recycling scheme in the WE is also primarily supported by proximity among individuals, which leads us to believe that in high density residential
areas, novel mechanisms such as those suggested above, could prove successful as well. Household recycling could also result in behavioural spill
overs from adherence to workplace recycling schemes. While recycling habits at home have been shown not to translate into recycling in the
workplace the other way round has not been investigated. Therefore, this research can be seen as a starting point for a wide range of future
investigations that should look more closely at the role of incentives that mimic that of the monetary one, the importance of proximity in recycling in
contexts other than working places, and behaviour spillovers arising from recycling in the workplace. This study invites interesting questions on how to
best increase public involvement in recycling and other pro-environmental action. A key feature of this study was providing payment for recycling. In
light of a report published in 2018 (EIWG Report), the UK Government has committed to implement a Deposit Return Scheme on drinks containers.
This current plan offers no premium for returning bottles and cans beyond the price increment paid at the checkout. However, our findings imply that,
for a ‘significant minority' within the population (particularly those on low incomes), offering small rewards for such action could really raise their
propensity to engage with this process. Keywords: Recycling; Field Experiment; Incentives; Bass Model; Environmental Policy JEL Codes: C93; Q58
Author(s): Stefania Sitzia, Michael Brock, Lucia M. Murgia, Jiwei Zheng
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Financial Education via Gamification: Evidence from a Large-scale Field Trail
Marius Dietsch
 Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz
ABSTRACT:
By running a large-scale field trial, we investigate the effectiveness of a gamified experiential learning treatment within a Fintech financial aggregation
app. With about 250k participants of which about 25k take part in a financial literacy survey, we analyze whether and to what extent a non-incentivized
gamified financial education tool changes households' current account balances, overdrafts, and savings volumes over time. By specifically looking at
the treatment's differential impact on participants' self-perceived financial literacy, we hypothesize those with higher reported literacy to benefit more
than others. While the tool has no impact on overall savings and overdraft behavior, we find the treatment to increase average monthly current account
balances by about 55 Euros while reducing overall logins into the app. This effect stems from existing and less engaged customers and is not
influenced by self-reported financial literacy.
Author(s): Andreas Hackethal, Michael Kosfeld, Florian Hett, Andrej Gill, Marius Dietsch
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Are pro-environment behaviours substitutes or complements? Evidence from the field
Raisa Sherif
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Munich
ABSTRACT:
This paper uses a field experiment among adolescents in India to study how interventions designed to increase one pro-environment activity (namely,
recycling single-use plastic carry bags), spill over to other pro-environment activities. I show using lab and field experiments combined with survey
data that (i) providing information on the need to recycle does not change recycling behaviour, whereas (ii) providing incentives along with the
information leads to higher recycling. There is a positive spillover from the incentive treatment to other pro-environment activities. This positive
spillover is observed among subjects who respond to the incentives and increase recycling. Notably, the positive spillover is also observed among those
in this treatment who do not respond to the incentives and do not change recycling behaviour. This evidence indicates strong complementarities among
pro-environment behaviours and suggests that interventions may have unaccounted positive effects on non-target environment behaviours.
Author(s): Raisa Sherif
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Using Contact to Improve the Relationship between the Police and the Population
Gwen-Jiro Clochard
 CREST - Ecole polytechnique
ABSTRACT:
The relationship between the police and parts of the youth in France is tense, and violent outbreaks sporadically occur. In this paper, I conduct a lab-in-
the-field experiment to test the effect of very short face-to-face meetings between police officers and high-school students in two high-schools in Paris'
suburbs. The data was collected during March 2021, and is still being processed, but preliminary results indicate that the contact has a positive and
significant effect on the amount sent in the trust game if the person met is a police officer, corresponding to approximately 0.9 tokens additional tokens
sent, or 0.25 standard deviations. The effect, however, does not appear to translate to an increase of trust towards police officers in general.
Author(s): Gwen-Jiro Clochard
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Information intervention to promote safe water consumption: An RCT in areas affected by groundwater arsenic in India
Daniel Salicath
 University of Cologne
ABSTRACT:
We use a randomized controlled trial in Bihar, India, to test the effectiveness of an information intervention about arsenic in groundwater that focused
on raising awareness and recommending low-cost mitigation techniques. The intervention enhanced knowledge and increased adoption of healthy
water treatment practices and reduced the use of unhealthy ones. We also find a reduction in measured arsenic quantity in the primary drinking water
source and significant improvements in mental health eight weeks after the intervention. The initial results suggest low-cost and low-effort information
interventions can be an effective tool to change behavior.
Author(s): Shambhavi Priyam, Daniel Salicath and Matthias Sutter
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Fairness of Wage Cuts
Essi Kujansuu
 European University Institute
ABSTRACT:
I study how workers' effort responds to different kinds of wage cuts and whether employers anticipate these reactions correctly. Workers and employers
engage in a laboratory real-effort gift exchange market with negative shocks. Hiring happens by initial offers before potential shocks are announced.
The non-binding offers can then be adjusted. Effort is non-contractible and determined after workers learn their final wages. To predict responses to
wage cuts, I use a model of social preferences and negative reciprocity. Without shocks, employers should never cut wages. Adjustment might be,
however, justifiable after a shock if sharing its burden is considered to be fair. With a laboratory experiment, I find that although wage cuts are
counterproductive, their effects are insignificant in the absence of shocks. After shocks, wage cuts are punished, regardless of whether the shock hits
employers or workers. Surprisingly, it does not matter whether the shock hits predominately the employer or the worker as in both cases the cuts lead
to considerably lower effort.
Author(s): Essi Kujansuu
Topic: Social Behavior: Norms and Morals, Markets: Other
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Supported Employment or treatment-as-usual? Results from a large-scale randomized field experiment
Karen Hauge
 Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research
ABSTRACT:
A high share of people with reduced work capacity end up outside of the labor marked. Supported Employment is a methodology that was developed
in the US to help people into employment. While traditional vocational rehabilitation focused on training and preparing before placement in the
ordinary job market, the focus of Supported Employment is fast placement in the ordinary job market while simultaneously receiving support to keep
the job (so-called «place-then-train»). Several RCT-studies from the US, as well as other countries, have shown that Supported Employment increases
employment relative to other programs. However, many of these studies rely on small samples and focus on people with severe mental illnesses. We
report the results from a large randomized field experiment conducted in a European setting. The field experiment was conducted from 2014-2017 in 6
Norwegian counties in collaboration with the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration, and included 3737 participants. The study population
consists of people with reduced work capacity who needed help to find or keep employment in the ordinary job market, and who normally would have
been applied into one of two train-then-place programs. We compare the labor market outcomes for those who were randomized to Supported
Employment with those who were randomized to the treatment-as-usual. We evaluate the effect of the intervention using administrative register data
which give us the possibility to follow the participants in up to 6 years, month-by-month, without attrition. The evaluation suggests that the experiment
was successful in the sense that the randomization was without manipulation and that program participation was in line with the randomization. We do
not find any lasting differences in labor market outcomes between the two treatment groups. Our results, based on a large sample of people with
reduced work capacity, therefore implies that Supported Employment does not entail improved quality relative to existing programs.
Author(s): Helene Berg, Karen Huge, Simen Markussen, Tao Zhang
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Child Care and Maternal Labor Supply: A Field Experiment
Marina Krauss
 University of Augsburg
ABSTRACT:
Despite a considerable convergence during the past decades, gender gaps in labor-market outcomes still persist. Especially full-time employment rates
differ substantially between men and women. Increasing evidence suggests that motherhood and child care obligations are among the key drivers of
gender inequalities in the labor market. We provide first experimental evidence on the effects of publicly provided child care below the age of three on
maternal full-time employment. We exploit a randomized intervention with more than 600 parents in Germany that had large positive effects on child
care enrolment for families with lower socioeconomic status (SES). We find a large positive effect of the intervention on full-time employment rates of
lower-SES mothers: Eighteen months after the treatment, when children are aged between two and three years, the treatment increased lower-SES
mothers' full-time employment by about 8 percentage points. Given that only 5 percent of lower-SES mothers in the control group work full-time, our
intervention more than doubles the probability to work full-time for lower-SES mothers. At the same time, the gender gap in full-time employment in
the lower-SES sample is reduced by 11 percent due to our intervention. Our results suggest that child care provision below the age of three is an
effective tool to mitigate the gender gap in full-time employment.
Author(s): Henning Hermes, Philipp Lergetporer, Frauke Peter, Simon Wiederhold
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Increasing Employment Through the Partial Release of Information
Todd Kaplan
 University of Exeter
ABSTRACT:
We investigate whether an agency can increase employment by strategically releasing partial information about workers' skills and abilities to
employers. Theoretically, we find that such an increase is possible and that there exists a range of employment levels that can be supported in
equilibrium. We test this possibility using laboratory experiments with subjects as employers and agencies. We find that full information about workers
leads to employer profits that are consistent with theory. Revealing coarser and not necessarily verifiable information about workers increases
employment at the expense of the employers' profits but not to the highest theoretically achievable levels.
Author(s): Surajeet Chakravarty and Luke Lindsay
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This paper theoretically and experimentally analyzes a repeated principal-agent game with varying relative stakes. We study an environment with
asymmetric information. The principal hires an informed agent to observe the state and take action accordingly. There is a high probability that the
principal and the agent have misaligned preferences. Repeated play becomes valuable in such a setting by improving the equilibrium payoff of the
principal. The agent has reputation incentives that motivate her to take action matching the true state in the initial periods rather than maximize her
own period payoff. As Morris (2001) calls, the "discipline effect" of the reputation incentives benefits the principal. We show it is optimal for the
principal to start the interaction small and increase the stakes gradually. The agent's reputation incentives are managed so that the reputation evolves
slowly. We test these predictions in four treatments via online experiments. Each period receives an equal stake in one treatment. In the other three
treatments, the interaction starts small, and the stakes increase at different speeds. We show that the smaller the interaction starts, the higher the
reputation incentives of the agent. More importantly, we show that the principal earns a higher payoff in starting-small (gradualism) treatments than the
equal-stakes treatment. We contribute to the literature on gradualism by showing it is a valuable tool to improve equilibrium payoffs in the particular
principal-agent framework with asymmetric information.
Author(s): Shahin Baghirov
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Peer effect within homogenous groups, such as neighbors, are well-documented in the literature. This paper explores peer effect from a novel
hierarchical perspective using data from workplace. With the employer-employee match information and credit card consumption records from a bank,
we find that individual's consumption is significantly influenced by coworkers of all hierarchical layers. Interestingly, peer effects with coworkers at
higher layer are positive correlated with the probability of getting a raise in salary. For raised individuals, their peer effects with higher-layer workers
increase significantly both before and after the raise; while for the non-raised workers, there is a similar increase before but declines immediately after
their colleagues' salary raises. Our findings suggest that promotion incentive can be a novel motivation underlying the peer effect in a hierarchical
context.
Author(s): Miao Jin; Yu-Jane Liu; Juanjuan Meng; Yu Zhang
Topic: Social Behavior: Other, Applied Economics: Other
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Monetary and Social Incentives in Multi-Tasking: The Ranking Substitution Effect
Matthias Stefan
 University of Innsbruck
ABSTRACT:
Rankings are intended as incentive tools on labor markets. Yet, when agents perform multiple tasks -- not all of which can be ranked with respect to
performance --, rankings might have unintended side-effects. Based on a dynamic model of multi-tasking, we present an experiment with financial
professionals in which we identify hidden ranking costs when performance in one task is ranked while in another prosocial task it is not. We find that
subjects lagging behind (leading) in the ranked task devote less (more) effort to the prosocial task. We discuss implications for optimal incentive
schemes in organizations with multi-tasking.
Author(s): Matthias Stefan, Jorgen Huber, Michael Kirchler, Matthias Sutter, Markus Walzl
Topic: Decision Theory: Preferences, Social Behavior: Other
Link: econpapers.repec.org/paper/innwpaper/2020-06.htm
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Collaborative Dishonesty: A Meta-Study
Margarita Leib
 University of Amsterdam
ABSTRACT:
Whereas dishonesty is often a social phenomenon, it is mostly studied in individual settings. The last decade has seen extensive multi-disciplinary
work in economics, psychology, management, and related fields studying the extent to which people are dishonest in settings where dishonesty is
independent of others. However, dishonesty often depends on others and requires collaboration. For instance, in Volkswagen's emission scandal,
engineers had to collaborate with their peers to manipulate emissions test results to meet US standards, causing damage of 59 early deaths and $450
million. We present the first meta-analysis on collaborative dishonesty, drawing on data from 51,640 decisions, made by 3,264 participants across 43
experimental treatments. Results reveal that in collaborative settings people lie substantially. They lie more when their partners lie; in later stages of the
interaction; and when the financial temptation to lie is high. Further, early decisions have big impact on the overall dishonesty of the dyads. We
conclude by identifying open theoretical questions and setting an agenda for future research. Most notably, our meta-study highlights the importance of
studying the collaborative roots of dishonesty.
Author(s): Margarita Leib, Nils C. Koebis, Ivan Soraperra, Ori Weisel, & Shaul Shalvi
Topic: Social Behavior: Lying and Cheating, Social Behavior: Group Behavior
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Risk taking with unethical money: An experimental study
Sorravich Kingsuwankul
 Gate Lab, University of Lyon
ABSTRACT:
The previous literature has shown that people use money differently according to whether it has been earned through personal effort or by being lucky.
Since sometimes money is also earned through unethical means, we investigate whether dishonestly earned money is treated more as a windfall income
or as the result of costly effort, which could be the case if dishonestly-earned money came at a psychological cost. We conducted an online experiment
to test whether people make different decisions under the risk of losing an endowment, depending on whether this endowment was previously earned
through a moral choice, effort or randomness. We found that in the context of risk taking, individuals treat dishonestly-earned money more like a
windfall gain from luck than as an effort-based income. The increase in risk taking with dishonestly-earned money is especially prevalent among risk
averse individuals.
Author(s): Sorravich Kingsuwankul, Marie Claire Villeval
Topic: Decision Theory: Risk, Social Behavior: Lying and Cheating
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The evolution of honesty by partner choice
Aslihan Akdeniz
 University of Amsterdam
ABSTRACT:
How can honesty evolve, if one can gain from lying? We experimentally test how, in the presence of asymmetric information, honesty allows people to
credibly commit to behaving prosocially, and that partner choice then explains why honesty in people has been selected for. Our results show that there
is a strong preference for honest partners, driven by an expected positive correlation between honesty and prosociality, and that this is also rationalized
as honest people behave indeed more prosocially. By comparing treatments with communication and without communication, we further study how
communication can scaffold the connection between honesty and prosociality. We show that honest individuals are consistently prosocial independent
of whether there is explicit communication or not. Less honest individuals on the other hand use the asymmetry in information to their advantage when
this requires them to deceive their partners implicitly, but not when it requires them to tell an explicit lie. Honesty therefore credibly signals
commitment to prosociality and makes honest people more attractive partners, which can then compensate for the costs of honesty, and explain how
honesty can evolve.
Author(s): Aslihan Akdeniz, Stephan Jagau, Shaul Shalvi, Matthijs van Veelen
Topic: Social Behavior: Lying and Cheating, Psychology and Biology: Emotions
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Unethical behavior towards groups
Michel Tolksdorf
 Technische University Berlin
ABSTRACT:
This paper experimentally studies lying behavior in situations where other people are directly affected by the lie. We contrast lying towards
individuals, small groups (groups of three) and large groups (groups of 6) as one dimension and whether the total damage caused by the lie is shared
among or multiplied by those who are affected by the lie. The damage distribution only affects groups differently, which leaves the lie towards
individuals as a unifying benchmark. Early results suggest that participants lie less when groups are affected independent of how damage is distributed
when the group is small. For larger groups efficiency concerns seem relevant, as damage that is multiplied induces more truth-telling than damage that
is shared among the group, i.e. where individual harm is lessened. In ongoing exploratory analysis we link stated motivations of the participants with
their revealed behavior. This might reveal what drives appar- ently less rational lying behavior, such as downward lying or non-exhaustive upward
lying.
Author(s): Vera Angelova and Michel Tolksdorf
Topic: Social Behavior: Lying and Cheating, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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Dynamics of deception between strangers
Aljaz Ule
 CREED, Amsterdam School of Economics
ABSTRACT:
Little is known how dishonesty, and any associated psychological costs, develop with time. On one hand, a truth-telling norm may emerge with social
sanctions imposed on cheaters. On the other hand, past experience of dishonesty may with time reduce any reservations against cheating. In this project
we investigate the development of honesty in a repeated deception game between strangers. For 100 periods, groups of 6 subjects play sender-receiver
games with random matching and we vary the information that senders see about past honesty of their current receivers. We compare the resulting
dynamics to the development of generosity in equivalent repeated helping games. Unsurprisingly, we find that reputation decreases deception.
Surprisingly, we also find that people are more likely to be generous than to tell truth, with no evidence supporting a stable cost of lying. One
explanation is that vicious cycles are more common in interactions that involve deception.
Author(s): Aljaz Ule and Ziga Velkavrh
Topic: Social Behavior: Lying and Cheating, Games: Repeated Games
Back to session: Lying 2
Measuring Individual Preferences for Truth-Telling
Susanna Grundmann
 University of Cologne
ABSTRACT:
Fraudulent behaviors are prevalent in many markets, particularly, when lying at the individual level is not observable. Aggregate data from controlled
environments suggest heterogeneous preferences for truth-telling which are determined by the combination of an intrinsic motivation to be honest and
the desire to be seen as honest. However, aggregate data do not allow us to understand which truth-telling types (co)exist and how prevalent each type
is. Both are crucial for the cost-effective design of institutions. We propose a novel experimental measure of individual preferences for truth-telling that
keeps true states of the world unobservable. The key idea of the experiment is not to rely upon actual reports, but to measure participant's intention to i)
be dishonest and ii) avoid being seen as dishonest. This allows to identify the importance of both motives at the individual level without knowing
whether participants actually lied. First results suggest systematic heterogeneity in preference types, for whom one or both underlying motives matter.
Also, the intention to be dishonest turns out to be predictive of behavior in two incentivized validation tasks. The intention to be seen as honest appears
to matter most for participants who have some, but not too strong intentions to be dishonest. Based on these findings, we propose an even simpler
version of our measure suited for representative samples allowing for individual-level predictions of behavior in many other domains.
Author(s): Susanna Grundmann, Simeon Schudy, Lisa Spantig
Topic: Social Behavior: Lying and Cheating, Social Behavior: Norms and Morals
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Lie O'clock: Experimental Evidence on Intertemporal Lying Preferences
Georgia Michailidou
 New York University Abu Dhabi (NYUAD)
ABSTRACT:
In standard lying utility models, benefits and costs typically occur presently and simultaneously. However, lying and its products often develop
asynchronously. Considering established and emerging evidence about the role of discounting on effort excretion, charitable giving, and altruism, we
set out to study lying behaviour in time dynamic contexts. We develop an experiment in which we manipulate the intensity and time occurrence of
stakes, externalities, and image costs of lying aiming to make structural inferences about the intertemporal properties of lying preferences.
Author(s): Georgia Michailidou, Hande Erkut
Topic: Social Behavior: Lying and Cheating, Decision Theory: Preferences
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You Lie? I Lie? How Social Norms and Reputational Concerns Affect Honesty
Timo Promann
 University of Hamburg
ABSTRACT:
People frequently engage in dishonest behavior, which entails large costs to individuals, organisations, and society. Consider fraudulent practices in
organizations inciting corruption, tax fraud, and related malfeasance (prominent examples include Enron, Volkswagen, or Wirecard), for instance,
which bear large costs to society (e.g. Dyck et al., 2013). A commonly applied remedy to increase moral behavior is to address reputational concerns
by increasing observability and transparency. For example, in 2001, Norway implemented a system of public disclosure for tax reports, through which
citizens could see what their friends and neighbors have reported (Bo et al., 2015). Similarly, companies often implement a “four-eyes principle” to
increase honest behavior. The idea is simple: By increasing people's reputational concerns through e.g., higher observability or transparency, people
behave more honestly. Despite the widespread popularity of these approaches, previous studies on the effects of reputational concerns on honest
behavior yield inconsistent results. On the one hand, in some situations reputational concerns increase honesty (Bo et al., 2015; Bodenschatz &
Irlenbusch, 2019). The system of public disclosure in Norway increases income reports (Bo et al., 2015). On the other hand, some studies found no, or
even a negative relationship between reputational concern and honesty (Weisel & Shalvi, 2015). To illustrate, people lied more often, rather than less
often, when another person could observe them but benefited from their dishonesty (Weisel & Shalvi, 2015). These disparate findings present a puzzle
that is yet unresolved: When and why do reputational concerns increase honesty? To advance theory and guide the development of effective policies
and intervention to curtail dishonesty, it is crucial to understand the circumstances under which reputational concerns increase honesty. One possible
explanation for the inconsistent effects is that situations differ in the extent to which people expect others to behave (dis)honestly. Observing others
actual behavior can alter ones empirical expectations on what constitutes the social norm in a given context (Bicchieri, 2016). In Norway, people might
have clear expectations of other people's high social expectations towards their honesty, and therefore reputational concerns increase people's
conformity to the underlying social norm of honesty. On the other hand, when another person benefits from your dishonesty and you observe this
person lying, people might expect that their observer's social expectations towards them points into the opposite direction of honesty. Here, reputational
concerns through observability have been shown to increase dishonest behavior. We propose that reputational concerns increase honesty to the degree
that the underlying social norm is to be honest. If instead the social norm is to be dishonest, reputational concerns can have a backfiring effect and
rather increase people's dishonesty. We test this proposition by manipulating people's perception of the social norm as well as their reputational
concerns. Following Bicchieri & Dimant (2019), we aim to nudge social norms by manipulating subject's empirical expectations on social
expectations. For that, participants will be informed about how others behaved (dishonest norm or honest norm). We will then induce reputational
concerns by making participant's decisions observable by their social norm group or not (high vs. low reputational concerns). We expect that
reputational concerns increase honesty when the norm is to be honest, yet that reputational concerns can have a backfiring effect when the norm is to be
dishonest, i.e., reputational concerns could make people act more according to the underlying social norm – in this case of dishonesty and thereby
encourage dishonesty. This experiment will have theoretical as well as practical implications for theories on honesty and important implications for
policy-makers and organizations alike. For organizations implementing the four-eyes principle, knowing that this policy could backfire if the social
norm is to be dishonest, is crucial. Taken together, we postulate the following three main hypotheses: H1: People are more honest in the honest norm
condition in comparison to the dishones tnorm condition. H2: People are influenced by reputational concerns. H3: Reputational concerns and social
norms have an interactive effect on honesty. Specifically, reputational concerns increase honesty under the honest norm condition, yet decrease honesty
under the dishonest norm condition.
Author(s): Christoph Huber, Christos Litsios, Annika Nieper, Timo Promann
Topic: Social Behavior: Norms and Morals, Social Behavior: Lying and Cheating
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Pledges are public statements by individuals in which they declare how they will behave in a future situation. Pledges have been shown to positively
affect cooperation in social dilemmas. However, their effectiveness relies on how credible others perceive these public statements to be. A large body
of experimental evidence shows that individuals are heterogeneous in their propensity to keep their word. In this paper, we examine the impact of
credibility - measured as past promise-keeping behavior- on cooperation in a social dilemma. To address this question, we designed an experiment in
which we (i) elicit some participants' credibility and then (ii) manipulate whether one's credibility is observable by others in a subsequent maintenance
game. We use a modified version of the promise-keeping game (PKG) by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) to elicit trustee's credibility. Each trustee is
then matched with two participants (that they haven't encountered before) and take part in a repeated maintenance game. We implement heterogeneity
in beliefs about the trustee's credibility by providing trustees' group members with feedback about the trustee's decision in the PKG at the beginning of
the maintenance game. In the observable treatment, group members can observe whether the trustee made a promise and whether the trustee kept that
promise or not. In the the hidden treatment, group members are only informed about whether the trustee made a promise or not, but cannot observe the
trustee's final decision. The maintenance game is composed of two stages: First, participants indicate how much they intent to withdraw from a pre-
existing public good. They then make their actual withdrawal decisions after observing their group members' intentions. This design allows us to
measure the causal effect of credibility on cooperation intentions and actual cooperation both at first acquaintance and throughout the game.
Preliminary results show that trustees who kept their promise in the PKG foster more cooperation at first acquaintance and throughout the game when
their past promise-keeping behavior is made public. In contrast, trustees who did not kept their promise leads to lower cooperationat first acquaintance
and throughout the game when their group members can observe their past promise-keeping behavior. We found no effect of credibility on pledges.
Author(s): Timo Goeschl and Alice Sold-
Topic: Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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Preventing (panic) bank runs
Ismael Rodriguez-Lara
 Universidad de Granada
ABSTRACT:
We study experimentally how to prevent bank runs using a mechanism inspired in Andolfatto et al. (2017). They propose a mechanism that eliminates
bank runs as a coordination problems among depositors (Diamond and Dybvig (1983)) by offering depositors the possibility to relocate their funds to a
priority account. We implement this mechanism in an experimental envi- ronment and find that bank runs that occur because of coordination problems
are prevented. Further, this mechanism eliminates panic bank runs a la Kiss et al. (2018) that occur when depositors can observe the action of others.
While the theoretical prediction is that depositors will not use the priority account in equilibrium, we find that depositors relocate their funds to this
account, especially if their choices are not observed by others.
Author(s): Kiss, H.J.; Rodriguez-Lara, I.; Rosa-Garcia, A.
Topic: Markets: Macroeconomics, Markets: Finance
Back to session: Macroeconomics
Animal Spirits and Endogenous Cycles: New Empirical Evidence
Stefanie J. Huber
 University of Amsterdam
ABSTRACT:
Economic theory suggests that agents take their decisions based on their expectations of aggregate macroeconomic outcomes. Psychology, on the other
hand, highlights the importance of the limbic systems, which provide people with simple stop-or-go decisions that are driven by impulsive behavior
rather than sophisticated reasoning. This psychological concept of decision-making has repeatedly found its way into the economic literature under the
term “animal spirits” (Keynes (1936), Howitt and McAfee (1992), Akerlof and Shiller (2010), Farmer (2012)). In this paper, we propose a behavioral
model to explain the cyclical features of aggregate outcomes. Cycles arise endogenously in a constant environment set-up without any exogenous
shocks. The only source of uncertainty is the choices of other agents in the market. The key factors driving the aggregate cycles is a triplet of agents'
impulsive decisions: i) they keep investing if they had a positive personal investment experience, ii) they start investing if they see that all other
investors got lucky by investing today iii) they stop investing if they had a negative personal investment experience. All these actions are impulsive
and not necessarily consistent with their actual expectations. We test our model in the context of a labor market using a laboratory experiment. The
model matches and explains a large part of the cycles in the aggregate labor supply in the experimental data without any exogenous shocks to the labor
demand (vacancies).
Author(s): Angela Fiedler, Stefanie J. Huber, and Luba Petersen
Topic: Markets: Macroeconomics, Markets: Finance
Link: sites.google.com/site/stefaniehuber/
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Monetary Policy, Efficiency Wages, and Employment. Experimental Evidence on a Missing Link
Cornelia Strauss
 University of Giessen
ABSTRACT:
A frequently addressed, yet prevailing puzzle in macroeconomics is why wages do not fall sufficiently in recessions to avert surges in unemployment.
In this paper, we test the hypothesis that the nominal money supply affects employment although agents in the economy can freely adjust nominal
wages. This hypothesis covers a complete causal chain from monetary policy to employment. We do find that changes in the economy-wide money
supply have an effect on the employment rate, yet, this effect runs contrary to previous findings. Our paper studies a stylized labor market with flexible
nominal wages from a theoretical as well as an experimental perspective. In the paper money serves the same three roles it does in real life, namely it is
a medium of exchange, a unit of account and a – temporary – store of value. The results suggest that fiat money acquires value endogenously. In the
course of the first market game a strong reciprocal relationship develops in which sellers respond with high effort to high nominal wages. After an
exogenous monetary shock that leads to an economy-wide reduction of the amount of money, subjects do adjust wages downwards. Sellers decrease
effort in response, however, this effect is not significant. In the long run, a stable reciprocal relationship reestablishes in which effort choices
correspond to those of the first part, while wages are comparatively higher. To our surprise, the employment rate increased after the monetary shock.
Author(s): Max Albert, Cornelia Strauss
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Applied Economics: Labor Market
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Reciprocating Preferences in Two-sided Matching: An Experimental Investigation
Timm Opitz
 Max-Planck-Institute for Innovation and Competition
ABSTRACT:
Matching markets intend to form mutually beneficial stable relationships. The stability criterion guarantees that no participant can benefit from
breaking up a formed match. Under the deferred acceptance mechanism (DA), matches ought to be stable. This result builds on the assumptions of
strict and invariable preference orders under complete information. Empirical evidence on whether preferences actually meet these assumptions is
lacking. In a theory-guided experiment, we test whether agents have reciprocating preferences. We hypothesize that agents prefer to interact with
someone who prefers interacting with them. Hence, agents adjust their own preference ranking once they know how other participants ranked them.
We document how this affects the stability of the DA, investigate subsequent cooperation behavior in the formed teams and discriminate between
belief-based and preference-based explanation for preference changes. This contributes to the literature on the design and robustness of (centralized)
matching markets.
Author(s): Timm Opitz, Christoph Schwaiger
Topic: Markets: Market design and Matching, Decision Theory: Preferences
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Does expectation-based loss aversion explain preference misreporting in strategy-proof matching mechanisms?
Peter Katuscak
 RWTH Aachen University
ABSTRACT:
Expectation-based loss aversion (EBLA) has been suggested as an explanation of true preference misreporting in strategy-proof matching mechanisms.
EBLA implies disappointment aversion. Reporting the true ranking might create an expectation that proves too optimistic ex post, leading to a
disappointment. To avoid such disappointment, it might be optimal to over-rank a less desirable, but a more probable, option over a more desirable, but
less probable, option. We test this hypothesis in a simple experiment with only two options. Varying probabilities of availability of different options in
a between-subject design, we find a small and statistically insignificant effect in the direction predicted by EBLA. However, responses to debriefing
questions suggest that the small effect is more likely to be due to a preference vs. probability tradeoff thinking rather than EBLA.
Author(s): Roy Chen, Peter Katuscak, Thomas Kittsteiner, Katharina Kutter
Topic: Markets: Market design and Matching, Decision Theory: Bounded Rationality
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Should a Robot be King? On the Acceptance of Algorithmic Decisions
Wolfgang Luhan
 Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Enterpreneurship
ABSTRACT:
While AI-assisted decision-making is getting more widespread, it is important to understand how it affects the acceptance of the proposed decisions by
those affected. In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to study if the use of AI for decision-making can improve the outcomes not trough better
decisions as such but through wider acceptance of these decisions and improved procedural fairness. On the one hand, a non-human agent has no
stakes in allocation decisions as it would be in the case if a decision is made by an involved party and is free of biases that may affect a third-party
decision maker. On the other hand, a non-human decision maker may be perceived as inherently less moral, since a human agent is the key to any
system of morality and ethics. We develop an experimental design to examine the acceptance of decisions based on various decision parameters in
different contexts.
Author(s): Marina Chugunova and Wolfgang Luhan
Topic: Public Choice: Voting and Rent Seeking, Social Behavior: Norms and Morals
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We report results from a stock trading lab-in-the-field experiment, lasting three weeks, to study how algorithms (i.e. robo-advisors) can be better
designed to help investors to commit to rational investment strategies. In the first week, participants could trade without any type of restrictions. In the
second week, depending on the treatments, participants had to rely every two rounds on two types of algorithms: one blocked trading; the other type
traded for them according to Bayesian rules. We also varied the rigidity of both types of algorithms, whereby some participants could override
algorithmic trading, and some could not. Finally, in the last week, participants decided whether to use the robo-adviser as in the second week. The
majority of participants chose not to rely on an algorithm, but those who did preferred robo-advisers that were doing active trading and could be
overridden. Allowing overrides of advice did not significantly reduce trading performance. Participants who performed better on their own were more
likely to opt for a robo-adviser in the third week. This shows that while those who need advice the most - being more subject to the disposition effect -
are less likely to seek it, this issue can be alleviated by offering active robo-advisers that can be overridden.
Author(s): Alexia Gaudeul and Caterina Giannetti
Topic: Markets: Finance, Unknown: Unknown
Link: www.thinkforwardinitiative.com/research/using-robo-advisers-as-commitment-devices
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Motivating Beliefs in a Just World
Max Lobeck
 Paris School of Economics
ABSTRACT:
This paper studies whether individuals distort their beliefs about the relative importance of effort and luck to motivate themselves to exert effort. To
that end, I develop a novel experimental design where past experience of success or failure serves as a noisy signal about the true importance of effort
in success. To test whether beliefs are distorted to motivate future effort, I vary the moment in time when subjects are informed about a real effort task
to be performed later in the experiment. Subjects who receive the information before belief elicitation can, hence, distort beliefs to motivate effort in
the later task. The results show that, in this case, individuals are more likely to believe that their effort is important for success. Motivating belief
distortion is particularly pronounced for subjects who receive discouraging news about the true state of the world. I additionally test whether
motivating belief distortion affects subjects' willingness to distribute money between two \textit{other} individuals as a third-party spectator. I do not
find evidence that distributive behavior differs across the two treatment groups. The results of this paper advance our understanding of how individuals
form luck-effort beliefs by showing that they do not only depend on past or current events but they are also endogenous to the incentive structure
individuals expect to face.
Author(s): Max Lobeck
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Decision Theory: Beliefs
Link: www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/docs/lobeck-max/lobeck2020motivatingbeliefsjustworld.pdf
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Strategic confusion: searching extra trees to avoid seeing the forest
Jantsje Mol
 University of Amsterdam
ABSTRACT:
Recent theoretical and experimental work on motivated reasoning finds robust evidence for willful ignorance: people willfully avoid free but
inconvenient information, such as how their choices affect the payoffs of others. In this paper, we conjecture that in some cases people will not avoid
information, but rather engage in excessive information search and aim for what we call 'strategic confusion'. These people will keep searching
conflicting evidence (e.g. medical information, tax regulations, environmental impacts) in the hope of finding too complex information and justify non-
action (e.g. no vaccination, not reporting certain assets, not switching diets). We test the existence of strategic confusion in a lab experiment, using a
novel variation of the Dana-Weber-Kuang task in which participants can progressively sample information about the payoff structure under high and
low variance.
Author(s): Jantsje M. Mol and Shaul Shalvi
Topic: Social Behavior: Lying and Cheating, Games: Information
Link: www.jantsje.nl
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Fair Shares and Selective Attention
Davide Domenico Pace
 Univarsity of Amsterdam
ABSTRACT:
Fairness views often serve to justify economic privilege. To understand the formation of such views, we experimentally investigate how subjects
allocate their visual attention to the contributions of merit and luck in the generation of a surplus, and how they decide on its division. We find that
subjects who randomly obtained an advantaged position pay less attention to information about true merit and retain more of the surplus. Both the
attentional and behavioral patterns persist when dictators subsequently divide money between pairs of advantaged and disadvantaged subjects in the
role of a benevolent judge. Moreover, attention has a substantial causal effect: forcing subjects to look for one second more at merit information
relative to overall outcomes reduces the effect of having an advantaged position on allocations by about 25%. These findings suggest that attention-
based policy interventions may be effective in reducing polarized views on inequality.
Author(s): Dianna Amasino, Davide D. Pace, Jo?�l van der Weele
Topic: Social Behavior: Norms and Morals, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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Its me again... Ask Avoidance and the Dynamics of Charitable Giving
Maximilian Spaeth
 University of Goettingen
ABSTRACT:
This article analyzes the impact of repeated donation requests on charitable giving. In a laboratory experiment, participants receive once an endowment
and can transfer a share of it to a charity. Implementing three donation decision stages (instead of one) leads to a slight increase in donations. A
treatment in which participants can avoid the repetition of the ask yields the highest average donation. One third of participants choose to avoid the
repetition. "Non-avoiders" donate significantly more than "avoiders". Importantly, non-avoiders also transfer significantly more than the participants in
the treatment with one decision stage. This finding suggests that offering an avoidance option might a suitable strategy to identify the most promising
targets of fundraising, namely those individuals who enjoy donating repeatedly.
Author(s): Maximilian Spaeth
Topic: Applied Economics: Charitable Giving, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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Avoiding Your Conscience: Belief-Dependent Preferences and Information Acquisition
Claire Rimbaud
 GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne
ABSTRACT:
A large body of evidence shows that individuals care about the welfare of others. Yet, these apparently pro-social preferences have been shown to fade
away in the presence of uncertainty about the relationship between actions and outcome. In contrast, little is known about this effect when uncertainty
concerns others' expectations. In this paper, we investigate whether individuals avoid the consequences of their stated belief-dependent preferences by
strategically seeking information in a self-serving way. To address this question, we developed a model of information acquisition from which we can
derive testable hypotheses about the optimal strategy for different types of belief-(in)dependent preferences. We then test our main predictions in an
online experiment with a modified trust-game. Our design allows us to (i) identify participants with belief-based preferences and (ii) investigate their
information acquisition behavior. We find that most individuals classified as belief-dependent seek self-serving information to reduce the monetary cost
of their belief-dependent preferences.
Author(s): Claire Rimbaud, Alice Sold-
Topic: Decision Theory: Beliefs, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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Willful ignorance: a Meta-analysis
Linh Vu
 University of Amsterdam
ABSTRACT:
Research endeavors in the last two decades have highlighted that decision making is prone to willful ignorance. While deliberate avoidance is
beneficial to the decision maker to maximize self-interest, this behavior can induce adverse externalities to others, from another individual in the small
scale of a social interaction, to the labor force in the large scale of a consumer market. To obtain a comprehensive understanding of this topic, we
present the first meta-analysis on willful ignorance. The aggregated results from 34 papers indicate that in an ambiguous setting, a significant amount
of subjects rely on ignorance to make the selfish choice while protecting themselves from learning the impact of their action. This increase in selfish
choices made leads to a significant reduction in the recipients earning when full information is lacking. We propose an explanation for this deliberate
tendency as a violation of one's rationality. Most notably, our study highlights the need for interventions that promote thoughtful and sustainable
decision making.
Author(s): Linh Vu, Margarita Leib, Ivan Soraperra, Jo?�l van der Weele, Shaul Shalvi
Topic: Decision Theory: Ambiguity, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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Since their introduction, antibiotics drastically reduced the threat of severe bacterial infections. However, their widespread use decreases the efficacy
and contributes to the rise of bacterial resistance. For this reason, antibiotics are classified as a prescription-only drug in most of the countries.
Nevertheless, over-the-counter (OTC) sales of antibiotics is common in many developing countries. In this paper we test a behavioral intervention
aimed to reduce OTC sales of antibiotics in Ethiopia, a country where the illegal sale of antibiotics is widespread. In collaboration with the Addis
Ababa Food Medicine Health Care Administration and Control Authority (FMHACA), we run a RCT field experiment targeting (more than 800)
pharmacists in Adis Ababa examining the casual effect of an information campaign with 3 different treatments: (i) a coercive letter to the pharmacy—
in which the pharmacist is informed that selling antibiotics without prescription is against the law—; (ii) a moral appeal letter to the pharmacy—in
which pharmacists are reminded of their critical role in encouraging the rational use of antibiotics—; and (iii) the compulsory placement of a poster
informing both pharmacist and costumers about the prohibition to sell antibiotics without prescription in the pharmacy premises. Using simulated
patients (i.e., mystery shoppers) reporting symptoms of Urinary tract infection and Pediatric pneumonia, we estimated the short run (three weeks after
the campaign) and the long run (five months after the campaign) effects of the three information campaigns. Our results show that: (i) OTC sales of
antibiotics are common before the campaign, with 54% of the pharmacies dispensing antibiotics without prescription; (ii) all interventions significantly
reduce OTC dispensing of antibiotics in the short run (the letters by 24 percentage points and the poster by 13 percentage points); (iii) the effects are
weaker but persistent when evaluated 3 months later.
Author(s): Maria Vittoria Levati, Ivan Soraperra, Saba Yifredew
Topic: Field Experiments: General, Social Behavior: Norms and Morals
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Enhancing Longevity Awareness to Improve Retirement Security
Abigail Hurwitz
 The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
ABSTRACT:
Many people have only a vague idea about what life expectancy and longevity risk mean, which may lead them to save suboptimally for retirement or
to not purchase longevity insurance. This paper employs an online experiment using vignettes to investigate alternative ways of describing both life
expectancy and longevity risk, to assess whether these can raise peoples' awareness of possible retirement shortfalls. We show that merely prompting
people to think about financial decisions changes their perceptions regarding subjective survival probabilities. Moreover, providing this information
boosts respondents' interest in saving and demand for longevity insurance. Additional evidence from a field experiment shows that life expectancy
information also promotes peoples' interest in obtaining advice about long-term saving products.
Author(s): Abigail Hurwitz, Olivia S. Mitchell and Orly Sade
Topic: Applied Economics: Other, Unknown: Unknown
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People have imprecise beliefs about CO2 emissions in their everyday activities. Correcting these misperceptions might push consumers toward the
reduction of their carbon footprints, provided that they care for the environment. In this paper, we investigate the scope of information-provision
interventions that are designed to correct for misperceptions and change behavior. Our empirical strategy combines two types of data: (i) consumers'
beliefs about CO2 emissions of common food items, house appliances, and means of transport; and (ii) consumers' attitudes towards mitigating CO2
emissions. We obtain the data by surveying a representative sample of the US population. For the beliefs, we leverage an intuitive graphical interface
that incentivizes truthful reporting of the respondents' point estimates for the emissions as well as their subjective uncertainty around these point
estimates. For the attitudes, we elicit the respondents' willingness to pay to mitigate CO2 emissions through a series of incentivized tradeoffs between
emissions and monetary rewards. A unique feature of our experimental design is that it elicits both perceptions and willingness to mitigate CO2
emissions from the same respondents, while current research typically elicits only the former. This allows us to investigate whether those who
underestimate the emission size will change their behavior if their beliefs are corrected-- a necessary condition for information policies to be effective.
Overall, we find that the majority of respondents underestimate the magnitude of CO2 emissions generated by the products under consideration.
However, they have a good understanding of the ordinal ranking of CO2 emissions. Moreover, they are willing to give up monetary rewards to avoid
CO2 emissions, and their marginal willingness to pay for emission reduction declines with emission size. Finally, combining our measures of beliefs
and attitudes in a structural model allows us to discuss the likely effect of information provision that reduces uncertainty and corrects biases in beliefs.
Author(s): Taisuke Imai, Davide Pace, Peter Schwardmann, Joel van der Weele
Topic: Applied Economics: Other, Unknown: Unknown
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Exploring perceptions and expectations of grades in a quantitative course: results from an incentivized experiment
Marieta Valente
 Universidade do Minho, Portugal
ABSTRACT:
Understanding the determinants of student performance and academic success has been a topic of interest in the Education literature. Several studies
have focused on student characteristics, teachers' and the teaching environment and even institutional features. Student characteristics include gender
effects as well as socio-economic and educational background. Additionally, perceptions held by students also seem to play a role in explaining
performance and success, namely intrinsic perceptions about academic self-efficacy, or about the usefulness of the degree or course, for example,
which in turn affect self-motivation. The literature has thus established a relation between student self-perceptions and educational outcomes. In terms
of students' capacity to predict their grades, few studies have been carried out. Attwood et al. (2013) implemented a questionnaire to 109 high school
students to explore the relation between expected GCSE grades and actual grades. Overpredictions were found to be far more frequent than
underpredictions, and male students tended to be more overconfident than female students. Chevalier et al. (2009) studied higher education students
and also found a similar gender effect in terms of overestimation of predicted grades. The economic background of students was also significant. Perry
et al. (2018) implemented their study in several English secondary schools based on the observation that grade expectations were used to define grade
targets, either by schools or by students, and found that higher grade expectations indeed corresponded to higher grades. In this study we use an
incentivized questionnaire to elicit students' grade predictions. To the best of our knowledge this is the first study using an experimental economics
approach to this research question. We put forward the hypothesis that asking for students' predictions in an incentivized manner increases the
truthfulness of predictions, and thus the salience of the explained variable. We can then explore with more accuracy the factors that explain academic
success and, more importantly, explain predicted academic success. The study was carried out in a Portuguese public university through a survey
administered in the first day of classes of the chosen course. The course was a quantitative course (Introductory Applied Statistics) in the first year of
three undergraduate degrees of a non-quantitative nature (public administration, political science and international relations). It is indeed the only
inherently quantitative course in the three-year degrees and can potentially serve a signalling mechanism for future employers of the student' analytical
skills. Additionally, the quantitative nature of the course invokes the concept of “statistics anxiety” or “maths anxiety” present in the Education
literature. The data was collected over three academic years, during which the lecturer, teaching methods and course material were held constant. The
preliminary results show that gender plays a role in the likelihood of overestimating the final grade as well as self-motivation, with female students less
likely to overestimate than their male counterparts. Furthermore, students motivated by the course nature, are more likely to overestimate their
performance, and students motivated by the course nature, are more likely to overestimate their performance. We do not find that motivational
variables play a role for the final result, whereas being a women has a grade premium relative to male students. Given the incentivized way the study
was designed, it has the potential to enrich the literature on determinants for academic success and the capacity to anticipate one's grade. Keywords:
student performance, grade expectation, incentivized experiment. References: Attwood, G., Croll, P., Fuller, C., Last, K., 2013. The accuracy of
students' predictions of their GCSE grades. Educational Studies, 39(4), 444-454. Chevalier, A., Gibbons, S., Thorpe, A., Snell, M., Hoskins, S., 2009.
Students' academic self-perception. Economics of Education Review, 28(6), 716-727. Perry, T., Davies, P., Qiu, T., 2018. Great grade expectations?
The role of pupil expectations in target setting. International Journal of Educational Research, 89, 139-152.
Author(s): Marieta Valente, Nuno Soares, Carla Sa, Silvia Sousa
Topic: Applied Economics: Other, Field Experiments: General
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Delegation under Overconfidence
Adrian Hillenbrand
 University of Bonn
ABSTRACT:
Efficient delegation is key to the success of project and research teams. However, under-delegation is as prevalent as there are attempts to address the
problem. In this project, we will investigate whether overconfidence is a key driver of under-delegation. Persistently overconfident principles will
allocate an inefficiently high share of a task to themselves. More importantly, they will attribute failure to miss goals to their co-worker's ability. This
might lead to a vicious circle in which principals become more and more pessimistic about the co-worker's ability and end up delegating less and less.
Based on this mechanism, we propose and then test remedies to improve efficient delegation. First, we want to show that reducing overconfidence
leads to more efficient delegation, providing a causal test of the mechanism. Then, we study remedies focusing on team composition and team
feedback.
Author(s): Claudia Cerrone, Adrian Hillenbrand, Andreas Kluemper, Wladislaw Mill
Topic: Psychology and Biology: Cognition, Applied Economics: Other
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People tend to overestimate their abilities and chances of success, even thoughinaccurate beliefs lead to costly mistakes. How can these beliefs persist
in an environment with frequent feedback? I propose a new test of the hypothesis that peopleinterpret favorable feedback to be more informative.
Using experimental data, Iprovide the first causal evidence that the utility from beliefs affects one's percep-tion of signal informativeness. To establish
causality, I adopt a matching estimatorapproach and construct a counterfactual outcome of a subject who observes thesame signal, but the signal is not
affecting his belief-based utility. I find a strongand significant effect: subjects interpret favorable signals to be more informativedue to the changes in
belief-based utility. The results cast a new light on the origins ofoverconfidence and illuminate mechanisms that perpetuate it in the face of feedback.
Author(s): Marta Kozakiewicz
Topic: Decision Theory: Beliefs, Decision Theory: Learning
Link: marta-kozakiewicz.github.io/assets/kozakiewicz_jmp.pdf
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Overplacement in logical reasoning skills due to political differences
Lia Flores
 University of Porto
ABSTRACT:
Psychologists have long identified the tendency of humans to overestimate their skill relative to their peers (overplacement). Moreover, social identity
theory predicts people evaluate in-group members more positively than out-group members. In this study we hypothesised that this differential
treatment may result in greater overplacement when interacting with an out-group member. We tested this hypothesis with 301 US voters affiliated with
either the Republican or Democratic party in the run-up to the 2020 Presidential election, a time when political identities were salient and highly
polarised. While group affiliation seems to have an effect at the start, such effect is not intensified any further when participants are asked to update
their beliefs.
Author(s): Lia Flores and Miguel Fonseca
Topic: Decision Theory: Beliefs, Social Behavior: Other
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Leadership in a public good game: Does the leader need to be pro-social or just say they are pro-social?
Edward Cartwright
 De Montfort University
ABSTRACT:
We study leadership by example in a public good game. The social value orientation (SVO) of leaders is elicited to determine if they are classified as
pro-social or pro-self. If followers are not informed of the leaders SVO then aggregate contributions are higher, on average, if the leader is pro-social.
This is because pro-social leaders contribute more than pro-self leaders. Against this benchmark we compare four treatments, in a 2x2 between subject
design, where leaders can send a message to followers about their SVO. The treatments differ in the reliability of the message. In a baseline treatment
SVO is independently calculated and the leader can only tell the truth. At the opposite extreme the leader self-evaluates SVO and can lie to followers.
We find that the possibility for leaders to self-evaluate SVO and lie about SVO has a positive effect on contributions. This is because: pro-self leaders
tend to claim they are pro-social, followers respond positively to a leader who claims they are pro-social, and leaders who lie about being pro-social
tend to increase their own contribution. Ultimately, therefore, efficiency with a pro-self leader (who claims they are pro-social) replicates that with a
pro-social leader.
Author(s): Edward Cartwright and Yidan Chai
Topic: Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource, Social Behavior: Lying and Cheating
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Absolute versus Relative: Asymmetric Framing and Feedback Design in a Heterogeneous-Endowment Public Goods
Game
Lan Zhou
 Renmin University of China
ABSTRACT:
Individual contributions to public goods can be framed as absolute amounts or as relative proportions of endowments. We examine the effect of
asymmetric framing and feedback on cooperation level when group members are heterogeneously endowed. We develop a reference-dependent theory
in which group members use absolute or relative contribution level of others as a reference point in their contribution decisions. The theoretical results
show that relative framing increases contribution of high-endowment type more than the absolute framing, while the opposite is true for the low-
endowment type. Therefore, the group contribution level is highest when high-income members are framed with relative metrics and low-income
members are framed with absolute metrics. We test our theory by conducting a laboratory experiment where players with heterogeneous endowments
play the public goods game in groups of 4 members. We employ a 4 by 2 design where the framing can be either uniform (absolute or relative for all
players) or asymmetric (different for players with different endowment levels) and there can be either no feedback or feedback on the highest
contribution among group members. Experimental results confirm most of the basic treatment effects while also challenge some of the asymmetric
framing effects. Our study, from both theoretical and experimental perspectives, contributes to a better understanding of how endowment, framing, and
feedback separately and jointly affect individual play in public goods provision.
Author(s): Xianghong Wang; Jie Zheng; Lan Zhou
Topic: Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource, Games: Coordination
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Existing experimental studies typically model individual funding of social projects as contributions to a threshold public good. We examine
contributors' behavior when faced with multiple threshold public goods and the possibility of coordinating contributions via an intermediary.
Employing the experimental design developed by Corazzini, Cotton, and Reggiani (2020), we vary both the size of a ‘destination rule', which places
restrictions on the intermediary's use of a contributor's funds, as well as the overhead cost of the intermediary, modeled as a sunk cost incurred by the
intermediary regardless of whether any public good is successfully funded. In an online experiment with live interaction, we show that subjects behave
in line with equilibrium predictions with regard to the size of the destination rule, only increasing their contributions when there is no threat of
expropriation by the intermediary. However, we also find that the positive effect of a high destination rule is undone in the presence of overhead costs.
While this is in direct conflict with the theory that predicts no role of such costs, it is in line with the well-documented finding of ‘overhead aversion'
often exhibited by donors when selecting charities.
Author(s): Diya Abraham, Luca Corazzini, Milos Fisar, Tommaso Reggiani
Topic: Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource, Applied Economics: Charitable Giving
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In this paper we propose a tractable model of behavior in threshold public good games. The model is based on learning direction theory. We find that
individual behavior is consistent with the predictions of the model. Moreover, the model is able to accurately predict the success rate of groups in
providing the public good. We apply this to give novel insight on the assurance problem by showing that the problem (of coordinating on the inefficient
equilibrium of no contributions) is only likely with a relatively low endowment. In developing the model we compare and contrast best reply learning
and impulse balance theory. Our results suggest that best reply learning provides a marginally better fit with the data.
Author(s): Federica Alberti, Edward Cartwright, Anna Cartwright
Topic: Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource, Games: Repeated Games
Link: repec.port.ac.uk/EconFinance/PBSEconFin_2021_01.pdf
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Can groups of unequal individuals cooperate efficiently? In this study, we explore the effects of endowment inequality on contribution with a meta-
analysis of the economic experiments introducing endowment inequalities in public goods games. This allows us to explore the effect of (the level of)
inequality (i) on aggregate contributions, (ii) on individual patterns of contributions and (iii) on the mitigating effect of some mechanisms, such as
punishment or communication. To conduct our meta-analysis, we included 27 studies, for which we retrieved the raw data, either from repositories or
from the authors directly. The resulting database comprises over 85000 observations, from more 6900 experimental subjects distributed in over 100
treatments. It presents a large panel of levels of endowment heterogeneity (measured by the Gini index of endowment), mechanisms (punishment,
communication…) and other parameters (number of periods, MPCR…). We use regression analyses to quantify the effect of inequality on aggregate
contributions, the mitigating role of different mechanisms and individual patterns of contributions. The following results are preliminary. Overall, we
find a strong negative effect of endowment inequality on contributions: the elasticity of aggregate contributions to the Gini index of endowment ranges
between -0.1 to -0.2, depending on the econometric specification. This relation remains if we restrict our sample to groups in which there is some
inequalities. This suggests that not only the existence, but also the strength of inequality matters. Strikingly, cooperation collapses faster in unequal
groups than in equal groups. The negative effect of inequality is mitigated when mechanisms such as punishment or communication are introduced. At
the individual level, we find that relatively “rich” participants contribute significantly less in proportion of their endowment than relatively “poor”
participants.
Author(s): Remi Suchon & Vincent Theroude
Topic: Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource, Methodology: Other
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Climate policies under collective risk: Provision of local irrigation systems in the lab and field
Shuwen Li
 Shanghai Jiao Tong University
ABSTRACT:
The increasing frequency of extreme weather events has imposed new challenges to small farmers, especially in developing countries. In this paper, we
aim to find efficient ways for governments to partner with the local farmers so that modern irrigation channels can be constructed to avoid losses from
drought. Using a framed threshold public goods game of loss avoidance, we focus on testing whether government subsidies increase rate of successful
irrigation system provision. We collect data in the field using farmers in rural Henan, China, as well as in the lab using college students in the US.
Results show that with no subsidy, the rate of provision is below the social optimum. Subsidies substantially increase the likelihood the irrigation
project is undertaken, though groups remain under-insured in relation to the social optimum. A one-to-one matching subsidy appears to be at least as
effective as lump-sum grants under same budget, and the success rate is significantly higher with the former scheme than the latter under high risk of
loss in the field.
Author(s): Shiyan Zhai, Shuwen Li, Daniel Houser
Topic: Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource, Social Behavior: Group Behavior
Back to session: Public Goods 1
Keep your eyes on the prize: How to make penalty contracts work
Stefanie Jaussi
 University of Bern, Institute for Organization and HR
ABSTRACT:
Many lab experiments on incentive framing have found that penalties induce higher effort than bonuses. However, there are also many studies that did
not find this effort-enhancing effect of penalties. In a first experiment, we consider the relevance of the upfront payment in producing this effect of
penalties. We find that penalty contracts where participants receive the upfront payment physically before working on a real effort task induce more
effort than economically-equivalent bonus contracts. When comparing penalty contracts with cash upfront payment and without, we find that the latter
induce significantly less effort. One potential reason could be the higher salience of the upfront payment when it is administered directly in cash. In a
second experiment conducted online, we show that a significant effort-enhancing effect of penalty contacts can be observed when payments are
sufficiently salient, even when there is no actual money transfer upfront. This is achieved by visualizing payments with images of dollar bills. In
treatments where payments are only verbally described, penalty framed contracts do not lead to higher effort provision than bonus contracts. We
conclude that penalty contracts can induce higher effort than bonus contracts if the payments at stake are salient enough.
Author(s): von Bieberstein, F., Essl, A., Friedrich, K. & Jaussi, S.
Topic: Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices, Special Topic: Experimental Payments
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The Demand for Punishment to Promote Cooperation Among Like-Minded People
Christoph Buehren
 Clausthal University of Technology
ABSTRACT:
We use an experiment to test the hypothesis that groups consisting of like-minded cooperators are able to cooperate irrespective of punishment and
therefore have a lower demand for a costly punishment institution than groups of like-minded free riders, who are unable to cooperate without
punishment. We also predict that the difference in the demand for punishment is particularly large when members know about the composition of their
group. The experimental results confirm these hypotheses. However, the information about the composition of the group turns out to be even more
important than we expected. It helps cooperative groups to avoid wasting resources for an unneeded punishment institution. In uncooperative groups, it
helps members to recognize the need for punishment early on and not to follow an uncooperative path that produces a persistently competitive attitude.
These findings highlight the role of group composition and information for institution formation and that lessons learned by one group cannot be
readily transferred to other groups.
Author(s): Christoph Buehren, Astrid Dannenberg
Topic: Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource, Public Choice: Voting and Rent Seeking
Link: www.uni-marburg.de/en/fb02/research-groups/economics/macroeconomics/research/magks-joint-discussion-papers-in-economics/papers/2020-
papers/44-2020_buehren.pdf
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I Can Feel You - How Experience Shapes Third-Party Punishment
Jonathan Staebler
GESS/ University of Mannheim
ABSTRACT:
In this paper, we experimentally investigate the effect of a previous experience on third-party punishment decisions for the experienced situation. Since
third-party punishment serves as an enforcement mechanism of social norms and depends on emotions, it is important to understand how these social
norm perceptions and emotions arise. We posit that a previous experience plays a crucial role hereby. We develop a set of hypotheses related to the
overall experience, the type of experience, and the role in the experience. The type of experience consists either of a norm transgression or a norm
following or exceeding experience, and the role of a subject either of a setter or receiver of an experience, or of an observer. We design an online
experiment, in which we measure the difference in the willingness to punish in a between-subjects design, with an identical punishment stage and
identical wealth of punishing subjects across treatments, but differing in what precedes the punishment phase. We elicit changes in emotions and social
norms perceptions within-subjects. We employ a modified dictator game, where dictators can transfer either 0, 10, 40, or 50. The experience stage
consists of being a dictator, recipient, or observer, followed by punishment decisions, elicited via the strategy method. In the baseline treatment, there is
no experience stage. Preliminary findings suggest that experience, it's type, and the role of subjects matter for their punishment decisions. Therefore,
we show that accounting for previous experiences enriches the existing knowledge of third-party punishment.
Author(s): Katarina ��ellarova, Jonathan Staebler
Topic: Social Behavior: Norms and Morals, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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Preferences for the allocation of production rewards between capital and labor
Florian Schneider
 University of Zurich
ABSTRACT:
Production in a society is typically assumed to be a function of labor and capital inputs. Historically, the allocation of production between capital and
labor has long been of interest to economists. Recently, increasing capital shares and related inequality have renewed interest in the topic. In this
project, we examine what people consider to be the fair distribution of the returns from production between labor and capital. To elicit distributional
preferences, we build on the spectator approach of Almås, Cappelen and Tungodden (2020). Moreover, we investigate how potential heterogeneities in
fairness views relate to socio-economic status and policy attitudes (support for capital gain taxes and minimum wages).
Author(s): Florian Schneider, Vanessa Valero and Roberto Weber
Topic: Social Behavior: Norms and Morals, Public Choice: Other
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Redistribution beyond equality and status quo - heterogeneous societies in the lab
Jan Hausfeld
 University of Amsterdam
ABSTRACT:
Selfishness and fairness are important drivers of redistribution, but recently an additional motive got into focus. In heterogeneous societies, ingroup
preferences can be an important determinant of redistribution decisions. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate the relative importance of different
motives while we remove selfishness as a motive. We create heterogeneity by providing subjects with information about a social group of recipients
(political orientation, nationality or random), we manipulate how initial inequality is generated (earned, arbitrary or unfair) and the shape of the
distribution. Further, we extend the redistribution mechanism to go beyond the usually applied limits of status quo and equality. We find ingroup
favoritism to be the strongest motive; decision-makers use extreme forms of redistribution almost exclusively to favor members of their own social
group. We complement the behavioral data with eye-tracking data, showing that attention to the social group information and to poor outliers are
indicative of redistribution.
Author(s): Urs Fischbacher, David Grammling, Jan Hausfeld
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Psychology and Biology: Neuroeconomics
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Testing a condensed methodology to estimate distributional preferences a la Fisman et al. (2007)
Fabio Tufano
 University of Nottingham
ABSTRACT:
Estimating individual distributional preferences has become a widely used technique in behavioural economics research. A frequently utilised
methodology to do so has been put forward by Fisman, Kariv and Markovits (2007). In their methodology, subjects make distributional choices in 50
modified dictator games, which are then used to estimate two distinct utility parameters. One captures the relative weight for the own payoff (α) and
the other describes an efficiency-equity trade off (ρ). In this study, we use the original and new data to explore whether we can reduce the number of
distributional choices made by subjects whilst still accurately estimating preference parameters. Simulation results, already obtained by us, show high
accuracy in estimating both parameters when using as few as 20 dictator games. Moreover, collected experimental data supports the high accuracy of
our proposed methodology. Therefore, we develop and propose a condensed methodology that can accurately estimate distributional preference
parameters in a time and budget efficient manner.
Author(s): Malte Baader, Simon Gaechter, Chris Stamer, Fabio Tufano
Topic: Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
Back to session: Redistribution
Experience of social mobility and support for redistribution: Beating the odds or blaming the system
Nina Weber
 King's College London
ABSTRACT:
Perceptions of social mobility in society are one of the most important determinants of individuals' preferences for redistribution and tolerance for
economic inequalities. How the experience of social mobility affects people's redistributive preferences is however so far little understood. Using
cross-country survey data, a newly generated dataset on social mobility and a survey experiment, I examine the effects of experienced social mobility
on support for redistribution at the individual level. The survey data, including respondents from 27 countries questioned across three decades,
indicates a divide between people who experienced downward mobility as opposed to upward mobility – experiencing downward mobility increases
support for redistribution while experiencing upward mobility does not affect redistributive preferences. This finding can be explained by how people's
own mobility experience affects their perceptions of opportunities within society. In line with the self-serving bias, those with negative mobility
experiences ‘blame the system' and extrapolate from their negative experience onto society at large, which increases their demand for redistribution.
Conversely, those who experienced positive mobility believe they ‘beat the odds' and, therefore, do not extrapolate from their experience onto
perceptions of societal mobility, leading to no less support for redistribution. This relationship suggests significant implications at the aggregate: As
overall absolute mobility increases, ceteris paribus, demand for redistribution rises. In an online survey experiment I test the causality of this
mechanism.
Author(s): Nina Weber
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Decision Theory: Preferences
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Does correlation really matter in risk taking? An experimental investigation
Moritz Loewenfeld
 Toulouse School of Economics
ABSTRACT:
Two prominent alternatives to expected utility theory, regret theory and salience theory, rely on the assumption that when a decision maker chooses
between two lotteries, not only the marginal distribution of the lotteries, but also the correlation of payoffs across states impacts risk taking.Recent
experimental studies on salience theory seem to provide evidence in favor of such correlation effects. However, these studies fail to control for events-
splitting effects (ESE). In the first part of this paper, we seek to disentangle the role of correlation and event-splitting in two settings: 1) the common
consequence Allais paradox as studied by Bruhin et al. (2018); Frydman and Mormann(2018); 2) choices between Mao pairs as studied by Dertwinkel-
Kalt and Köster (2019). In both settings, we find evidence suggesting that recent findings supporting correlation effects are largely driven by ESE.
Once controlling for ESE, we find no consistent evidence for correlation effects. We further test for correlation effects in a novel task that allows to
detect correlation effects even when they are of second-order importance only. In this setting, we find a precisely estimated null effect. Finally, we
demonstrate that when changing the correlation structure implies a change from state-wise domination to FOSD, this can lead to an increase in the
number of suboptimal choices.The observed choice patterns contradict both salience and regret theory. Our results thus shed doubt on these theories
but also provide evidence that correlation effects exist in some cases.
Author(s): Moritz Loewenfeld, Jiakun Zheng
Topic: Decision Theory: Risk, Decision Theory: Preferences
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Cognitive abilities and risk taking: the role of preferences
Johannes Lohse
 University of Birmingham
ABSTRACT:
A growing literature in economics suggests that cognitive abilities and risk preferences could be related. However, since neither risk preferences nor
cognitive abilities can be observed directly, it is unclear whether measured associations point towards a true relationship or instead result from
systematic measurement errors. Previous studies, which have raised this concern, only test this proposition indirectly. In this paper, we complement
their approach by providing a direct test that sheds light on the existence and direction of a link between risk preferences and cognitive abilities once
systematic measurement errors are taken into account. Using a lab experiment that employs a repeated choice design, we give participants the
opportunity to revise an initial choice made in a simple lottery task. We measure cognitive abilities via the cognitive reflection task and affect
individuals' access to cognitive resources by exogenously varying their cognitive load across treatments. Our results provide evidence that cognitive
abilities remain strongly correlated with risk preferences after errors are controlled for.
Author(s): Johannes Lohse and Michalis Drouvelis
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Expectation Formation Under Uninformative Signals
Pascal Kieren
 University of Mannheim
ABSTRACT:
Can individuals distinguish informative from uninformative signals when forming beliefs? The neoclassical theory of probabilistic beliefs assumes that
people update their prior beliefs according to Bayes' Theorem whenever new (informative) information arrives. In reality however, not every signal
contains new information, either because the signal is simply uninformative, or because the information is ambiguous. In this article, we study whether
individuals can distinguish objective pieces of new information from pieces which do not contain information. In a modified bookbag-and-poker-chip
experiment (Grether, 1980) with 600 participants, subjects repeatedly observe new signals to learn about an underlying state of the world. In this
environment, we exogenously manipulate both the informational content of signals (informative vs. uninformative) and the valence of signals (high vs.
low payoffs). Our design allows us to test (i) whether individuals can distinguish informative from uninformative signals, and (ii) whether the belief
updating process is affected by the valence of uninformative signals. We find that individuals update their priors even after observing signals which
contain no information about the underlying state of the world. Importantly, the direction in which they update depends on the valence of the signal.
Subjects who observe positive uninformative signals increase their prior beliefs, while subjects who observe negative uninformative signals decrease
their priors. Whereas a Bayesian forecaster would not update his prior beliefs after observing an uninformative signal, individuals tend to adjust their
priors with about 34% of the strength as if the observed signal would contain information. This bias becomes even more pronounced when the valence
of the uninformative signals is at odds with subjects' prior beliefs and the more uninformative signals individuals observe. Our results provide novel
insights why individuals form and entertain false beliefs in environments where potentially new information is easily accessible but costly to verify
(e.g. online media).
Author(s): Pascal Kieren; Martin Weber
Topic: Decision Theory: Beliefs, Decision Theory: Learning
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Should individuals choose their own incentives? - Evidence from a Mindfulness Meditation Intervention
Andrej Woerner
 Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich
ABSTRACT:
This paper theoretically and experimentally investigates the effects of letting people choose their own incentive schemes. We conduct a field
experiment in which we pay participants monetary rewards for completing daily online mindfulness meditation sessions. While we randomly assign
some participants to either a constant incentive scheme (monetary reward for every completed meditation session) or a streak incentive scheme (larger
monetary reward for each completed series of three consecutive sessions), we allow other participants to choose between the two schemes. In contrast
to our theoretical predictions, we find that participants who could choose their preferred incentive scheme complete significantly less meditation
sessions than participants that were randomly assigned. We show that this result is not driven by poor selection as participants partially separate in
accordance with their expected meditation frequency, suggesting that letting people choose their own incentives may have a detrimental effect on their
motivation.
Author(s): Andrej Woerner, Giorgia Romagnoli, Birgit Probst, Nina Bartmann, Jonathan N. Cloughesy, Jan Willem Lindemans
Topic: Field Experiments: General, Applied Economics: Other
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Experience might increase people's self-awareness about their self-control problems, and this might lead to higher demand for commitments. Using
data from a natural field experiment conducted with university students, I study whether experience leads to an increase in the take-up of commitments.
Students make up to eleven commitment vs. flexibility decisions regarding submission of course assignments over a period of (up to) two semesters. I
find that most students never make commitments. Somewhat surprisingly, I also find that the fraction of commitments is highest for the first assignment
and gradually decreases. This decrease is driven by the fact that students who make commitments gradually stop doing so at some point. There is also a
‘restart effect' where the fraction of commitments increases at the start of a new semester, but this effect disappears with the next assignment.
Author(s): Huseyn Ismayilov
Topic: Decision Theory: Preferences, Field Experiments: General
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A popular empirical technique to measure norms uses coordination games to elicit what subjects in an experiment consider appropriate behavior in a
given situation (Krupka and Weber, 2013). The Krupka-Weber method works under the assumption that subjects use their normative expectations to
solve the coordination game. However, subjects might use alternative focal points to coordinate, in which case the method may deliver distorted
measurements of the social norm. We test the vulnerability of the Krupka-Weber method to the presence of alternative salient focal points in two series
of experiments with more than 3000 subjects. We find that the method is robust, especially when there are clear normative expectations about what
constitutes appropriate behavior.
Author(s): Francesco Fallucchi, Daniele Nosenzo
Topic: Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices, Social Behavior: Norms and Morals
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While social norms have received great attention within economics, little is known about the role of personal norms. We propose a simple utility
framework and design a novel two-part experiment to study their relevance across various economic games and settings. We show that personal norms
— together with social norms and monetary payoff — are highly predictive of individuals' behavior. Moreover, they are: i) distinct from social norms
across a series of economic contexts, ii) robust to an exogenous increase in the salience of social norms, and iii) complementary to social norms in
predicting behavior. Our findings support personal norms as a key driver of economic behavior.
Author(s): Zvonimir Basi�a and Eugenio Verrina
Topic: Social Behavior: Norms and Morals, Social Behavior: Other
Link: homepage.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2020_25online.pdf
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Social Norms Offer Explanation for Inconsistent Effects of Incentives on Prosocial Behavior
Caroline Graf
 Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
ABSTRACT:
Incentives have surprisingly inconsistent effects when it comes to encouraging people to behave prosocially. Classical economic theory struggles to
account for these effects, as it predicts an increased supply of behavior that is incentivized. More recent theories therefore posit a reputational cost
offsetting the benefits from receiving an incentive -- yet unexplained effects of incentives remain, for instance across incentive types and countries. We
propose that social norms can offer an explanation for these inconsistencies. Ultimately, social norms determine the reputational costs or benefits
resulting from a given behavior, and thus variation in the effect of incentives may reflect variation in norms. We implemented a formal model of
prosocial behavior integrating social norms, which we empirically tested on the real-world prosocial behavior of blood donation. Blood donation is
crucial for the functioning of medical systems, but also presents an ideal testing ground for our theory: Various incentive policies for blood donors exist
across countries, enabling a comparative approach. Our preregistered analyses reveal that social norms can indeed account for the varying effects of
financial and time incentives on individual-level blood donation behavior across 28 European countries. That is, incentives are associated with higher
levels of prosociality when norms regarding the incentive are more positive. The results indicate that social norms play an important role in explaining
the relationship between incentives and prosocial behavior. More generally, our approach highlights the potential of integrating theory from across the
economic and behavioral sciences to generate novel insights, with tangible consequences for policy making.
Author(s): Caroline Graf, Eva-Maria Merz, Bianca Suanet, Pamala Wiepking
Topic: Social Behavior: Norms and Morals, Applied Economics: Charitable Giving
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Sharing with minimal regulation? Evidence from neighborhood book exchange
Anouk Schippers
 University of Groningen
ABSTRACT:
Informal peer-to-peer services to share or barter goods often succumb to free riding behavior because they lack the tools to enforce compliance and
reciprocity. We collect unique quantitative data on an increasingly popular and apparently viable form of unregulated peer-to-peer in-kind exchange:
the neighborhood book exchange that is facilitated by privately-owned public bookcases, also known as little free libraries. Over a six-month period we
track the stock and transactions at 56 of these libraries and elicit the social norms that guide informal book exchange. We find that free libraries are
frequently visited and able to maintain the quality and quantity of their stock with a minimum of informal, non-enforced rules. Our evidence shows
limited free riding (visitors supply 70% of all books) and points to the importance of having a benevolent owner and the presence of strong social
norms as key factors in explaining their success.
Author(s): Anouk Schippers and Adriaan R. Soetevent
Topic: Markets: Other, Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource
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On the Robustness of Social Norm Elicitation
Christian Koenig genannt Kersting
 University of Innsbruck
ABSTRACT:
We study the robustness of Krupka and Weber's method (2013) for eliciting social norms. In two experiments with more than 1200 participants, we
find that participants' response patterns are invariant to differences in the salience of the monetarily incentivized coordination aspect. We further
demonstrate that asking participants for their personal first and second order beliefs without monetary incentives results in qualitatively identical
responses. In addition, we observe that participants give sensible responses whether or not they understand the task or their monetary incentives.
Overall, Krupka and Weber's method produces remarkably robust response patterns.
Author(s): Christian Koenig-Kersting, Stefan T. Trautmann
Topic: Social Behavior: Norms and Morals, Methodology: Lab, Field and External Validity
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Noblesse Oblige: Holding High-Status Individuals to Higher Standards
Yilong Xu
 University of Heidelberg
ABSTRACT:
Although there is evidence for the generosity of high-status individuals, there seems to be a strong perception that the elites are selfish and contribute
little to others' welfare, and less so than poorer people. We argue that this perception may derive from a gap between normative and empirical
expectations regarding the behavior of the elites. In two large-scale survey experiments, we show that high-status individuals are indeed held to higher
ethical standards in both the US and China. We then present direct evidence for a gap between people's normative expectations of how the rich should
behave, and their empirical expectations of how they actually do: empirical expectations are generally lower than both normative expectations and
actual giving.
Author(s): Stefan Trautmann; Xianghong Wang; Yijie Wang
Topic: Social Behavior: Norms and Morals, Social Behavior: Group Behavior
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Voluntary Interaction and the Principle of Mutual Benfit
Andrea Isoni
 University of Warwick
ABSTRACT:
Most theories of non-selfish behaviour are based on observations of non-voluntary interactions. We argue that non-selfish behaviour takes
fundamentally different forms in voluntary interactions, such as market transactions. We hypothesise the existence of an injunctive norm – the
Principle of Mutual Benefit, which requires that an individual who enters an interaction voluntarily conforms to common expectations about behaviour
within it. This norm can induce patterns of behaviour at odds with existing social preference theories, and allow extrinsic incentives for fulfilling
contracts to crowd in trustworthiness. In a new experiment, we find support for many of the model's predictions.
Author(s): Andrea Isoni, Robert Sugden, Jiwei Zheng
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Social Behavior: Norms and Morals
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Oops!... I Did It Again: Understanding Mechanisms of Persistence in Prosocial Behavior
Lingqing Jiang
 University of Essex
ABSTRACT:
We test whether asking individuals to donate blood leads to a persistent change in behavior, and examine the underlying mechanism. In a field
experiment, we randomize a phone call, asking blood donors to turn out, and follow them over up to 18 months. We observe significant behavioral
persistence for at least one year. We use naturally occurring rainfall as a second instrument for donor turnout to test whether behavioral persistence is
due to habit formation (Stigler and Becker, 1977) or a persistent increase in motivation independent of past donation. Our results strongly favor habit
formation as the underlying mechanism.
Author(s): Adrian Bruhin, Lorenz Goette, Simon Haenni, Lingqing Jiang
Topic: Applied Economics: Charitable Giving, Field Experiments: General
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Social and Moral Distance in Risky Settings
Chiara Nardi
IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca
ABSTRACT:
This paper reports the results of probabilistic dictator game experiments in which we manipulate the social and moral distance between dictators and
recipients. The reduction in moral distance significantly increases both the probability of a positive allocation and the allocation amount, whereas the
reduction in social distance is less effective. We propose a model that accounts not only for ex ante and ex post fairness concerns, but also for the
potential effect of altruism on allocation decisions. We find support for this model in our data, in the sense that decreasing social and/or moral distance
significantly increases the odds of fair choices.
Author(s): Anastasios Koukoumelis, Maria Vittoria Levati, Chiara Nardi
Topic: Applied Economics: Charitable Giving, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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Under pressure: stress and the support of neediness
Ann-Katrin Kienle
 University of Applied Sciences of the Grisons
ABSTRACT:
Welfare states redistribute money to help those in need. At the same time, stress at work increases. In this study I assume that stress while income
generation results in prosocial behavior. I hypothesize that input in form of stress leads to gender-, age- and income-specific differences especially in
case of altruism. For this reason, I conducted a laboratory experiment in which I quantified the stress of 200 participants. After an encryption task,
participants were allowed to allocate their earned income with a needy participant. Some of the recipients lacked a little and some a lot of income to
overcome the financial threshold for further participation. I measured stress during income generation as well as distribution decision and compared the
data with the resting values of the individuals' heart rate variability (HRV). The results indicate that stressed participant allocate more money to their
needy opponent. The effect can be observed at low levels of need and is mainly due to the female participants. Under stress, they give far more than
needed by the recipient. Non-stressed men do not distribute noticeably different than stressed men. Therefore, stress triggers more generous behavior in
women beyond need thresholds.
Author(s): Ann-Katrin Kienle
Topic: Decision Theory: Other, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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Cooperation and Corruption
Francesca Federico
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
ABSTRACT:
Corruption is a widespread phenomenon that correlates with economic growth, institution quality, social inequalities. It is an impediment to
cooperation, since it threatens the integrity of institutions. Institutions sustain cooperation by punishing free-riders, giving a way out to the social
dilemma between selfish interest and collective welfare. However, the possibility of bribery compromises the efforts made to enforce cooperation.
Transparency is one of the main tool that civil society has to fight corruption, although there might be the temptation to reduce monitoring, since it is a
costly activity. We design a modification of a Public Goods Game, a Bribe Game, where the possibility of bribing and a transparency mechanism are
introduced. The transparency mechanism allows players to buy information about the umpire and react opting out if the umpire does not match their
intentions. We examine which conditions allow the transparency mechanisms to be efficient in curbing bribery, by verifying the correlation between the
level of corruption and the acquisition of information.
Author(s): Francesca Pancotto, Francesca Federico, Simone Righi
Topic: Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource, Social Behavior: Norms and Morals
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Family Affairs or Government's duty? The tax morality of a mobile society
Alessandro Cascavilla
 University of Bari
ABSTRACT:
The aim of this paper is to shed lights on the relationship between intergenerational mobility and tax morale, defined as the intrinsic motivation in
paying taxes. Individuals are more willing to pay taxes if they deem that the government will put in place policies that lead to more opportunities for
the future generations. Employing the European Values Study data, we show that higher intergenerational mobility increases tax morale among
European countries. This linkage is stronger and significant in countries where there is a commitment of the government in guaranteeing more
opportunities to citizens regardless of their familiar or parental starting condition (more defamiliarized countries). In fact, sorting countries according
to the welfare system, data show that intergenerational mobility is significantly associated with tax morale in liberal and sociodemocratic countries
only, where there is a greater degree of defamiliarization. As proof, we further show that the positive linkage between intergenerational mobility and
tax morale is significant only for individuals who show less family ties. Hence, we argue that the fairness in tax payment should be seen in the light of
the efficiency of the welfare state in providing policies that guarantee more opportunities across generations.
Author(s): Alessandro Cascavilla, Rocco Caferra, Andrea Morone
Topic: Applied Economics: Labor Market, Applied Economics: Other
Back to session: Tax Morale and Corruption
The role of reporting institutions and image motivation in tax evasion and incidence
Topi Miettinen
 Hanken School of Economics and Helsinki GSE
ABSTRACT:
We study effects of tax reporting mechanisms on evasion and incidence in experimental double auction markets where counterfactual reporting and
market outcomes are observed after convergence. We compare markets without taxes to cases where (i) taxes are automatically levied, (ii) taxes are
based on seller reports and nes paid in case low probability audit discovers evasion, or (iii) there is reporting by both the buyers and the sellers, and the
audit probability is increasing in the gap between the units reported by the seller and her customers. The latter mimics the so called third-party
reporting in tax enforcement. We nd that about half the sellers fully evade when only sellers report, but that 80% report truthfully under third-party
reporting. Moreover, in the treatment with evasion, prices do not fully reflect the lower costs of evaders. Therefore tax incidence does not conform with
predictions of the standard model, but is instead heavily distorted towards the buyers, unlike in other treatments where the standard model predicts
incidence quite well. Pricing, incidence and reporting patterns in all treatments can be explained by a model of lying with image concerns based on
Gneezy et al. (2018).
Author(s): Kaisa Kotakorpi, Satu Metsaelampi, Tuomas Nurminen
Topic: Markets: Other, Social Behavior: Lying and Cheating
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Using large-scale in-person and online surveys with embedded experiments, we study how time preferences vary with age and subjective life
expectancy. We find that, as economic theory would predict, people become more impatient with increasing age and decreasing life expectancy.
Evidence is mixed for the hypotheses that inheritability increases patience, and that anticipation of a decrease of patience over time leads to a future-
bias in discounting.
Author(s): Ben Greiner, Anita Zednik
Topic: Decision Theory: Preferences, Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences
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We propose a simple method for eliciting individual time preferences without estimating utility functions even in settings where background
consumption changes over time. It relies on lottery tickets with high rewards. In a standard intertemporal choice model high rewards decouple lottery
choices from variation in background consumption. We validate our elicitation method experimentally on two student samples: one asked in December
when their current budget is reduced by extraordinary expenditures for Christmas gifts; the other asked in February when no such extra constraints
exist. We illustrate an application of our method with unemployed job seekers which naturally have income/consumption variation.
Author(s): Michele Belot, Paul Muller and Philipp Kircher
Topic: Decision Theory: Preferences, Applied Economics: Labor Market
Link: ftp.iza.org/dp14091.pdf
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How Preference Misperceptions Confound the Identification of Time Preferences
Sili Zhang
 University of Zurich
ABSTRACT:
Intertemporal trade-offs exist in most economic decisions. Economists often identify time preferences from intertemporal choices, assuming that
people correctly perceive their future preferences. This paper demonstrates that individuals often hold state-dependent misperceptions of their
preferences, and that these misperceptions systematically confound the identification of time preferences, which may lead to ineffective policy design. I
first outline the identification problem using a theoretical framework, which predicts that misperceptions in a good state can generate present-focused-
like behavior, and that misperceptions in a bad state can generate future-focused-like behavior. I then conduct a real-effort experiment that varies in
time horizons and decision states to illustrate both the identification problem and potential solutions. I find evidence of state-dependent misperceptions
in both predictions of tiredness and choices about future work compensations. These misperceptions can lead to different point estimates of time
preference parameters depending on the exact decision state in which work choices are made. In fact, most variations in choices in the experiment are
driven by the variation in decision states instead of the variation in time horizons. I also find that most gap between choices in different states can be
mitigated by having more experiences, however, the gap persists among those with a higher level of misperceptions.
Author(s): Sili Zhang
Topic: Decision Theory: Preferences, Decision Theory: Bounded Rationality
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The main function of most of the platforms that enable or facilitate sharing economies is to increase the level of trust between users and providers. The
way the platform positions itself and its communication strategy can have a decisive impact on trust. Moreover, the same communication strategy can
have a different effect depending on the nature of the platform, and specifically, depending on whether it is a pure-sharing platform, such as
Couchsurfing or Blablacar, or a market-oriented for-profit platform, such as Airbnb and Uber. In this experiment, we study how the nature of the
platform interacts with the communication strategy in shaping trust. In particular, we consider two communication strategies, one highlighting the trust
dimension and the other highlighting the profitability of the interaction, and we show how these strategies can have different effects on trust for pure-
sharing and market-oriented for-profit platform. Our main experiment augments a standard trust game (Berg et al., 1995) with the introduction of a
third player. This third player can choose to send a pre-coded message which, depending on the treatment, encapsulates different communication
strategies. In the Money treatment, the message stresses the higher monetary rewards that can be gained with high levels of trust. In the Trust
treatment, the focus of the message is diverted away from the material domain, and directed to evoke positive feelings of trust and reciprocity. The
second treatment variation, interacting with the former in a 2X2 design, is concerned with the monetary incentives of the third player. In the No-profit
condition (intended to replicate the pure-sharing platforms), the third player earns a flat-fee which is unaffected by the amount of trust displayed in the
trust game. In the For-profit condition (intended to replicate the commercial platforms), the third player earns a fee which is proportional to the amount
of trust displayed in the trust game. These two variations generate four between-subject treatments: Money No-Profit, Money For-Profit, Trust No-
Profit, Trust For-Profit. With a difference-in-difference approach, we can explore the interactions between the earning model and the communication
strategy of the platform. Our results show that, while in the No-profit condition the type of message is inconsequential for the achieved level of trust, in
the For-Profit condition, the Trust message achieves significantly lower levels of trust compared to the Money message. These results show that
leveraging a rhetoric of trust can actually backfire for profit oriented platforms. In a follow-up study (for which we are presently analyzing the data) we
explore possible mechanisms that explain the results. For this purpose, we elicit beliefs about the amounts reciprocated by the receiver as well as
shared opinions regarding the honesty and trustworthiness of the third player's message as a function of the payoff structure.
Author(s): Simona Cicognani, Giorgia Romagnoli, Shaul Shalvi, Ivan Soraperra
Topic: Social Behavior: Communication, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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The literature assessing the impact of trust on economic variables is tremendous and still growing. Trust, however, is a complex notion often measured
with errors. The use of attitudinal surveys as an indicator of trust prevails but is criticized. In this paper, we contribute to the ongoing debate on
whether trust, as measured by surveys, correlates with the behavior observed in trust games. We argue that the lack of correlation is due to
measurement errors. Drawing on the work of Gillen et al. (Experimenting with measurement error: Techniques with applications to the caltech cohort
study, Journal of Political Economy, 2019), we will use the ORIV method to remove the measurement error bias. Our results will provide evidence on
whether the two measurement methods can be used interchangeably as good indicators of trust. Furthermore, we will estimate by how much the
standard OLS regression results in the trust literature are biased by measurement errors.
Author(s): Heloise Clolery, Guillaume Hollard, Fabien Perez and Ines Picard
Topic: Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices, Social Behavior: Other
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Trust and Citizen Engagement in Participatory Governance
Dina Tasneem
 American University of Sharjah
ABSTRACT:
In this experimental study, we attempt to understand the relationship between trust and citizen engagement in participatory governance, utilizing the
unique setting of a public procurement project in Bangladesh. In this model of civic engagement, in each project site, a citizen-monitoring group is
formed to oversee the quality of implementation and report any irregularities to the authorities. The study investigates whether the intra-group trust
level affects the performance of the citizen-monitoring group in the monitoring task and/or the interpersonal interaction resulting from the participation
in the citizen-monitoring group affects the level of trust. We measured trust using both a simplified trust game and a survey. Our finding is inconclusive
to the question of whether trust level in the community affects the performance of the citizen-monitoring group. While we find no such indication from
the trust games the data on generalized trust from the survey shows a positive effect of trust on monitoring group performance. We find stronger
support for the hypothesis that participation in the monitoring group affects the level of trust. According to our findings, the effect has been negative in
this case. An additional aspect of our study is figuring out a simplified design that allows us to collect behavioral data effectively from a population that
lacks general and technological literacy and/or to implement the experiment remotely under extraordinary circumstances (such as COVID – 19
pandemic).
Author(s): Mehnaz Rabbani, Semab Rahman, Dina Tasneem
Topic: Field Experiments: General, Applied Economics: Economic Development
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Social comparisons and effort provision: The psychological effect of being less trusted than one's peers
Diya Abraham
 Vienna University of Economics and Business
ABSTRACT:
We study how a subjective comparison made by a principal when deciding which of two agents to trust influences the agents' level of effort provision.
Employing a lab experiment, we quantify the pure psychological effect of being more/ less trusted by a third party relative to someone else. Unlike
previous experimental studies exploring intention-sensitive behavior of agents, we keep the rewards associated with different levels of trust constant
thus removing the possibility that material reciprocity concerns could play any role in the agents' subsequent choice of effort for the principal. We find
an asymmetric effect on effort provision: while those who are less trusted than their peers reduce their level of effort provision relative to a control
group in which no intentional trust or distrust can be inferred, we do not find a corresponding increase in effort by those who are more trusted. We find
suggestive evidence that this asymmetric effect is driven in part by the negative emotions experienced by agents who are less trusted. These findgins
suggest that payoff irrelevant decisions in firms (for e.g. task assignment) could have detrimental consequences if such decisions convey different
levels of subjective trust in agents.
Author(s): Diya Abraham, Ond?�ej Kr��al, Rostislav Stan��k.
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Applied Economics: Labor Market
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Experiments in Information Acquisition and Voting
Moumita Deb
 University of Birmingham
ABSTRACT:
Is majority voting an effective way of aggregating information in small to medium sized groups when voters have to acquire information from sources
of varying quality? We investigate this question in a theoretically informed lab experiment, where participants can obtain relevant information by
choosing between two sources of instrumental but imperfect information. Both sources are informative on a true state of nature, but one is more
informative than the other. The less informative source grants an additional ‘consumption benefit'. There are thus strong incentives to free-ride on the
information acquisition of others. To understand whether such free riding harms the quality of group decisions, we compare four different information
environments between subjects. We vary the observability of group-members' information acquisition choices and the signal realisations. In the
baseline, signal source choices and signal realisations are unobservable. In the “Source” treatment, the signal source choices are observable, but the
realisations are not. In the “Source and Signal” treatment, the signal source choice and the signal realisation are both observable. In the final treatment,
“Endogenous”, participants decide whether they wish to reveal their source-choice and/or realisation of their signal. They can misrepresent their
information. We find that in the “source and signal” treatment, participants acquire low quality information significantly more often. However, this
does not harm their eventual outcomes since this treatment yields a high average payoff per person. This suggests that free-riding on other group-
members' information acquisition does not harm overall decision quality in an otherwise information rich environment. In sum, we present the first
evidence regarding the effect of acting in various information environments, on outcomes such as endogenous information acquisition, voting patterns
and payoffs.
Author(s): Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay, Moumita Deb, Johannes Lohse and Rebecca McDonald
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The Expressive Power of Voting Rules
Joao Ferreira
 University of Southampton
ABSTRACT:
There are several voting rules that are commonly used to settle collective decisions. An extensive literature has emerged which judges these voting
rules in terms of desirable axiomatic properties, such as the ability to always elect the Condorcet winner or the ability to resist strategic voting. A
promising complementary way to judge voting rules, for which much less is known, is to compare the expressive utility that voters derive from voting
with each rule. In this paper, we propose a simple ordinal theory of expressive voting that allows to compare voting rules in terms of their expressive
power: we say that voting rule A has more expressive power than voting rule B if A allows to express more preferences than B and all preferences that
are possible to express with B can be expressed with A. Our theory provides a testable implication, according to which expected turnout increases with
expressive power. We run an online experiment to test this implication in a controlled environment. We find that if voters are made aware of different
voting rules, turnout is higher in voting rules with higher expressive power. This brings support to the descriptive implications of our theory. Overall,
we argue that the expressive power of voting rules provides a new criterion to judge voting rules with descriptive and normative appealing features.
Author(s): Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde and Jo?�o Ferreira
Topic: Public Choice: Voting and Rent Seeking, Decision Theory: Preferences
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Political Competition, Cognitive Dissonance and Political Beliefs
Francesco Capozza
 Erasmus University Rotterdam
ABSTRACT:
We study how the results of a political competition lead to political polarization of voter's beliefs. The most recent example of the political polarization
in the US is the Trumpist assault to Capitol Hill. The severity of the voters' polarization has led political commentators to define the U.S. as "two
separate countries in one" (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020). Moreover, the gap in how Democrat and Republican supporters
experience the political activity is widening (Pew Research, 2020). First, we assess whether winning or losing an election leads to polarization, by
looking at pre- and post-elections survey data from the ANES (from 1980 to 2016). Second, we rely on cognitive dissonance theory (CDT) to explore
the underlying mechanism behind the post-elections' political polarization. CDT postulates that humans are driven to reduce cognitive inconsistency,
for example after winning or losing an election. On this theoretical grounds, we derive a tractable, micro-founded model of beliefs changes and plan to
test its main predictions in a large-scale online experiment. To isolate the effect of CDT on political polarization, we control for other possible routes
leading to polarization: the emotional attachment to the candidates, the effort exerted in political campaigns and the importance of the debated issues.
Third, we assess whether Democrat and Republicans supporters react differently to the announcement of a political outcome. Finally, we relate how
changes in political beliefs, via cognitive dissonance, concretely reflect in political actions though charitable giving. The results of the present research
will deliver many important implications for how we organize our societies and how we interpret polarization. For example, the results will inform
whether people change beliefs after taking a relevant action, which can be voting, distributing flyers, joining a demo or even a simple “like” on
Facebook. By knowing what is the impact of these actions on political polarization, the policymakers could build the necessary tools to ensure the
safeguard of a free and tolerant society.
Author(s): Tanja Atriga-Gonzalez, Francesco Capozza, Georg Granic
Topic: Public Choice: Voting and Rent Seeking, Decision Theory: Beliefs
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The impact of negative links: theory and evidence
Xiannong Zhang
 Washington University in St. Louis
ABSTRACT:
I study the impact of negative links through signed network formation. First, I propose a game-theoretical model to study how negative links reshape
stable networks. I characterize the properties of pairwise stable and strong stable networks and discuss models' implications through two applications:
the military alliance network and the school bullying network. I vary the relative gain of negative links and show that stable networks are assortative
and agents tend to be homogenous when the gains are high; stable networks are more star-like when the gains are low. Second, I conduct a continuous-
time online experiment to study the behavioral changes related to negative links. I find that subjects are more myopic and less farsighted when negative
links are introduced. This is the first paper to both theoretically and behaviorally analyze the impact of negative links.
Author(s): Xiannong Zhang
Topic: Applied Economics: Other, Applied Economics: Other
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Do People Vote Sincerely under Preferential Voting?
Sabine Kroeger
 Department of Economics, Laval University
ABSTRACT:
The paper reports on a laboratory experiment that study voters' behavior under Preferential Voting. Preferential Voting is a complex voting procedure
under which voters rank-order candidates. Its adoption has been advocated in several countries based, among other things, on the argument that the
complexity of this system will induce voters to vote sincerely, i.e., submit their true ranking of the candidates. We have conduct a laboratory
experiment to test this conjecture. We find that a large fraction of the participants did not vote sincerely and that a small, but significant, fraction voted
strategically. We also identify several heuristics adopted by the participants.
Author(s): Philippe Chabot, Arnaud Dellis, Sabine Kroeger
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The impact of defining reasonable doubt on jury outcomes is highly debated, yet unknown. This paper uses an online experiment to analyze how
different reasonable doubt definitions influence subjects' willingness to convict defendants. In our experiment, subjects have the opportunity to convict
a defendant who may have taken money from another subject. We provide subjects with jury instructions and then ask them if they are willing to
convict based on different probabilities of guilt. We vary whether jury instructions have a reasonable doubt definition and the reasonable doubt
definition. By taking reasonable doubt definitions from various states, we are able to address the question of whether reasonable doubt definitions
matter. In addition to addressing whether reasonable doubt definitions matter, we decompose various definitions to uncover the factors that influence
jurors.
Author(s): Stanton Hudja; Jason Ralston; Jason Aimone; Lucas Rentschler; Charles M. North; Wilson Law
Topic: Applied Economics: Other, Unknown: Unknown
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Environmental valuation using bargaining games: an application to water
Cesar Mantilla
 Universidad del Rosario
ABSTRACT:
We characterize a general bargaining game that can be used with environmental valuation purposes. In this game, a jointly endowed asset is divisible
into smaller units of two types: those with and without an associated costly attribute. Bargaining parties can use monetary transfers to their counterpart,
in exchange for accruing more units of the jointly endowed asset. We show that, in the cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining solutions, the cost
of the attribute is perfectly absorbed by the monetary transfer. Outcomes differing in the allocation of the units with the costly attribute allows us to
identify whether the players' valuation of the attribute corresponds to its induced value (i.e., its cost), or whether this attribute is over- or under-valued.
We show an application to the valuation of water in a lab-in-the-field experiment conducted with Colombian farmers. We find evidence that the players'
valuation of in-plot access to water dwells between 2.1 and 3.5 times its induced cost in the experiment.
Author(s): Cesar Mantilla and Margarita Gafaro
Topic: Applied Economics: Economic Development, Games: Bargaining
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Investment defaults and retirement savings allocations
Thomas Rietz
 University of Iowa
ABSTRACT:
We study how a change in the University of Iowa pension plan affected participant behavior. In 2006, the default investment changed from a money
market fund to a target date fund. We find that participants who joined under the money-market default quickly moved away from that fund, whereas
most who joined under the target date default stayed with the default for at least 3 years. To understand these differences, we combine administrative
data from TIAA and the University with data from a related experiment. In general, participants who joined under the target date default allocated
more to equity, even when comparing participants who did not accept either default investment. This contributes to the behavioral literature on
defaults, providing an example of a default that is largely ignored.
Author(s): Robert McDonald, Dave Richardson and Thomas Rietz
Topic: Decision Theory: Other, Field Experiments: General
Link: http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/trietz/papers/TIAA-Iowa%20Default%20Paper.pdf
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Willingness to vaccinate and test are critical in the COVID-19 pandemic. We study the effects of two measures to increase vaccination and testing:
“choice architecture” and monetary compensations. Choice architecture has the goal of “nudging” people into a socially desired direction without
affecting their choice options. Compensations reward vaccine takers and are already in use by some organizations. Yet there is the concern that
compensations may decrease vaccination if compensations erode intrinsic motivation to vaccinate. We show that both approaches, compensations and
choice architecture, significantly increase COVID-19 test and vaccine demand. Yet, for vaccines, low compensations can backfire.
Author(s): Marta Serra-Garcia, Nora Szech
Topic: Decision Theory: Preferences, Field Experiments: General
Link: bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2021/ii21-302.pdf
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Individual compliance with disease-preventive behaviors: Experimental evidence
Andrea Sorensen
 University of St. Thomas
ABSTRACT:
The rise and spread of COVID-19 has made individual compliance with disease-preventive behaviors such as wearing face coverings, social
distancing, staying home when sick, hand washing, and vaccination critically important to reducing the spread and saving lives. From an economic
perspective, these disease-preventive behaviors vary in terms of the private and external benefits they provide. Because of this, individual compliance
may vary across behaviors, and interventions aimed at increasing compliance may be more successful for some behaviors than others. The experiments
in this paper characterize a simplified version of the disease-prevention environment. Individuals face a possible loss, representative of getting sick,
and are given the option to pay a small cost to decrease either their own probability of loss, others' probabilities of loss, or both, depending on the
treatment. Additionally, each decision environment is tested in three different frames, positive, negative, and neutral. In the positive frame, the positive
externality created by paying the cost is emphasized in environments with an externality. In the negative frame, the negative externality created by not
paying the cost is emphasized in environments with an externality. An additional treatment includes a “moral nudge”, in which subjects read the
University's mission statement to “advance the common good” prior to participating in the experiment. Initial results suggest that in baseline
treatments, individual behavior is well predicted by the Nash equilibrium, which is sub-optimal for environments with an externality. Individuals do,
however, choose to pay the cost more often in treatments with a positive frame on the externality, and even more often in treatments with a negative
frame on the externality. Additional sessions are needed to confirm these initial results and to further investigate the “moral nudge”.
Author(s): Andrea Sorensen
Topic: Applied Economics: Other, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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The presence of pre-selected default options has been shown to influence individual decision making in various contexts including the choice of health
insurance and retirement contributions. Even so, it is not well understood how individuals with heterogeneous preferences react to the procedure used
to select the default options. We develop an econometric approach to test and compare default bias across different default-setting rules while
controlling for heterogeneous preferences. Using a within-subjects experimental design involving choices among lotteries, we apply this approach to
compare four different default-setting rules: Random defaults, Custom defaults selected based on an individual's own past choices, Social defaults
selected based on others' choices, and Expert defaults selected based on a normative criterion. We find that the content of default-setting rules matters:
default bias is present for all non-random default-setting regimes. In an environment with no time dimension nor explicit adjustment costs, this
provides evidence in favor of the endorsement effect as an important mechanism behind observed default bias.
Author(s): David J. Freeman; Hanh T. Tong
Topic: Decision Theory: Bounded Rationality, Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices
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In Your Name! The Effect of Intermediaries on Discrimination
Maivand Sarin
 University of Cologne
ABSTRACT:
Literature within economics has shown a change in behavior when people decide for others compared to a situation where they decide for themselves.
In this project, the effect of intermediaries, defined as decision-makers who act on behalf of others, on discrimination is investigated. A novel
incentivized discrete choice experiment is employed. Decision-makers choose from a list of candidates with either typical western or typical middle-
eastern first names. The study finds that while, on average, there is no discrimination when decision-makers decide for themselves, significant
discrimination emerges when they act on behalf of another person and have an incentive to match the other's choice. The study further shows that this
finding can neither be fully explained by a preference for discrimination nor by the traditional notion of statistical discrimination based on beliefs over
candidates' performance. Instead, the study finds strong evidence that inaccurate beliefs about others' discriminatory behavior drive the effect. Thus,
from a general perspective, the study contributes to long-standing literature that is in the search for reasons why people discriminate.
Author(s): Maivand Sarin
Topic: Decision Theory: Beliefs, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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Testing Elicitation Mechanisms Via Team Chat
Paul Healy
 Ohio State University
ABSTRACT:
A fundamental difficulty in testing the incentive compatibility of a mechanism is that, if types are unobservable, one cannot verify if reports are
truthful. Here, we use team chat messages to observe directly the beliefs of participants, and also whether they discuss attempts to deviate or
manipulate the mechanism. We do this for a binarized scoring rule, a multiple price list, and a treatment with no payment information given. We find
very little evidence of manipulation. Instead, deviations from objectively-given beliefs stem from confusion and errors. Showing complicated incentive
information to subjects increases this error on ``easy'' problems, but reduces it on ``hard'' problems.
Author(s): Paul J. Healy & John Kagel
Topic: Decision Theory: Beliefs, Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices
Link: healy.econ.ohio-state.edu/present/Healy_Kagel-ElicitationInTeams45Min.pdf
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Experimentally Decomposing Inattention
Kevin Laughren
 Simon Fraser University
ABSTRACT:
Most non-routine economic choices require a consumer to first gather some information, then choose an action. Rational Inattention (RI) describes a
consumer who is not fully informed because the marginal cost of gathering more information outweighed the marginal benefit exante. Many consumer
choices which appear to be mistakes can be plausibly explained as cases of RI, but when is a mistake more serious? This paper presents a simple
information gathering problem implemented in an online experiment to separately measure three stages of the choice process: the intention to collect
information, the collection of information, and the processing of collected information into action. This design permits an axiomatic test of whether
individuals behave as if they have a known attention cost function, and distinguishes RI from mistakes which are more costly and correctable. The
median percentage of choices which are consistent with the axioms is 99%, and 32% of participants generate a dataset which is perfectly consistent
with the costly information representation axioms, suggesting participants respond strategically to information costs and benefits. RI can account for
70% of mistakes, but over a quarter of mistakes occur after choosing to gather information, split between dynamic inconsistency (18%) and ineffective
attention (8%).
Author(s): Kevin Laughren
Topic: Decision Theory: Bounded Rationality, Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices
Link: kevinlaughren.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Laughren-experimentally-decomposing-inattention-v18Dec2020.pdf
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Drivers of Oveprecision: Overweighting and Neglecting Correlation of Multiple Signals
Jason Paulo Tayawa
The Ohio State University
ABSTRACT:
Decision makers are prone to ascribe higher precision to their information in political, financial, and goods market settings. It has been shown that such
overprecision, the belief that one's information is more precise than it actually is, leads to more polarized beliefs, over-investment, and lower social
welfare. We investigate the two distinct biases that drive overprecision, namely, overweighting and correlation neglect. Overweighting relates to
excessive response from the accuracy of one's information while correlation neglect relates to the ignorance of the correlation of one's information
sources. The presence of both drivers leads to the formation of extreme overprecision. We propose an experiment that disentangles the two biases in an
environment with multiple signals. To do so, we propose a debiasing method that shuts down one bias while holding the other fixed. This design allows
us to determine if the biases covary or are orthogonal to each other. We hypothesize that correcting for overweighting does not correct correlation
neglect. If they are found to be independent, then we can pinpoint the bias that contributes more to the level of overprecision.
Author(s): Jason Paulo Tayawa, Ancilla Marie Inocencio
Topic: Decision Theory: Beliefs, Decision Theory: Other
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Will gifts disrupt online market reputation systems? An experimental study
Liang Qiao
 THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
ABSTRACT:
The online reputation system is critical in mitigating the adverse selection resulting from information asymmetry, which prevails in electronic markets.
There is a concern about gifting, a typical sellers' strategic behavior, that it may corrupt the reputation system. To study the effect of gifting on the
online reputation system, I conduct a laboratory experiment using an infinitely repeated market transaction under two conditions: the gift market and
the no-gift market. In the gift market, sellers can transfer money (send gifts) to buyers who purchased their products before rating, but gifting is not
allowed in the no-gift market. Results show that gifting does not affect the period-average market efficiency, while the period-specific efficiency
increases faster in the gift market. Reputation is similarly valuable to sellers in that sellers with a given reputation earns equally in two markets. Since
buyers value products and gifts equally, transferring money is less efficient in building reputation than providing better products. However, sellers in
the gift market keep sending gifts to buyers via transferring money.
Author(s): Liang Qiao
Topic: Markets: Other, Games: Repeated Games
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Experimental Commodity Markets with Storage
Katerina Sherstyuk
 University of Hawaii, Dept of Economics
ABSTRACT:
Storage is a central feature of commodity markets that has been studied extensively outside the lab. We use laboratory and online economic
experiments to test the predictions of the canonical model of markets with stochastic supply in a controlled environment. Theoretically, storage
decreases intertemporal price volatility and improves dynamic efficiency of the market. The empirical literature points to many apparent departures
from stochastic dynamic competitive equilibrium, including possible excess price autocorrelation, excessive storage even under apparent negative
returns, and occasional commodity bubbles. In our experiment, storage improves efficiency of experimental markets compared to the markets without
storage, but we observe dynamic inefficiencies due to too little storage. We find that just a few savvy traders profit greatly and can push markets toward
greater efficiency, and further explore the conditions that may lead to improved dynamic efficiency of the market. Finally, we compare the performance
of these complex markets in the laboratory and online to draw implications for experimental methodology.
Author(s): Michael J. Roberts, Krit Phankitnirundorn and Katerina Sherstyuk
Topic: Markets: Other, Markets: Industrial Organization
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Emissions uncertainty has led regulators to include price controls in many cap-and-trade markets. We study how these controls affect  fi rms' incentives
to invest in new abatement technologies in a model with abatement cost uncertainty. Price floors increase investment incentives because they raise the
expected bene fits from lowering abatement costs. We also report a market experiment that features abatement cost uncertainty and the opportunity for
cost-reducing investment, with and without a price floor. Trade occurs through a continuous double auction market. Consistent with the theoretical
model, investment is signi cantly greater with the price floor in place. Emissions permit prices also respond as predicted to abatement investments and
emissions shocks.
Author(s): Tim Cason, John Stranlund, and Frans de Vries
Topic: Markets: Other, Applied Economics: Other
Link: www.krannert.purdue.edu/faculty/cason/papers/Investment_Price_Floor.pdf
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IRPD Games with Changing Discount Rates
David Cooper
 Florida State University
ABSTRACT:
There is a large body of evidence indicating that cooperation in IRPD games is sensitive to discount rates (Dal Bo and Frechette, 2018). The evidence
comes from studies where the discount rate was varied between sessions, but there is no reason to assume discount rates are stable in real world
settings. In this experiment, we compare behavior with fixed discount rates versus behavior when discount rates vary within and/or between
supergames. Holding the current discount rate fixed, cooperation rates vary depending on whether subjects have experienced different discount rates
either earlier in the same supergame or in earlier supergames. With experience, subjects learn to respond to changes in the discount rate. There is no
evidence that subjects initially understand the significance of differing discount rates. Instead, their response to varying dynamic incentives appears to
be entirely learned. Past experience appears to be more important than current dynamic incentives in determining whether cooperation occurs.
Author(s): David Cooper and Matt Gentry
Topic: Games: Repeated Games, Decision Theory: Learning
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It's complex -- How does offering more products affect consumer decision making?
Carola Grebitus
 Arizona State University
ABSTRACT:
When consumers buy products they have to make choices, and they might use a different decision strategy every time. Depending on how complex the
decision is, strategies will likely differ. More complex choices are more likely to be made using heuristics, i.e., rules of thumb, and less complex
choices can be made using compensatory strategies. Choice complexity is dependent on the amount of products and the amount of information present
(Payne et al., 1993). For instance, for some products, only two or three options might be available, e.g., specialty or ethnic foods. For other products
more than 20-30 options can be available, e.g., different yogurt varieties. The more options available and the more information present, the more
complex is the decision. This can lead decision makers to switch from processing all information and making a trade-off between them, i.e.,
compensatory decision, to process information selectively, i.e., adaptive decision making/heuristic (Bettman et al., 1998). In the case that not all
information is used, this can cause decision errors (Payne et al., 1993). Our study analyzes the use of compensatory versus adaptive decision strategies
when choices differ in complexity. We do so by combining choice experiments with eye tracking. This allows us to measure how much attention
decision makers pay to the information presented in the choice experiments. We vary the complexity of the choice experiments by presenting different
amounts of products to choose from. Since we are tracking eye movements, we can analyze the use of decision strategies when making choices that
differ in complexity. The objective is to shed light on how complexity in decision making drives use of compensatory and adaptive decision strategies.
Previous literature has used eye-tracking to provide insight into choice making for increasingly complex decision under time pressure (Reutskaja et al.,
2011), and has investigated the impact of choice complexity on decision-making strategy and final choice (Dellaert et al., 2012). Studies have found
that choice complexity affects the error of decision making (Caussade et al., 2005; Jacobsen et al., 2012). Grebitus and Roosen (2018) found that in
more complex choices more product alternatives were ignored. We are building on previous research by taking into account what effect the number of
product alternatives has on using compensatory or adaptive decision strategies. The use of an eye tracker allows us to determine which strategy was
used to make a choice because it enables us to evaluate which and how much information was acquired by the decision maker (Payne et al., 1993). For
example, when information is ignored this is an indicator for use of adaptive decision strategies. Our experimental design accounts for the relationship
between decision strategy and choice-making relative to the number of products presented in a choice set. We collected our data in a laboratory
experiment in 2017. We combined discrete choice experiments with eye-tracking. Complexity is modeled by varying the number of products presented
in the choice experiment. Eye tracking measures fixations where information is processed (Wedel and Pieters, 2007). The eye movement is tracked
while participants make their choices. We measure the use of different decision strategies by recording the attention towards products and specific
product information while subjects are making choices. This allows us to account for selectivity in information processing to identify whether a
compensatory or adaptive decision strategy was used. The experiment includes two treatments. In treatment one the choice sets had two product
alternatives and in treatment two they had four product alternatives. Comparing the use of information in the two treatments, i.e., whether the decision
maker makes a perfect trade-off between all information presented or not informs on the use of decision strategies. Data are analyzed using random
parameter logit models focusing on eye fixations. Preliminary results indicate that fixation count by alternative significantly affects choice for both, the
two-product and four-product design. This suggests that the amount of attention paid to product alternatives affects choice.
Author(s): Carola Grebitus (Arizona State University, USA) and Jutta Roosen (Technical University Munich, Germany)
Topic: Methodology: Lab, Field and External Validity, Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices
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Estimating Social Preferences Using Stated Satisfaction: Novel Support for Inequity Aversion
Lina Diaz
 George Mason University
ABSTRACT:
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is among the most renowned models in behavioral economics, positing a generalized aversion to inequality that is stronger
when one's own payoff is lower–rather than higher–than others; i.e., “envy” is stronger than “guilt.” While aggregate-level estimates based on revealed
preferences in laboratory games have supported the model, the assumption that guilt is stronger than envy is often violated at the individual level. This
paradox may be due to limitations of the revealed-preference approach. Instead, we directly ask subjects to report their satisfaction with payment-
profiles that hold their own payment constant while varying another subject's payment; we then use stated satisfaction to estimate the Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) model. An advantage of avoiding games is that eliciting stated satisfaction is relatively easy to implement and is less prone to being confounded
with motives like reciprocity in the estimation of inequity aversion; also the absence of tradeoffs between own and others' payoffs is cognitively less
demanding for subjects. Our unstructured approach does not limit the expression of social preferences to inequity aversion, yet our methodology yields
significant support for Fehr and Schmidt (1999). At the individual level, 86% of subjects exhibit at least as strong envy as guilt, and 76% (65%) of
subjects weakly(strongly) adhere to the model. Our individual-level estimates are robust to changing the value of one's own constant payment and to
changing the range of the other subject's payments. Methodologically, eliciting satisfaction can be an easy-to-implement complement to choice-based
preference-measures in contexts other than social preferences that are of interest to economists.
Author(s): Lina Diaz, Daniel Houser, John Ifcher, Homa Zarghamee
Topic: Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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Measuring Norms: Assessing the Bicchieri-Xiao elicitation method
Francesco Bogliacino
 Universidad Nacional de Colombia
ABSTRACT:
Recently, experimental economists have turned to several methods to elicit normative expectations that underpin social norms. The method introduced
by Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) uses a two-step procedure: after eliciting non-incentivized Personal Normative Beliefs (PNB), they then incentivize
subjects to accurately estimate the PNBs of other subjects. Since the PNB is elicited without incentives and many normative views are potentially
controversial, there is some risk that this method is susceptible to Social Desirability Bias. The main goal of this paper is to explore the robustness of
this method in the presence of social influence that might induce Desirability Bias; thus we compare normative expectations and PNBs elicited under
two different protocols that vary in the extent to which reports may be influenced by Social Desirability Bias.
Author(s): Aycinena, D; Bogliacino, F; Kimbrough, E
Topic: Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices, Social Behavior: Norms and Morals
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Social Proximity and the Erosion of Norm Compliance
Eugen Dimant
 University of Pennsylvania
ABSTRACT:
We study how individuals' compliance with norms of pro-social behavior is influenced by other actors' compliance in a dynamic and non-strategic
experimental setting. We are particularly interested in the role that social proximity among peers plays in eroding or upholding norm compliance. Our
results suggest that social proximity is crucial. In settings without known proximity, norm compliance erodes swiftly because participants only conform
to observed norm violations of their peers while ignoring norm compliance. With known social proximity, participants conform to both types of
observed behaviors, thus halting the erosion of norm compliance. Our findings stress the importance of the broader social context for norm compliance
and show that, even in the absence of social sanctions, conformity can be sustained in repeated interactions, provided there is group identification, as is
the case in many social encounters in natural and online environments.
Author(s): Cristina Bicchieri (UPenn), Eugen Dimant (UPenn), Simon Gaechter (UNottingham), Daniele Nosenzo (Aarhus)
Topic: Social Behavior: Norms and Morals, Social Behavior: Group Behavior
Link: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3355028
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We investigate how the intentionality of investors or trustees' actions affects third party compensation and punishment interventions after a trust game.
Investors and trustees are randomly assigned to conditions where they either make intentional choices or their choices are made by a random machine.
Overall, we find that lack of reciprocity is punished more than lack of trust, and third parties exhibit strong preferences for compensation over
punishment. We find that only punishments are affected by the intentionality of parties' actions, whereas compensation occurs in all conditions,
whether lack of trust or reciprocity has been intentional or unintentional.
Author(s): Cristina Bicchieri, Marta Maras
Topic: Social Behavior: Norms and Morals, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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The effect of Negative Shocks on pro-social and anti-social behavior
Rafael Charris
 Universidad Nacional de Colombia
ABSTRACT:
A large empirical literature argues that negative economic shocks induce antisocial behavior, mainly through incentives effect. However, there is also a
literature that claims that negative shocks experienced because of violence or natural disasters increase prosocial behavior. In this paper, we explore the
prediction of incentives effects in both settings, using a norm compliance model and we test them using a set of experiments
Author(s): Francesco Bogliacino, Rafael Charris, Camilo Gomez, Felipe Montealegre
Topic: Social Behavior: Norms and Morals, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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Exploring the Intensity of Higher-Order Risk Attitudes
Cary Deck
 University of Alabama
ABSTRACT:
Risk apportionment is the standard method for identifying higher order risk preferences. However, previous theoretical work only provides for
identifying the sign of such risk attitudes. This paper provides a theoretical basis for using risk apportionment to measure the intensity of risk attitudes
of any arbitrary order; develops a simple, systematic, generalizable procedure for capturing relative and absolute nth order risk attitudes; and reports
the results of a laboratory experiment implementing the procedure. The participants exhibit a wide range of risk intensities spanning risk neutrality,
prudent neutrality and temperance neutrality, casting doubt on the applicability of commonly assumed preference models.
Author(s): Cary Deck, Rachel Huang, Larry Tzeng, Lin Zhao
Topic: Decision Theory: Risk, Decision Theory: Preferences
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The Demand for, and Avoidance of, Information
Russell Golman
 Carnegie Mellon University
ABSTRACT:
We apply a previously developed “information gap” framework to better understand and predict information seeking and avoidance. The resulting
theory posits that, beyond the conventional desire for information as an input to decision making, two additional motives contribute to the demand for
information: curiosity—the desire to fill information gaps, i.e., to answer specific questions that capture attention; and motivated attention—the desire
to savor good news and ignore bad news, i.e. to obtain information we like thinking about and avoid information we do not like thinking about. Five
experiments (N = 2,361) test three of the primary hypotheses derived from the theory about the demand for information both when information is
neutrally-valenced and when it is ego-relevant. People are more inclined to acquire information: a) when it seems more important, even when the
information is not instrumental for decision making (Experiments 1A & 2A); b) when it is more salient, manipulated by how recently the information
gap was opened (Experiments 1B & 2B); and c) when it has higher valence—i.e., when individuals anticipate receiving more favorable news
(Experiment 2C). This set of findings demonstrates that we gain insight into informational preferences by recognizing how information gaps attract
attention.
Author(s): Russell Golman, George Loewenstein, Andras Molnar, Silvia Saccardo
Topic: Decision Theory: Other, Psychology and Biology: Cognition
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Some remarkable recent work (Peters, 2011) has demonstrated that Bernoulli's conjectured solution to the “St. Petersburg Paradox”—to maximize the
expected value of the natural log of wealth—is the exact solution to a completely different problem—to maximize the time averaged growth rate of
one's wealth. This “time resolution of the St. Petersburg paradox” can be understood as highlighting more generally the need to take account of
whether the wealth generation process is ergodic or not. In particular, if we provisionally accept the hypothesis that the growth rate of one's wealth is a
suitable optimand for an economic agent to focus upon, then the transformation of wealth represented by what is conventionally called the utility
function takes on a new meaning: it is the transformation of wealth whose stochastic behavior is ergodic—meaning that both the “ensemble” or “cross
sectional” distribution is the same as the “time average” distribution. Notably, this transformation depends not upon individual risk preferences, but
rather upon the physical environment. For example, the St. Petersburg Gamble, which has a geometric distribution over time, requires the natural log
transformation to yield an ergodic process, while a simple binomial gamble (win a dollar or win 0 with equally probability in each round, for example)
requires no transformation of wealth—it is already ergodic. So the appropriate function to optimize with differs, for the same individual, across
different gambles. We report on an experiment designed to exploit the implications of Peter's theory. We compare gambling behavior in a truncated (to
10 periods) version of the St. Petersburg Gamble to behavior in a 10 period Binomial Gamble. We conceive of the experiment as a horse race between
risk-neutral expected utility and the growth rate maximization hypothesis. These two hypotheses yield distinct predictions for the threshold of the cost
of playing the gamble above which a decision maker should not be willing to play the St Petersburg Gamble, but rather similar predictions for the two
theories for the Binomial Gamble. Our results are, briefly, that the vast majority of subjects are remarkably consistent, behaving as if they have a
distinct threshold in mind for each type of gamble, for a given initial (endowed) wealth level that they have to work with, and from which they pay the
cost of playing he gamble, or which they keep if they do not play the gamble. The threshold levels increase systematically with the initial wealth level,
but the implied transformation of wealth (or utility function) ends up being too variable to be consistent with either hypothesis. Further, overall
behavior in the St. Petersburg gamble is generally closer to risk neutral behavior than is behavior in the Binomial Gamble. A third alternative
hypothesis that the initial wealth subjects are endowed with amounts to “house money” and is not integrated into wealth, is explored. Overall, the full
implications of the multiplicative nature of wealth dynamics in the St. Petersburg Gamble does not seem to impinge on decision makers' thinking. A
future experiment in which subjects have decision aids to given them feedback on hypothetical decisions they might make before deciding to gamble
or not is discussed. Peters, Ole. “The Time Resolution of the St Petersburg Paradox.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 369, no. 1956
(December 13, 2011): 4913–31
Author(s): Jacqueline Gelman and Barry Sopher
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We provide the first examinations of uncertainty resolution with respect to the resolution of ambiguity rather than risk. While previous studies have
experimentally elicited preferences for uncertainty resolution, all have only examined preferences for the resolution of risk. We elicit both preferences
for uncertainty and risk resolution within-subjects and observe their correlations. We find that there exists a preference for early resolution of ambiguity
as well as risk, and these two preferences are highly correlated. There is suggestive evidence the attitude toward ambiguity aversion also affects this
relationship. Our theoretical summary of dynamic models under uncertainty shows only one model of ambiguity aversion (Hayashi and Miao, 2011)
can plausibly explain our experimental findings. Our results also shed light on whether examining uncertainty resolution only in the domain of risk
produces a biased picture of an individual's overall preferences on uncertainty resolution.
Author(s): Alexander L. Brown, Huiyi Guo, Hyundam Je
Topic: Decision Theory: Ambiguity, Decision Theory: Ambiguity
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What Drives Excessive Borrowing and Under-Borrowing? A Field Experiment
King King Li
 Shenzhen Audencia Business School, Shenzhen University
ABSTRACT:
We investigate the determinants of excessive/under-borrowing. Our study differs from the literature by measuring excessive/under-borrowing, and
estimating the effect of self- control, financial literacy, and misperception of interest rates, in addition to present bias. We observe both excessive
borrowing and under-borrowing, with higher proportion of subjects exhibiting the latter. Subjects with better self-control are less likely to exhibit
excessive borrowing, and are more likely to exhibit under-borrowing. It suggests that excessive (under-) borrowing can be due to over-estimation
(under-estimation) of self- control. Subjects with better financial literacy are less likely to exhibit excessive borrowing. An additional level of better
self-control leads to 10.34% lower borrowing interest rate in real-life. An additional level of better financial literacy leads to 3.44% lower interest rate.
Borrowers exhibiting interest rate misperception pay about 11.49% higher interest rate. The findings on the role of financial literacy and misperception
of interest rate suggest that excessive-borrowing is not merely a self-control problem, and it can be reduced through appropriate financial education.
Author(s): Li King King, Liu Dan, Mai Xin Da, Zhang Qiu Ju, Ren Xiao Yu, Xu Gao Qian, Zhang Kai
Topic: Field Experiments: General, Markets: Finance
Link: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3795838
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Patience Across the Payday Cycle
Holly Dykstra
 Harvard Kennedy School
ABSTRACT:
Individuals often behave impatiently when making financial decisions, which can have long-term economic consequences. This paper proposes and
tests that the timing of decisions relative to payday—which leads to strong cyclical fluctuations in liquidity for many individuals—influences the level
of patience they have. In a large pre-registered online experiment, I ask participants to adopt a commitment device that binds them to being patient.
Participants who make this decision eight days before their payday, rather than one day after payday, are 38% more likely to take up commitment. This
is consistent with a mechanism where projection-biased agents have self-control problems. By documenting the importance of the timing of financial
decisions relative to payday, this paper offers a new policy tool as well as new evidence on the behavioral dynamics that affect everyday savings and
consumption choices.
Author(s): Holly Dykstra
Topic: Applied Economics: Other, Decision Theory: Beliefs
Link: scholar.harvard.edu/files/holly-dykstra/files/payday.pdf
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Measuring the Time Preferences of Experienced Producers
Paul Feldman
 Johns Hopkins University
ABSTRACT:
There have been substantial innovations in the elicitation of time preferences. Notwithstanding, there is a lack of empirical evidence of any significant
gains. Recent methods justify their estimates by obtaining comparable mean discount rates to prior elicited rates and to credit card rates. To provide
more meaningful comparisons, we evaluate three prominent methods within subjects in a field experiment with experts (older farmers); with larger
rewards, delays, and horizons; and more participants. The three methods contrasted are joint time and risk elicitation, discrete-time budgets, and a
direct method (for eliciting the discount function). Unlike prior studies, we find smaller median individual yearly discount rates with distributions
skewed towards zero. These results are robust across the methods. Our within-subject design allows for sharper contrast and indicate the discrete-time
budgets discount rates have the highest correlation with the other two methods. Moreover, risk preferences are uncorrelated with time preferences. We
provide some guidance to sort between methods.
Author(s): Paul Feldman, Paul Ferraro, and Collin Weigel
Topic: Decision Theory: Preferences, Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices
Link: sites.google.com/view/pfeldman/research
Back to session: Field Experiments 1
A Tale of the Tortoise and the Hare: Monetary Incentives, Social Status and Physical Activity
Natalia Valdez Gonzalez
 Texas A&M University
ABSTRACT:
We conduct a field experiment to understand the role of social status and monetary incentives as motivation to increase physical activity. We find that
social status alone does not induce a change in physical activity. However, when social status is combined with monetary incentives, we find an effect
in the number of daily steps. This effect is heterogeneous. Individuals with a low activity level increase the number of steps by 12%, while those with
high activity levels show a decrease in the number of steps by 25%. The increased motivation of the low activity group and the crowding-out effect of
the high activity group are reminiscent of the hare and the tortoise fable. There are no changes in the number of steps in the control, indicating that the
use of pedometers did not induce a change in the level of physical activity. An exogenous social status treatment –uncorrelated with physical activity–
provides robustness to our findings and rules out potential experimenter demand effects and other factors driving the results. Our results call for a
cautionary approach for analyzing the role of social status –in many cases unobserved in social media– for physical activity intervention programs.
Author(s): Natalia I. Valdez Gonzalez, Jennifer Y. Kee, Marco A. Palma, J. Ross Pruitt
Topic: Field Experiments: General, Social Behavior: Group Behavior
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This paper studies the role of verification in communication and its interaction with commitment. The framework features partial commitment and
costly verification. The model suggests that when the verification cost is low, it can significantly improve information transmission with low
commitment while its influence is limited when commitment is high or the cost is high. I test the theoretical predictions in an experiment and find that
subjects react to verification cost in line with the main qualitative implications of the theory. The main departure comes from senders' choices in the
hidden communication plan in which they show lying aversion.
Author(s): Junya Zhou
Topic: Social Behavior: Lying and Cheating, Social Behavior: Communication
Back to session: Lying and Communication
Does lying for others dominate lying aversion?
Daniel Parra
 WZB Berlin Social Science Center
ABSTRACT:
I study whether people take advantage of privileged positions to avoid their lying costs. I use a sequential cheating game in dyads in which if at least
one member of the dyad lie, both benefit from it. Consequently, the first-mover can avoid the cost of lying by reporting truthfully if he or she expects
that the second-mover will lie. In this setting, two channels may affect lying behavior: generating a positive externality in others and having the
possibility to avoid the cost of lying. I conducted two online experiments using an observed lying game (N=925) and a mind lying game (N=1009). I
use treatment variations to turn off the second-mover possibility of lying, the positive externality of the first-mover on the second mover, and the
decisions' sequentiality. I found that participants use the positive externality as an excuse to lie even if they could rely on second-mover incentives.
However, when they cannot signal the lie's prosociality to the second mover, they try to free-ride on the partner's lie.
Author(s): Daniel Parra
Topic: Social Behavior: Lying and Cheating, Social Behavior: Norms and Morals
Back to session: Lying and Communication
Is It What You Say, or How You Say It? An Experimental Investigation of Communication Messages
Siyu Wang
 Wichita State University
ABSTRACT:
Prior studies have shown that free-form communication facilitates cooperation more than restricted-form. We investigated the reasons behind it by
comparing different formats of messages in a sequential game where the buyer sets the price and then the seller determines the quality of the product.
Before any decision is made, the seller could send the buyer a promise, a threat, a free-form message, or alternatively a message chosen from a
previously constructed free-form talk. We find that: (i) while a threat is ineffective compared to the baseline, a promise significantly promotes
cooperation; (ii) a free-form message further improves cooperation, but a selection from free-form messages is only as effective as a promise; (iii) the
notion of promise and honesty is frequently raised in free-form messages and such a message enhances cooperation; (iv) these two notions are more
effective in fostering cooperation when they are constructed by the senders as opposed to being chosen by the senders. Our results indicate that the
intention behind constructing the message rather than the richness of the message drives the improvement from restricted-form to free-form.
Author(s): Xiangdong Qin; Siyu Wang; Zhiren Wu
Topic: Social Behavior: Communication, Games: Coordination
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Strategic Responses to Lying
Fangtingyu Hu
 University of Minnesota
ABSTRACT:
While much of the previous research focuses on the lie-teller, the lie-receiver remains understudied. We provide an overarching view of how people
respond to possible lies and articulate the motivations behind those responses. We differentiate non-strategic responses and strategic responses. We find
evidence that receivers are being strategically, rather than genuinely, friendly towards dishonest reports by a long-term partner. Such difference is
driven by one's expectations of future reciprocity, instead of pure emotional reactions. Our findings carry important implications for the use of
performance evaluation in human resource practices.
Author(s): Fangtingyu Hu, Avner Ben-Ner
Topic: Social Behavior: Lying and Cheating, Social Behavior: Norms and Morals
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Communication matters in economic decision making, even in games with simple, unique equilibria. However, the exact mechanism through which
this effect happens remains unclear. Previous investigations have only been able to handle ad hoc hypotheses due to having a limited data. In this paper,
we employ Natural Language Processing on data from a large-scale principal-agent game run on Amazon's MTurk system with one way
communication from agents to principals. These NLP methods, combined with our dataset of over 1000 messages, allow us to approach the data with
minimal substantive assumptions to investigate the mechanisms underpinning trust. The structure of our dataset clearly links principals' choices
whether to trust agents to their received messages, allowing us to identify new features that increase a message's perceived trustworthiness. Further,
knowing the agents' ultimate decisions, we also identify features of messages which predict that they are likely untrustworthy. Comparing the features
which predict perceived and actual trustworthiness yields a set of features predicting which messages are likely to be both deceptive and effective.
These laboratory findings may help identify types of online interactions where there is a higher likelihood of deception.
Author(s): Austin Bradley, Alec Smith
Topic: Social Behavior: Communication, Games: Bargaining
Back to session: Norms and Trust
Measuring norms: Assessing the Krupka-Weber elicitation method
Diego Aycinena
 Universidad del Rosario
ABSTRACT:
Economists have been giving increasing attention to the influence of social norms in human behavior. To better understand such influence,
experimental economists have turned to several methods to elicit normative expectations that underpin social norms. The method introduced by
Krupka and Weber (2013) uses a coordination game (with multiple equilibria), where subjects are incentivized to match the modal responses
(regarding social appropriateness) of other participants. The method relies on the focality of collectively-shared norms to induce coordination. The
main goal of this paper is to explore the properties, drawbacks, and robustness of the KW method and variations on them. In particular, we examine
whether it can be improved by adding a neutral option that may allow examining an asymmetry in normative expectations. That is, if a social norm
prescribes an action that benefits a party, deviating from the prescribed action in a self-serving manner and costly to the other party (e.g., injustice) may
be perceived as normatively different from deviating in a generous to the other and self-costly manner (e.g. beneficence). We also examine if including
an incentive-compatible option to declare the unawareness of a social norm improves accuracy when we test situations that have normative
components vs those that do not.
Author(s): Aycinena, Diego; Bogliacino, Francesco; Kimbrough, Erik
Topic: Social Behavior: Norms and Morals, Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices
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Is a high level of trust and trustworthiness within the organization a good thing to the firm?
Yufei Ren
 University of Minnesota Duluth
ABSTRACT:
Although research in different fields has explored trust and trustworthiness to some extent, there is a lack of dyadic research examining how trust and
trustworthiness in the employment relationship influence organizational performance and turnover in the workplace. We elicited 3000 employees' and
managers' trust and trustworthiness attitudes toward each other using a virtual experiment. We find out that compared to employees, managers are more
likely to trust the employees and also expect the employees to trust them more. On the other hand, managers are more like to perceive their employees
as less trustworthy. We also examine how these trust and trustworthiness perceptions influence the work unit outcomes. We find out that
trustworthiness, not trust, impacts organizational performance. In particular, on average, the extent to which the employees believe that their managers
are trustworthy is negatively associated with the probability that the firm can achieve its profit goal. Furthermore, organizations in which employees
believe that their managers are less trustworthy are likely to have a higher turnover rate.
Author(s): Feng Lv, Lin Xiu, Xin Liang
Topic: Social Behavior: Other, Applied Economics: Labor Market
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Role of gender identity on conservation effort choice in an agricultural land leasing context: A Lab Experiment
Diya Ganguly
 University of Nebraska-Lincoln
ABSTRACT:
Adoption of conservation-friendly land-use practices on a significant portion of farmland in the United States is predicated on the land ownership and
environmental attitudes of the landowner and tenant. An emerging pattern of agricultural land ownership indicates an increase in the number of women
who own a significant portion of farmland in the United States. Implementation of sustainable long run conservation practices in these agricultural
areas is contingent on the type of lease, renters (mostly male) are offered. Additionally, surveys of women landowners indicate that women find it
difficult to mandate that the renters adopt specific conservation practices under the terms of the rental agreement. The overall objective of this study is
to identify the differences in lease choice and conservation effort choice between 1) female landowners and their male tenants and 2) male landowners
and their male tenants. For this purpose, we develop a theoretical model which is set up within the context of a sequential-move game. We use the
principal-agent framework and identity theory to model the leasing agreement between the two parties and arrive at subsequent land use choice and
equilibrium payoffs. We then use a controlled lab experiment to evaluate behavior on the basis of model findings. A laboratory setting allows us to
implement the key intervention, in our case altering the gender of the landowner in a bargaining framework with a male tenant, to draw causal
inferences about the impact of gender on lease choice and conservation effort choice. We contribute to the economic experimental literature by
analyzing the interaction between gender of participants and the type of contract executed between a landowner and a tenant. We implement a two-
person between-subject experimental design where participants play a multi-round sequential game, after being assigned the role of a landowner or a
tenant. The landowner's strategy choice consists of three possible rental contracts they can offer to the tenant. In response to receiving these contracts,
the tenant will choose between implementing high or low conservation effort. The landowner can offer to the tenant: i) a fixed rental contract with a
penalty for implementing low conservation effort, ii) a fixed rental contract with a discount for implementing high conservation effort, or iii) a fixed
rental contract with neither a discount nor a penalty. A discounted rental contract is promoted by extension but not observed in the field yet. Similarly,
the penalty in the contract is usually not observed in the field. However, using the discount and the penalty as incentives in the lab allow us to identify
correlations between the gender of the landowner, the choice of contract and the subsequent effort choice by the tenant. Our main treatment variable is
the gender of the landowner (female versus male) and whether it is revealed or not. In the control sessions, the gender of the landowner is not revealed
and not made salient. In treatment sessions gender is revealed and made salient. After completing the game, participants answer a questionnaire that
elicits their gender stereotyping tendencies which gives us a gender stereotyping score for each participant. When it comes to contract choice, we
hypothesize that female landowners will offer more contracts with discounts than male landowners; moreover, they will also offer higher rental
discounts than male landowners. Regarding effort choice, we hypothesize that male tenants will choose high effort for male landowners than female
landowners, regardless of the contract offered. Our analysis identifies how the effort choice outcome of the participants is impacted by the contract
choice and the gender of the landowner using a binomial logistic regression model. The explanatory variables include the contract choice, discount
offered (if discounted contracts are offered), treatment dummies and the gender stereotyping scores. The results of our model identify the role of
gender of the landowner on conservation outcomes on leased farmland. If male tenants only respond with high effort when offered a discount by
female landowners and display a tendency to “obey” a male landowner more than a female landowner, then by benchmarking this behavior this study
serves to highlight the need for gender-oriented conservation policy interventions to ensure the long run sustainability and provision of ecosystem
services on farmland.
Author(s): Diya Ganguly, Simanti Banerjee, Christopher R. Gustafson
Topic: Social Behavior: Norms and Morals, Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices
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Paved with Good Intentions: Group Identity and Partial Willful Ignorance in Public Goods Games
Braxton Gately
 University of Arkansas
ABSTRACT:
I investigate whether the propensity to remain partially ignorant of the consequences of one's decisions is compounded by group identity in public
goods games. Particularly, I seek to answer two research questions. First, do agents in a public goods games use information acquisition as a self-
deception mechanism that enables free-riding? Second, if so, is the amount of information acquired different when the other contributors are part of
one's ingroup than when the other contributors are part of the other contributor's outgroup? I use a 2 x 2 experimental design which varies the certainty
level in the experiment along one dimension (Certainty – Uncertainty) and whether or not group identity has been induced along the other (Identity –
No Identity). I offer three hypotheses rooted in a theoretical model. First, under certainty, contributions will be higher with induced group identity than
with no group identity if subjects have strong ingroup attachment and low outgroup attachment, and lower with induced group identity than with no
group identity if subjects have equal attachments to both ingroup and outgroup members. Second, under uncertainty, contributions will be higher with
induced group identity than with no group identity if subjects believe that the benefit to ingroup participants is greater than outgroup participants.
Third, under uncertainty, search rates will be higher with induced group identity than with no group identity if subjects believe that ingroup members
will be benefitted more than outgroup members. Data collection and experimental results are forthcoming.
Author(s): J. Braxton Gately
Topic: Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource, Social Behavior: Group Behavior
Back to session: Public Goods 1
The Gift of Giving: Disclosing Tribute Donation Size and Taboo Charitable Behavior
Kanatip Winichakul
 University of Pittsburgh
ABSTRACT:
Tribute donations are a ubiquitous form of charitable giving. Donors make contributions on behalf or in memory of others, and honorees are notified of
these donations. When charities notify honorees, however, it is common practice not to disclose tribute donation amounts. But does this industry
standard of concealing donation amounts benefit charities? In this paper, I run a laboratory experiment to explore tribute giving and whether the type of
honoree acknowledgment impacts donations. In particular, I examine whether disclosing tribute donation amounts affects the likelihood that donors
give on behalf of others, the size of donations, and future giving.
Author(s): Kanatip Winichakul
Topic: Applied Economics: Charitable Giving, Applied Economics: Charitable Giving
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Framing and Inequality in Public Goods Games
Brock Stoddard
 Appalachian State University
ABSTRACT:
In many social dilemmas, cooperation can be framed as giving decisions or taking decisions. An important example is environmental policy
encouraging “green” behavior. Such policy can be framed as individuals giving to the environment by making green decisions or as individuals taking
from the environment by not making green decisions. Beyond the frame, inequality potentially poses another obstacle to voluntary contributions. Do
rich and poor members react differently to how a social dilemma is framed? Similarly, do more productive members react differently to framing than
less productive members? We examine these questions using a VCM public goods game. In each give and take frame, we examine two kinds of
inequality. Heterogeneous endowment varies group members' initial resource endowment, leading to rich and poor subjects. Heterogeneous production
varies members' contribution productivity in creating a public good. The key preliminary finding is that the poor in heterogeneous endowment respond
differently across give and take frames. An established result that we find support for is that, in give-framed public goods games, the poor contribute a
larger percentage of their endowment than the rich. However, we do not find this to be true in take-framed public goods games; the poor contribute
significantly lower amounts in take-framed games than in give-framed games. Additional analysis will examine extreme behavior across the
treatments.
Author(s): Caleb Cox, Abhijit Ramalingam, Brock Stoddard
Topic: Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource, Social Behavior: Group Behavior
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Criminal Justice systems and decisions to commit crimes are embedded within a strategic environment of punishment that involves uncertainty of both
the commission of crimes and uncertainty regarding the implementation punishment. We use a set of experimental voluntary contribution mechanism
(VCM) games to study the effect of costly probabilistic punishment on contribution amounts. We study how punishment and contributions amounts
evolve over finitely repeated games and how these patterns vary depending on how likely it is for punishment to be effective. We use a typing
procedure to examine correlations between contribution type (e.g. altruist, conditional cooperator, etc.) and retaliatory punishment behavior. Our study
sheds light on how costly probabilistic punishment shapes cooperation in a group setting.
Author(s): Amanda Short, Jason Ralston, Jason Aimone, Lucas Rentschler, Charles North
Topic: Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource, Public Choice: Other
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Investor's Memory Recall Bias: Theory and Field Experiment
King King Li
 Shenzhen Audencia Business School, Shenzhen University
ABSTRACT:
We conduct a field experiment to investigate the memory recall bias of real-life investors who are asked to recall their best performing stock (BPS) and
worst performing stock (WPS). We find that investor are more likely to remember BPS than forgetting, while such pattern is not observed for WPS.
Further, investors with higher discount rate are more likely to forget WPS. Investors who pay more attention to stock prices are more likely to forget
WPS. The proportion of investors who forget WPS and remember BPS is higher than the proportion of investors who forget BPS and remember WPS.
Experience in investment play an important role that the less experienced investors are more likely to forget WPS than BPS, while more experienced
investors do not exhibit this bias. We propose a theory of investor's memory recall preference to account for the findings.
Author(s): King King Li, and Kang Rong
Topic: Field Experiments: General, Applied Economics: Charitable Giving
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Gender Differences in Preference to Give Advice
Elif Osun
 University of Maryland
ABSTRACT:
This paper experimentally investigates whether there is a gender difference in advice giving in a gender-neutral and risk-free task where the incentives
of the advisor and the decision make are perfectly aligned. The results indicate that women shy away from giving advice compared to men. The gender
difference is driven by the difficult questions in which knowing the exact correct answer is not likely. Self-confidence explains some of the gender gap,
but not all. The gender gap disappears if advice becomes enforceable, suggesting that the gender difference in advice giving may be driven by rejection
aversion.
Author(s): Elif Osun
Topic: Decision Theory: Preferences, Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences
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The influence of violating attribute cut-offs on utility for Medjool dates from Arizona
Carola Grebitus
 Arizona State University
ABSTRACT:
Using choice experiments we make the assumption that the passive bounded rationality model applies, which means that participants attend to and
process all information that is presented and make a trade-off between all presented attributes when choosing their preferred product option. This
assumption is based on the use of compensatory decision strategies in which a better value of one attribute can compensate for a poorer value of
another attribute (Payne et al., 1992). However, adaptive decision strategies can also be used in which not all available information will be used to
make a choice (Caplin, 2016; Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, 2011). An example for this is the use of attribute cut-offs which are a minimum acceptable level
that decision makers set for themselves for a specific attribute (Huber, Klein, 1991). They use their cut-off to screen product alternatives. Theoretically,
those who don't meet the cut-off should be eliminated from their consideration set. For example, if a decision maker wants to purchase a new car, and
brand is a valid cut-off (s)he will not consider cars with brands other than the preferred brand. Hence, modeling choices without accounting for
attribute cut-offs can bias estimates (Swait, 2001) because the model will still treat ignored attribute levels as part of the decision even though they
were not considered in the decision process (Hensher et al., 2005). This has implications on utility estimation. In addition, the question arises what
happens if a decision maker has a cut-off for an attribute but still chooses an option that violates this. For instance, if only domestic car brands are
considered but the decision maker violates her cut-off and chooses a foreign brand, how does this affect utility? One could argue that utility for
domestic cars should go down due to the violation. However, if the option containing foreign brand is chosen nonetheless, it could also lead to
increased utility due to other attributes of that option. Hence, our objective is to advance discrete choice modeling by accounting for cut-off levels and
informing on effects of attribute cut-offs and potential violation on utility. To do so, we conducted a laboratory experiment in the U.S. combining a
choice experiment with an assessment of cut-off values in the context of healthy and sustainable food choices. To be able to evaluate the role of
decision strategies during choice making, we use eye tracking to measure attention to the choice attributes. Preliminary results show that 41% of
participants had no cut-off levels, about one-third had at least one cut-off level. Almost two-thirds had a cut-off for price. We start by using Tobit
models to show that attribute cut-offs for product labeling increased attention. Having cut-offs for price did not have significant effects on attention and
subsequently the used decision strategies. Next, we will proceed to test how this affects, and what the effect of violating attribute cut offs is on choice
modeling in terms of model performance and utility levels. References: Caplin, A. (2016). Measuring and Modeling Attention. Annual Review of
Economics, 8(1), 379-403.; Gigerenzer, G., & Gaissmaier, W. (2011). Heuristic Decision Making. Annual Review of Psychology, 62(1), 451-482.;
Hensher, D. A., Rose, J., & Greene, W. H. (2005). The implications on willingness to pay of respondents ignoring specific attributes. Transportation,
32(3), 203-222.; Huber, J., & Klein, N. M. (1991). Adapting Cutoffs to the Choice Environment: The Effects of Attribute Correlation and Reliability.
Journal of Consumer Research, 18(3), 346-357.; Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., Coupey, E., & Johnson, E. J. (1992). A constructive process view of
decision making: Multiple strategies in judgment and choice. Acta Psychologica, 80(1), 107-141.; Swait, J. (2001). A non-compensatory choice model
incorporating attribute cutoffs. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 35(10), 903-928.
Author(s): Carola Grebitus (Associate Professor, Arizona State University, USA); Mohammed H. Alemu (Postdoctoral Researcher, University of
Copenhagen, Denmark); Ellen Van Loo (Assistant Professor, Wageningen University, The Netherlands)
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Grit, Discounting, & Time Inconsistency
Christian Koenig genannt Kersting
 University of Innsbruck
ABSTRACT:
We study the association of the perseverance-of-effort (PoE) and the consistency-of-interests (CoI) components of the psychological measure of grit,
with economic measures of impatience and decreasing impatience, respectively, in the general population. We find that impatience is associated with
grit through the PoE component. No association of time inconsistency with grit is found. Predicting participants' dissatisfaction with their financial and
health outcomes and behaviors, we find that, despite their correlation, both impatience and grit are predictive for both outcomes. Our findings suggest
that it may be beneficial for empirical studies of intertemporal decisions to include both economic impatience and psychological grit measures.
Author(s): Christian Koenig-Kersting, Stefan T. Trautmann
Topic: Decision Theory: Preferences, Field Experiments: General
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To Go Electric or to Burn Coal? A Randomized Field Experiment
King King Li
 Shenzhen Audencia Business School, Shenzhen University
ABSTRACT:
Coal heating in residential houses is an important source of indoor and outdoor air pollution, which brings about health damage. We conduct a
randomized field experiment to investigate potential obstacles to electric heating by conducting 3 types of SMS campaign containing either electricity
cost, or health damage, or social information on the heating methods by others, to households in rural villages in northern China. We find that a
majority of households overestimate their electricity expense, and underestimate the health damage from coal heating. When households are given
feedback on accurate electricity expenses, the demand for electric heating decreases by 52 percent; and this effect is stronger for households who
underestimate energy cost, and are concerned about the heating price; while it has no significant impact on those with cost overestimation. Among
households who perceive correctly and attach importance to the health impact from coal heating, providing information on the health damage from
coal heating increases the demand for electric heating by 55.8 percent and 25.6 percent, respectively. Moreover, providing social comparison
information on the heating methods chosen by others only has a positive effect on a small proportion of households who tend to follow others' heating
preferences.
Author(s): Hanming Fang, King King Li, and Peiyao Shen
Topic: Field Experiments: General, Applied Economics: Economic Development
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We use a combination of randomized field experiments and online surveys to test how the menu design affects food choices and food waste. In our
field experiment, participants face one of two menus: a narrow menu that only displays a small portion of food, or a broad menu that also contains
bigger portions. While all options are equally available in both menus, they differ in how easy and fast the different choices can be made. Our results
show that, compared to the broad menu, participants in the narrow menu ordered smaller portions of food. Importantly, food intake was similar across
conditions, leading to significant food waste reduction under the narrow menu. Our online survey suggest that these results are consistent with a
combination of anchoring and menu-dependent self-control theories. We discuss the implication of our results to menu design in real world settings.
Author(s): Joaquin Gomez-Minnambres (Lafayette College), Hongxing Liu (Lafayette College) and Danyi Qi (Louisiana State University)
Topic: Field Experiments: General, Decision Theory: Preferences
Link: digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/332/
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Haggling for a Smoke: A Natural Field Experiment on Price Discrimination in Mexico City's Informal Cigarette Markets
Hernan Bejarano
 CIDE & Chapman, Economic Science Institute
ABSTRACT:
Knowing more about how the illicit market for single cigarettes sets or negotiates prices and extracts profits is not only of interest to cigarette
manufacturers and tobacco regulators but also concerns the sizeable tranche of society in low and middle-income countries involved in selling and
consuming loose/single cigarettes from street sellers. What factors do affect prices in this market? A common finding in recent economic experiments
is that gender-based price discrimination often occurs (Gneezy, 2009; Castillo et al. 2013). In addition, theories of rational and visceral addiction, alike,
predict that the willingness-to-pay for an addictive substance is likely to be higher among individuals with lower levels of substance tolerance than
those with higher levels of substance tolerance (Hart, 2013). The effect of substance use on willingness-to-pay should therefore be observable in
negotiation outcomes for addictive substances. In our natural field experiment, we collected 1,549 observations of negotiations for single cigarettes in
16 informal street markets across Mexico City to test if price discrimination occurred and whether buyer gender and smoking status were potentially
causing its occurrence. We found first and third-degree discrimination. Findings of a gender and smoking status interaction suggest sellers positively
discriminate female smokers compared to male smokers but fail to price discriminate between female and male non-smokers.
Author(s): Hernan Bejarano, Rodrigo Cordova, and Lissandra ELlyne
Topic: Field Experiments: General, Applied Economics: Economic Development
Back to session: Field Experiments 2
Competition and Convergence in Complementary Contests
Daniel Stephenson
 Virginia Commonwealth University
ABSTRACT:
This paper experimentally investigates contests where agents allocate resources to compete over divisible complementary prizes. The unique Nash
equilibrium is shown not to depend on the level of competitiveness. Yet adaptive models predict faster convergence to equilibrium in less competitive
settings. As predicted by the adaptive best response model, the empirical rate of convergence to the unique Nash equilibrium was observed to be faster
in less competitive settings. These results suggest that adaptive models can provide useful insights into the rate at which the behavior of boundedly
rational agents converges towards the predictions of Nash equilibrium over time.
Author(s): Daniel Stephenson
Topic: Games: Contests, Markets: Auctions
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Secondary Markets and the Opioid Crisis: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
Yue Deng
 George Mason University
ABSTRACT:
The opioid crisis is responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths and trillions of dollars in costs. The secondary market for opioids contributes
substantially to those numbers. While shutting down the secondary market can alleviate the health threat induced by the drug diversions, it could also
trigger increased unnecessary prescriptions, leaving the welfare consequences of closing secondary market distribution ambiguous. Drawing on
Schnell's (2017) model of secondary markets and the opioid crisis, we design a laboratory experiment to investigate the effect of secondary markets on
patient and physician behaviors. We find that, as compared to when the secondary market is absent, in the presence of a secondary market patients visit
physicians more frequently and physicians provide more prescriptions. Consequently, we find that shutting down this distribution channel reduces total
consumption of opioids, and positively impacts overall health outcomes. Our results provide clear evidence that policies aimed at restricting secondary
markets would significantly contribute to mitigating the opioid crisis.
Author(s): Yue Deng, Daniel Houser
Topic: Markets: Industrial Organization, Markets: Other
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Opening the Book: Price Information's Impact on Market Efficiency in the Lab
Brett Williams
 University of California, Santa Cruz
ABSTRACT:
Trader behavior and market convergence are studied in a general equilibrium two-good setting through the use of the continuous double auction. The
transaction history varies across sessions in its accessibility. Congruently, the orderbook, which houses the traders' bids and asks, differs across sessions
in the visual and interactive availability of active orders. The set of active bids and asks shown to traders may range from only the best bid and ask in
the market to the full set of active orders; similarly, the set of visible transactions spans the full history of the trading period to only a trader's own
transactions. I leverage this variation to identify the impacts of differing levels of market transparency on outcomes such as price and allocation
efficiency, order volume and timing, and learning. Additional sessions are run in a partial equilibrium setting to investigate a subset of intermediate
cases (between the full book and no book) left by recent literature.
Author(s): Brett Williams
Topic: Markets: Market design and Matching, Markets: Other
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Exclusive Dealing with Committed Price
Xiaomin Bian
 Ohio state university
ABSTRACT:
Exclusive contracts prevent a buyer from buying the products of a different seller. Thus, exclusive contracts have anticompetitive effects if a buyer can
sign such contracts with an incumbent to deter efficient entry. When the exclusive contract is a bundle of committed price and compensation, we show
that the incumbent deters entry successfully by committing a price lower than its cost. However, if the game lasts for infinitely many periods and
contracts are signed for many periods, entry occurs as long as the discount factor is large enough. The shorter the contracts are signed, the earlier and
easier entry occurs. It implies that contracts should be restricted with shorter periods and be monitored on suspicious clauses for antitrust concerns. We
also run a lab experiment to check the theoretical predictions. The experiment is still in the pilot stage.
Author(s): Xiaomin Bian
Topic: Markets: Industrial Organization, Games: Contests
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Social Perceptions Predict Outcomes of In-Field Correspondence Studies
Marcos Nazareth Gallo
 California Institute of Technology
ABSTRACT:
Disparities in outcomes across social groups are found in nearly every modern human society domain, including education, the labor market, and
healthcare. Despite progress in documenting these disparities, much remains unknown about their origins. We have collected previously published
studies of correspondence experiments in the United States and Canada and performed a meta-analysis. These are experiments in which resumes or
other indicators in housing, hiring, and other decisions are sent to decision-makers which are identical except for ethnic/gender/demographic
information, e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan (2004). We have also used perception ratings of warmth and competence of targets in each study to predict
outcomes. We find that these perceptions have some explanatory power in predicting published results.
Author(s): Marcos Nazareth Gallo
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Methodology: Lab, Field and External Validity





I propose and characterize the General Reciprocity Model in a framework of context-dependent choice. In the model, the second mover can establish
their own rules or expectations regarding when or why to reciprocate. The model disentangles, while preserving, the unconditional baseline social
preference from reciprocity: reciprocity occurs when people deviate from their baseline preference due to the context and first mover's choice. The
revealed reciprocity result of the model coincides with the workhorse criteria to identify reciprocity in an experiment. Therefore, our model enables us
to investigate the behavioral implication underlying this intuition. Moreover, I impose two additional assumptions on the model, namely category
consistency and diminishing sensitivity, for situations where the first mover has fewer options to choose from (i.e. contextual shrinkage). These
assumptions help identify reciprocity and baseline preference even when the ideal ``no context'' data are not available. Applications to several previous
experiments on reciprocity are discussed for illustrating the identifications from the model.
Author(s): Paul Cheung
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Decision Theory: Preferences
Link: drive.google.com/file/d/1PQJ_-u1V32Lx6GrWft_dGm7iNLLnW6YM/view?usp=sharing
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Negative shocks predict change in cognitive function and preferences: assessing the negative affect and stress hypothesis
Felipe Montealegre
 Universidad Nacional de Colombia
ABSTRACT:
In the context of the current COVID-19 pandemic, households throughout the world have to cope with negative shocks. Previous research has shown
that negative shocks impair cognitive function and change risk, time and social preferences. In this study, we analyze the results of a longitudinal
multi-country survey conducted in Italy (N = 1652), Spain (N = 1660) and the United Kingdom (N = 1578). We measure cognitive function using the
Cognitive Reflection Test and preferences traits (risk, time and social preferences) using an experimentally validated set of questions to assess the
differences between people exposed to a shock compared to the rest of the sample. We measure four possible types of shocks: labor market shock,
health shock, occurrence of stressful events, and mental health shock. Additionally, we randomly assign participants to groups with either a recall of
negative events (more specifically, a mild reinforcement of stress or of fear/anxiety), or to a control group (to recall neutral or joyful memories), in
order to assess whether or not stress and negative emotions drive a change in preferences. Results show that people affected by shocks performed
worse in terms of cognitive functioning, are more risk loving, and are more prone to punish others (negative reciprocity). Data do not support the
hypotheses that the result is driven by stress or by negative emotions.
Author(s): Francesco Bogliacino, Cristiano Codagnone, Felipe Montealegre, Frans Folkvord, Camilo Gomez, Rafael Charris, Giovanni Liva,
Francisco Lupiannez-Villanueva & Giuseppe A. Veltri
Topic: Applied Economics: Charitable Giving, Applied Economics: Charitable Giving
Link: doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-83089-0
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Emotional Influence on Information Processing in Decisions under Uncertainty
Santiago Sautua
 Universidad del Rosario, Department of Economics
ABSTRACT:
In two laboratory experiments, we investigate the effect of incidental emotions on decision-making under ambiguity, both in the presence and absence
of information about past outcomes. In the experiments, the subjects make investment decisions and report their expectations of success after watching
a short video clip with either negative or positive content. Incidental emotions induced by the video clip have differential effects on expectations and
investments depending on whether the subjects have information about prior outcomes. When subjects lack such information, a negative emotional
state reduces investments, consistent with prior evidence that some negative emotions reduce risk-taking. By contrast, following strong bad news about
past outcomes, a negative emotional state attenuates the tendency to reduce expectations and investments. In fact, in this situation, a significant
proportion of subjects engage in contrarian behavior, increasing expectations and investments. These patterns are consistent with subjects following a
strategy of “affective compensation,” whereby they attempt to alleviate the discomfort resulting from the combination of a negative emotional state and
bad news. Overall, our findings underscore the need for additional research investigating how the interaction between emotional states and new
information affects decision-making under uncertainty.
Author(s): Silvia Lopez-Guzman and Santiago I. Sautua
Topic: Psychology and Biology: Emotions, Decision Theory: Learning
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This study examines sharing of true and false covid-19 news across 16 countries. We test the generalizability of prior findings from American subjects
that (i) accuracy judgments are more discerning than sharing judgments, (ii) having participants evaluate the accuracy of a non-covid headline, or
showing them minimal digital literacy tips, increases sharing discernment, and (iii) more reflective participants show higher truth discernment. Data
collection is ongoing and preliminary results will be presented.
Author(s): Antonio A. Arechar, Adam Berinsky, Ziv Epstein, Kiran Garimella, Jackson Lu, Gordon Pennycook, David G. Rand, Robert M. Ross,
Jerry Zhang
Topic: Psychology and Biology: Cognition, Social Behavior: Other
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Inequality and the Allocation of Collective Goods
Caleb Cox
 Virginia Commonwealth University
ABSTRACT:
We examine the allocation of a voluntarily-provided collective good with inequality in endowments or productive capabilities. After group members
choose their contributions to a collective good, a third-party allocator distributes the resulting value among the group members. With and without
inequality, we find that allocators significantly improve efficiency compared to automatic equal division of the collective good. However, inequality
creates a conflict between various notions of equitable distribution, potentially diminishing the allocator's ability to incentivize contribution. Our results
show that inequality in endowments or productive capabilities indeed reduces the effectiveness of allocators compared to the baseline case of equality.
Author(s): Caleb Cox, Brock Stoddard
Topic: Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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Information regime changes and path dependence - An experimental analysis of public goods contributions in
heterogeneous groups
Sabine Kroeger
 Department of Economics, Laval University
ABSTRACT:
We experimentally investigate the path dependence of voluntary contributions in a public good game with heterogeneous agents who vary in their
ability to increase the public good. More specifically, we analyze whether contribution norms observed in a first phase of the experiment under a
specific information regime carry over to a second phase with a more or a less transparent regime. We find evidence of path dependence that varies by
the ability of agents. Efficient contribution norms establish under common knowledge about heterogeneity and transparency of contributors' ability, and
they carry over to another game with less transparency. Other contribution norms that emerged under less transparency are also initially sticky, but they
eventually evolve toward an efficient norm under a more transparent information regime. Thus, path dependence may impede but does not prevent
efficient contribution norms to prevail in fully transparent settings.
Author(s): Gerlinde Fellner-Roehling, Sabine Kroeger, Erika Seki
Topic: Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource, Social Behavior: Norms and Morals
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We use a set of experimental voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) games to study the effect of costly probabilistic punishment on contribution
amounts. Our primary treatment variables allow us to vary probabilities of punishment, information regarding the contributions of group members, and
the occurrence of type I errors being made. Our methods and rich data set allow for a detailed typing procedure using punishment participant
punishment strategies, which can evolve according to different informational treatments and punishment conditions. We also use a Fischbacher et al.
2001 typing procedure to examine correlations between contribution type (e.g. altruist, conditional cooperator, etc.) and punishment type.
Author(s): Jason Ralston, Jason Aimone, Lucas Rentschler, Charles North
Topic: Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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Does increased partisanship undermine the ability of politically heterogeneous groups to function and cooperate in apolitical settings? On the eve of the
2020 U.S. elections, we conducted an online experiment in which Democrats and Republicans played repeated public goods games, both with and
without punishment. Absent punishment, mixed party groups are less cooperative and efficient than homogeneous groups. However, polarized groups
fare no worse than those in which political affiliations are unknown. We find no differences in cooperation across groups that are able to punish free-
riding behavior. Thus, knowing that one is in a group with likeminded individuals can serve as a substitute for an enforcement mechanism, but
polarized groups can, at some efficiency cost, achieve similar contributions when sanctions are possible.
Author(s): Andrea Robbett and Peter Hans Matthews
Topic: Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
Link: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3770834
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Agents commonly take risky decisions that influence the financial well-being of their principals. We study decision-making environments in which the
agent's incentive are convex, i.e. they participate in the upside but not on the downside. In an earlier study (Füllbrunn and Luhan, 2020), we show that
such limited liability leads to excessive risk-taking by agents yielding a clash between social and egoistic preferences. With this study, we extend our
knowledge base by manipulating the effects for the principals in a 2 x 2 design. First, we change the nature of the investment by increasing risk and
switching between negative and positive expected values. We remove the argument to invest due to positive expected value. Second, we change the
level of responsibility by substantially increasing the number of principals keeping the agents incentives constant. When social preferences play a role,
as shown in an environment without convex incentives, the severity of the decision should reduce risk-taking.
Author(s): Sascha Fuellbrunn and Wolfgang Luhan
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Social Behavior: Other
Back to session: Finance
Stress Tests and Information Disclosure: An Experimental Analysis
Douglas Davis
 Virginia Commonwealth University
ABSTRACT:
To improve the stability of the banking system the Dodd Frank Act mandates that central banks conduct periodic evaluations of banks' financial
conditions. An intensely debated aspect of these ‘stress tests' regards how much of that information should be disclosed to financial markets. This paper
uses an environment constructed from a model by Goldstein and Leitner (2018) to gain some behavioral insight into the policy tradeoffs associated
with disclosure. Experimental results indicate that variations in disclosure conditions are very sensitive to overbidding for bank assets. Absent
overbidding, however, optimal disclosure robustly improves risk sharing even when banks behave non-optimally.
Author(s): Caleb Cox ,Douglas Davis , Oleg Korenok and John Lightle
Topic: Markets: Finance, Games: Information
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We study indefinitely-lived assets in experimental markets and find that the traded prices of these assets are on average about 40% of the risk neutral
fundamental value. Neither uncertainty about the value of total dividend payments nor horizon uncertainty about the duration of trade can account for
this low traded price, while the temporal resolution of payoff uncertainty plays a crucial role. We find that probability weighting under the Epstein and
Zin (1989) recursive preference specification can rationalize the low traded price in our indefinite-horizon asset markets, while risk attitudes do not
play such an important role.
Author(s): John Duffy, Janet Hua Jiang, Huan Xie
Topic: Markets: Finance, Methodology: Other
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We experimentally investigate how interaction in multiple strategic settings simultaneously influences the collusive behavior of agents. We build on the
theory developed by Bernheim and Whinston (1990), which studies multi-market contact between price-setting firms, to derive the conditions under
which agents can support collusion in symmetric and asymmetric environments (i.e., in the symmetric environment, every individual receives the same
payoffs, in the asymmetric environment, one individual receives higher payoffs than the other). Theoretically, under both symmetry and asymmetry of
payoffs, multiple contacts can facilitate collusion. We additionally show that symmetry and asymmetry are strategically equivalent in achieving tacit
collusion under our payoff structure. We test our theoretical prediction experimentally. We find no significant increase in collusion due to multiple
interactions when analyzing the average actions individuals chose. While we do not see a significant difference in average actions, theory and our
analysis of the experimental data suggest that the effects of multiple contacts can be uncovered by studying the strategies that generated the observed
actions. Consequently, we conduct an econometric investigation of the underlying strategies. To this end, we extend popular strategies (e.g., Grim
Trigger, Tit-for-Tat, etc.) to condition on the history observed in multiple strategic settings. Our strategy estimation finds that only for asymmetric
payoffs, subjects use these new strategies while our theory shows strategic equivalence.
Author(s): Mouli Modak
Topic: Games: Repeated Games, Games: Other
Link: www.dropbox.com/s/fk33th6naziao25/main.pdf?dl=0
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Dynamic Coordination with Switching Costs
Joe Ballard
 Florida State University
ABSTRACT:
A key component to the efficient functioning of an organization is the successful coordination of activities by its constituent divisions. However, in
many organizational settings, different departments may be unable to process or understand the actions or techniques employed by others, let alone
determine whether the procedures across departments are compatible. Moreover, it is often costly for each department to modify its established set of
procedures. In this paper, we study coordination in a repeated interaction between two parties in search of compatible platforms. Neither party is able
to discern which pairings of available platforms are compatible at the outset of the relationship, and switching from one platform to the other is costly
for each party. Focusing on efficient symmetric equilibria, our model predicts that parties remain on their current platform with certainty if their
common belief about compatibility is above a fixed threshold (that depends on the switching cost), while for beliefs below the threshold, the
equilibrium probability of switching increases as the common belief converges toward zero. Nevertheless, due to the presence of switching costs, the
equilibrium switching rate remains below 0.5 for each belief. We conduct an experiment to test whether behavior supports the equilibrium predictions
of the model, varying (i) whether success occurs deterministically or stochastically when parties are on compatible platforms and (ii) the cost of
switching platforms.
Author(s): Joe Ballard and Luke Boosey
Topic: Games: Repeated Games, Games: Coordination
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We study school choice mechanisms in the lab to test whether the existence of justified-envy differentially impacts subjects with identical earnings.
The three widely-used mechanisms – immediate-acceptance, deferred-acceptance and top trading cycles – present a fundamental trade-off between
Pareto efficiency, elimination of justified-envy and incentive compatibility. Instead of directly eliciting responses on the perception of trade-offs, we
gauge biometric reactions when justified-envy is present by complementing our study with eye-tracking and GSR devices. While previous results have
provided welfare measures with regards to allocative outcomes, we aim to augment these results with welfare measures concerning both the experience
of the mechanism and other regarding preferences of the allocations.
Author(s): Valon Vitaku, Alexander Brown, Marco Palma
Topic: Games: Other, Psychology and Biology: Neuroeconomics
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An Experimental Investigation of Global Games with Strategic Substitutes.
Mir Adnan Mahmood
 The Ohio State University
ABSTRACT:
We experimentally investigate the Global Games equilibrium selection principle of Harrison and Jara-Moroni (2021) in a game where actions are
strategic substitutes. In our experiment, subjects take part in a 3 agent, binary action, simultaneous game. Action 0 yields a fixed payoff, whereas
Action 1's payoff depends on a random state parameter and is decreasing in the number of agents choosing 1. Payoffs are heterogeneous across agents
which results in an ordering of player “types”. Intermediate values of the state result in multiple equilibria when the state is known with certainty. In
contrast, Harrison and Jara-Moroni show that there is a unique equilibrium in cutoff strategies in the setting where agents observe a sufficiently precise,
yet noisy private signal about the state. Furthermore, these cutoffs are monotonic in player types. This cutoff behavior persists as noise vanishes,
resulting in a unique equilibrium in the limit, resolving the issue of multiplicity. Our experiment tests these predictions by varying the level of signal
noise across treatments.
Author(s): Mir Adnan Mahmood
Topic: Games: Information, Games: Other
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What is the effect of job candidates disclosing their salary history on callbacks and salary offers? If these effects differ by a job candidate's gender or
the amount they disclose, then disclosure might also impact inequality in the labor market. We implement a field experimental design we call a two-
sided audit study, in which recruiters evaluate job applications with randomized characteristics under randomly assigned salary disclosure conditions.
We begin by estimating the effects of candidates' salary disclosure on outcomes such as callbacks and salary offers. Then, we combine our estimates to
examine the likely effect of recent laws that ban employers from asking candidates for their salary history like those passed in Massachusetts,
California, New York City, and Chicago on wage inequality.
Author(s): Amanda Agan, Bo Cowgill and Laura K. Gee
Topic: Applied Economics: Labor Market, Field Experiments: General
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Signaling Competitive Traits
Elif Demiral Saglam
 Austin Peay State University / HKS
ABSTRACT:
We investigate the impact on perceived and actual employability when job candidates signal different personal tastes for competitions. Using three
experiments, with over 2000 participants in total, we show that candidates who are not willing to compete at all risk being perceived as less productive,
while those who signal a willingness to compete with others may be perceived as less socially skilled. Displaying a willingness to self-compete, i.e. to
challenge oneself to improve over time, does, however, increase the likelihood of being perceived as both productive and socially skilled. These
findings hold for both female and male candidates
Author(s): Demiral, Elif E; Mollerstrom, Johanna
Topic: Applied Economics: Labor Market, Applied Economics: Other
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A Robust Test of Prejudice for Discrimination Experiments
Daniel Martin
 Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management
ABSTRACT:
Lab and field experiments have proven to be an important source of empirical evidence on discrimination. We show that when average outcomes in a
discrimination experiment satisfy a simple condition, then this provides evidence that decision-makers are prejudiced – regardless of what they learned
about individuals in each demographic group before making their decisions. We also provide extensions of this test that allow for incorrect beliefs and
selection motives. We demonstrate this test using the lab experiment of Reuben, Sapienza, and Zingales (2014) and the field experiment of Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2004). We find robust evidence of prejudice in both.
Author(s): Daniel Martin and Philip Marx
Topic: Applied Economics: Labor Market, Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices
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We investigate how gender norms interacts with worker overconfidence to affect selection of labor contracts and performance. Our experimental data
suggests that gender norms explain much of the variation in contract selection and performance, reducing the estimated influence of overconfidence.
Similar to previous literature, we find evidence of greater overconfidence among male subjects and greater underconfidence among females, but both
of these effects are muted after controlling for gender norms. Our findings suggest that firms that use incentive contracts to select attractive (in a
productivity sense) employees should exercise caution before implementing those selection mechanisms. (JEL D83, J24, J33, J16)
Author(s): Brendan Cushing-Daniels, Marta Maras
Topic: Applied Economics: Labor Market, Social Behavior: Norms and Morals
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Nudging Enforcers: How Norm Perceptions and Motives for Lying Shape Sanctions
Eugen Dimant
 University of Pennsylvania
ABSTRACT:
The enforcement of social norms is the fabric of a functioning society. Through the lens of two experiments, we examine how motives for lying and
norm perceptions steer enforcement. Our contribution is to investigate the extent to which norm breaches are sanctioned, how norm-nudges affect the
observed punishment behavior, and how the enforcement is linked to norm perceptions. Using a representative U.S. sample, Experiment 1 provides
robust evidence that norm-enforcement is not only sensitive to the extent of the observed transgression (= size of the lie) but also to its consequences
(= whether the lie remedies or creates payoff inequalities). We also find norm enforcers to be sensitive to different norm-nudges that convey social
information about actual lying behavior or its social disapproval. To explain the punishment patterns, Experiment 2 examines how norms are perceived
across different transgressions and how norm-nudges change these perceptions. We observe a malleability of social norm perceptions: norm nudges are
most effective when pre-existing norms are vague. Importantly, we also find that punishment patterns in the first experiment closely follow these norm
perceptions. Our findings suggest that norm enforcement can be successfully nudged and thus represent an expedient alternative to standard incentive-
based interventions.
Author(s): Eugen Dimant (UPenn), Tobias Gesche (ETH Zurich)
Topic: Social Behavior: Lying and Cheating, Social Behavior: Norms and Morals
Link: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3664995
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Lying Aversion and Vague Communication: An Experimental Study
Keh-Kuan Sun
 Washington University in St. Louis
ABSTRACT:
An agent may benefit from misleading the audience's belief about the state of the world. While a more blatantly misleading message may be more
effective than a vaguely misleading message, however, they may affect one's internal cost of dishonesty and social identity of honesty differently. Thus,
a sophisticated agent must balance the degree of truthfulness and vagueness of the message. We explore the extent to which these two types of lying
costs affect people's sophisticated use of vague messages in communication and vice versa in a simple experimental setting. To this end, we introduce a
novel experiment design that isolates the internal cost of lying and the social identity cost of appearing dishonest. In particular, the design varies the
relevance of the social identity concern across anonymous and non-anonymous treatments. Our setup extends the framework of Fischbacher and
Föllmi-heusi (2013) by implementing a richer message space with vagueness. The experimental data shows that subjects employ more vague messages
in treatments in which the social identity concern is relevant. In treatments in which the social identity concern is irrelevant, on the other hand, we find
that most subjects exploit vagueness so as to be consistent with the truth, yet at the same time leveraging the imprecision to their own benefit in a more
undisguised manner. We also find a smaller but non-trivial-sized group of truth-tellers who do not take advantage of vague messages even against
potential opportunities for monetary gain. The result opens a new set of questions on the motivations behind the preferences for truth-telling.
Author(s): Keh-Kuan Sun, Guangying Chen
Topic: Social Behavior: Lying and Cheating, Social Behavior: Communication
Link: kehkuansun.github.io/documents/lying_vagueness_latest.pdf
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I study people's beliefs about others' motivated reasoning and the implications for news provision. I consider a sender-receiver setting in which senders
are aware that receivers engage in motivated reasoning. Theoretically, senders will prefer to send disinformation to receivers when they know more
about the receivers' motivated beliefs and when they are incentivized to be thought of as truthful. Data from a large online experiment suggest that
people largely believe that others engage in motivated reasoning towards holding stances that align with their politics, and that sending disinformation
about politics could be profitable. Theoretical results suggest that echo chambers and political polarization across news audiences lead to a greater
supply of and demand for disinformation, and that news suppliers may profit from targeting a narrow audience and distorting information as opposed to
appealing to a more diverse base.
Author(s): Michael Thaler
Topic: Social Behavior: Lying and Cheating, Decision Theory: Beliefs
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Direct revelation with lying aversion
Alexander Brown
 Texas A&M University
ABSTRACT:
Mechanism design relies heavily on the idea of direct revelation. If a principal can design a mechanism in which agents have messages that are weakly
dominant strategies and whenever they play those weakly dominant strategies the objective of the principal is obtained, then the principal “can” simply
use a delegation mechanism. That is, the principal can simply ask agents directly for their information and proceed as if they had delegated to them the
choice of a strategy in their mechanism. Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979) and Repullo (1985) note that this restriction to direct messages is not
completely without loss of generality. In a delegation mechanism, strategy profiles where individuals report incorrect information may also be weakly
dominant strategy equilibria that are preferred by all agents to the social planner's outcome. Thus, while a delegation mechanism provides each agent a
weak incentive to report truthfully, it is possible that all agents can be better off if they coordinate on a lie. the preceding analysis neglects that
delegation mechanisms make not revealing one's private information an explicit lie. Recent research has shown people are lying averse; it is as if they
suffer monetary costs from not telling the truth. We investigate whether lying aversion mitigates these authors' concerns. Part of our contribution is to
design an experiment in an intuitive principal-team context that captures the tradeoff for team members between truthfulness and the incentive to
cooperate to extract more surplus from the principal.
Author(s): Alexander L. Brown, Ethan Park, and Rodrigo A. Velez
Topic: Markets: Market design and Matching, Social Behavior: Lying and Cheating
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Hidden Identity and Social Preferences:Evidence From Sexual Minorities
Ian Chadd
 Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
ABSTRACT:
Using the context of sexual minorities, we experimentally study how these hidden identities interact with discriminatory behavior along pro-social
domains, and individuals' responses in anticipation of such behavior. We design a novel Icon Task where participants are allowed to voluntarily signal
their sexual identity by choosing the Pride icon (rainbow flag), prior to participating as recipients in a dictator game. We find that recipients who chose
the Pride icon are more likely to be perceived as non-heterosexual, and dictators discriminate based on their perceptions of recipients' sexual identity.
Heterosexual dictators who are Republican or voted for Trump allocate about 14%-17% less of their endowment to recipients whom they perceive to
be non-heterosexual. On the recipients' end, women are less likely to choose the Pride icon when they know the icon will be used to identify them in
the dictator game. We posit that women may in general be more likely to anticipate discriminatory behavior. Our findings have broad implications and
contribute to the discourse on the role of identity and discrimination in economic decision making.
Author(s): Billur Aksoy, Ian Chadd, Boon Han Koh
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences
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How to make a criminal: Antisocial Behavior after negative shocks
Mariana Blanco
 Universidad del Rosario
ABSTRACT:
We study whether income inequality generates predatory anti-social behavior in a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, income inequality can be
the result of differences in ability across individuals with equal opportunities, it may be determined by (negative) income shocks, or may result from a
combination of both ability and bad luck. After their place in the income distribution is determined, subjects are allowed to “take" any share of the
income of subjects in every part of the income distribution. We find that anti-social behavior is not explained by subjects' relative income but rather by
the process that determined their position in the income distribution. Specifically, we find that while being in the bottom of the income distribution does
not generate a differential taking behavior, experiencing a negative shock does correlate with disproportionate predatory behavior, regardless of the
position in the income distribution. Our results suggest that people do not have predatory intentions per se, but they find themselves in situations that
exacerbate their antisocial instincts.
Author(s): Mariana Blanco, Dan Houser, Juan F. Vargas
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Social Behavior: Other
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Anchor or Asset? The Role of Outside Obligations in Negotiations
Shakun Mago
 University of Richmond
ABSTRACT:
In this study, we explore whether information about outside obligations is of help or hindrance to employees in negotiations. We model the relationship
between an ‘employee' with an outside obligation, whose performance determines the firm's profit, and an ‘employer' with power-to-give, who decides
the employee's wage. We examine how information about the outside obligation impacts negotiations and the resulting distribution of surplus across
employees. We find that when these obligations are known, they yield higher wage offers to employees with high obligations, but have a similarly
significant but negative impact on employees without such obligations. Since the employer simply redistributes the surplus between employees,
responding to employee's outside obligation does not impose additional costs on the employer. We find no evidence of gender bias in wage offers
among any of the employer/employee combinations. Based on these findings, we consider how employment policies about information sharing may
explain some of the gender wage gap, and how seemingly equitable policies may still perpetuate inequity among employees.
Author(s): Shakun Mago; Jennifer Pate; Laura Razzolini
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences
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When the rich do (not) trust the (newly) rich: Experimental evidence on the effects of positive random shocks in the trust
game
Hernan Bejarano
 CIDE & Chapman, Economic Science Institute
ABSTRACT:
We study behavior in a trust game where first-movers initially have a higher endowment than second-movers but the occurrence of a positive random
shock can eliminate this inequality by increasing the endowment of the second-mover before the decision of the first-mover. We find that second-
movers return less (i.e., they are less trustworthy) when they have a lower endowment than first-movers, compared with the case in which first and
second-movers have the same endowment. Second-movers who received the positive shock return more than those who didn't. In fact, second-movers
who received the positive shock return more than second-movers who had the same endowment as the first-mover from the outset. First-movers do not
seem to anticipate this behavior from second-movers. They send less to second-movers who benefited from a shock. Our results suggest that in
addition to inequalities the source of these inequalities also plays an important role in decisions considering trust and trustworthiness.
Author(s): Hernan Bejarano, Joris Guillet, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara
Topic: Decision Theory: Preferences, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
Link: osf.io/download/600c5e7875226b011d51a625/
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Our research investigates the hypothesis that women have a lower desire to compete than men, an idea widely embraced by economists and offered as
an explanation for why women are a minority in high-ranking economic and political positions and for the existence of a gender pay gap in labor
markets. We advance the hypothesis that women are as competitive as men once the incentive for winning include factors that matter to women.
Allowing winners an opportunity to share some of their winnings with the low performers has gendered consequences for competitive behavior. We
ground our work in an evolutionary framework in which entering and winning competitions brings asymmetric benefits and costs to men and women.
In the new environment, the potential to share some of the rewards from competition with others may afford women the benefit of reaping competitive
gains without incurring some of its potential costs. An experiment supports our hypothesis: a gender gap in entry decisions closes once a prosocial
option is included to an otherwise identical winner-take-all incentive scheme. Besides providing a novel experiment that challenges the paradigm that
women are not as motivated to compete as men, our work proposes some suggestions for policy: including socially-oriented rewards to contracts may
offer a novel tool to close the persistent labor market gender gap.
Author(s): Alessandra Cassar and Mary L. Rigdon
Topic: Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences, Applied Economics: Labor Market
Link: maryrigdon.org
Back to session: Psychology 2
Don't tell anyone I lost to a girl! Gender stereotypes and hiding low performance
Shuya He
 University of Arizona
ABSTRACT:
It has been asserted that males incur a psychological cost when they are outperformed by a female competitor. We conduct a laboratory experiment that
allows us to measure this cost, for performance in a mathematical task. The experiment is conducted in both the US and China. We find that in our
Chinese sample, males are willing to pay more to hide the fact that they have performed worse than another individual than women are, while there is
no gender difference in the US. In China, females are willing to pay more to hide poor performance when losing to another female than to a male. In
the US, the opposite pattern is observed; women have a greater cost of revealing that they have lost to a man than to another woman. The gender of the
counterpart is not a determinant of males' willingness to hide poor performance. An incentivized questionnaire reveals that a stereotype that males
would outperform females exists in the Chinese sample, but not among our American participants.
Author(s): Shuya He, Charles Noussair
Topic: Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
Link: eller.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/Econ-WP-20-07.pdf
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Preferences for Precautionary Redistribution?
Stefan Trautmann
 University of Heidelberg
ABSTRACT:
We report the result of the first measurement of attitudes toward risk attitude in a social context and inequality attitudes in a risky context, for both
gains and losses, in a large representative population sample. These measurements are of theoretical importance in welfare economics. We relate our
attitude measurements to respondents' distribution behavior with and without background risk in a separate allocation task. Respondents exhibit social
risk aversion, inequality aversion and social risk prudence, while inequality prudence is not a predominant attitude. We find that the attitude measures
have predictive power for behavior in the allocation task. Although we find strong support for a preference for equality, we find no evidence for
precautionary redistribution in the presence of background risk.
Author(s): Gijs van de Kuilen
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Decision Theory: Risk
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Can market selection reduce anomalous behaviour in games?
Lawrence Choo
 Southwestern University of Finance and Economics
ABSTRACT:
We use an experiment to study whether market selection can reduce anomalous behaviour in games. In different treatments, we employ two alternative
mechanisms, the random mechanism and the auction mechanism, to allocate the participation rights to the red hat puzzle game, a well-known logical
reasoning problem. Compared to the random mechanism, the auction mechanism significantly reduces deviations from the equilibrium play in the red
hat puzzle game. Our findings show that under carefully designed incentives, market competition can indeed reduce anomalous behaviour in games.
Author(s): Lawrence Choo and Xiaoyu Zhou
Topic: Decision Theory: Bounded Rationality, Markets: Auctions
Link: www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/206571/1/168155903X.pdf
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In many professionals, workload has great seasonal variations. As workload increases, workers' economic decisions may be distorted by the elevated
stress, which may or may not be offset by the associated increase in financial income, if any. In this paper, we exploit the dramatic increase in workload
in the delivery industry before and after the Double-11 sales season in China. By randomizing the timing that workers in a delivery sorting center
participate in our online survey experiment, we find that experiencing the sharp increase in workload makes workers more impatient and more present
biased; these effects diminish after receiving the wage income for the sales season. After receiving the wage, workers also become less risk-averse, and
perform better in cognitive reflection test. We provide suggestive evidence that both stress levels and the extent of liquidity constraint exhibit some
mediation effects.
Author(s): Jingyi Meng, Wenbo Zou
Topic: Applied Economics: Labor Market, Decision Theory: Preferences
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Simulating Zero-Intelligence Traders to match Classroom Double Auction Market Results
Joseph Tao-yi Wang
 National Taiwan University
ABSTRACT:
We simulate zero-intelligence traders under various supply-demand conditions in classroom double-auction markets to reproduce negative price auto-
correlation and buyer rank-order correlation, as well as positive seller rank-order correlation, found in classroom experimental markets collected by
MobLab and reported in Lin et al. (NHB 2020). Compared to the default setting, larger markets tend to have rank-order correlations closer to zero,
while smaller markets tend to have rank-order correlations further from zero. Price-change auto-correlations vary only slightly. These differences in
zero-intelligence simulation results shed new light on whether they are able to explain classroom experimental data, and reinforces how classic
experimental results are replicated in classroom experiments.
Author(s): Chung Yang and Joseph Tao-yi Wang
Topic: Markets: Other, Decision Theory: Beliefs
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Choosing the best pond to motivate performance: relative feedback and performance in groups
Hanlin Lou
 University of Technology Sydney
ABSTRACT:
The effect of relative performance feedback, especially ordinal rank feedback, on performance has been broadly discussed in recent decades. However,
there are few studies on the relationship between the impacts of providing relative performance feedback and the choice of comparison group. Based
on prospect theory and theory of goals as reference points, this paper develops a theoretical framework for how revealing rank information affects
motivation. It suggests that how individuals respond to the rank achieved depend on their reference point choice. In particular, individuals have more
incentive to exert effort as they get close to the reference point adopted. We conjecture that splitting a large comparison group into multiple smalls
gives individuals more chance to be closer to the reference point, making them more sensitive to ranking information. This paper introduces two
natural experiments conducted in a primary school and a middle school. The results show that rank feedback provision has positive effects on
subsequent performance, and the effect tends to be enhanced in smaller same-ability groups.
Author(s): Hanlin Lou
Topic: Field Experiments: General, Applied Economics: Other
Back to session: Contests and rankings
Discrimination and Stereotypes in the Age of Covid19: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Marcello Puca
 University of Bergamo
ABSTRACT:
We study whether individuals coming from COVID19 hot-spots are discriminated in access to touristic services in Italy. We carry out an email
correspondence study in which we pose simple queries to more than 5,000 local hotels, bed and breakfasts, and other touristic service providers. In
doing so, we exploit the heterogeneous early diffusion of COVID19 Italian cases, that during the first epidemic wave were mostly concentrated in
Northern Italy. We find that emails from putatively northern-sounding senders are almost 1 percentage points less likely to receive an answer compared
to emails signed with a neutral-sounding surname. Moreover, queries coming from northern-sounding surnames are less likely to be accepted by
potential hosts. Further analysis suggests that the differential in the likelihood of answering is due to the negative stereotype associated to northern
Italian citizens rather than inferring the geographic origin of the sender. Our results shed some light on the discussion for the design of COVID19
``passports''.
Author(s): Marcello Puca; Paolo Buonanno; Flavio Porta
Topic: Social Behavior: Group Behavior, Decision Theory: Risk
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Using field experiments, we address these issues: Are there discriminations against marital and childbearing status in the labor market in China? Is
there a gender difference in such discriminations? Who is and which positions are more vulnerable to discriminations in marriage and childbearing?
Our research contributes to the literature in many ways. First, by exploring the discriminations against marital and childbearing status in the labor
market, we provide clues for establishing of strategies to eliminate discriminations. Second, through investigating the relationship between fertility and
employment, we deepen the understanding of the factors affecting fertility behaviors. Third, we assess the impact of the two-child policy from the
aspects of employment, fertility, population quality, etc. On the online recruitment platform, we randomly send 4 fake resumes, in which the marital
and childbearing status respectively are unmarried, married without child, married with one child, married with two children, to real positions. There is
a clear discrimination against women's marital and childbearing status in the labor market. Married women (especially those with two children) are
more likely to be discriminated against than single women. Women who already have children (especially those who are married and have two
children) are more likely to be discriminated against than women who have not. Men who have two children are more likely to be discriminated
against than men who have one child in marriage. In other cases, the impact of marital and childbearing status on men employments is statistically
insignificant. Individuals who are economic majors, highly educated, graduated from elite schools, and highly skilled are more vulnerable to
discrimination in the job market against marriage, childbearing, and having two children. There are obvious occupational differences in marriage and
childbearing discriminations: sales jobs discriminate against married and child-bearing people, especially women; researchers and civil servants are not
vulnerable to discriminations in marriage and childbearing; service jobs are very friendly to married and child-bearing people. There are
discriminations against marital and childbearing status in highly paid positions, especially for women. Discriminations in marriage and childbearing
are not related to the fluctuations in wages and other benefits. Because individuals with high human capital are more vulnerable to discriminations in
marriage and childbearing, the two-child policy may not be conducive to improving the quality of the population. We call for legislation to prohibit
companies from requiring job applicants to fill in information on marriage and childbearing on their resumes and asking about their marital and
childbearing status during interviews.
Author(s): Weiguang Deng
Topic: Applied Economics: Labor Market, Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences
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Peer Effects of Ability and Misbehaviors in Classroom: Evidence from a Seat Randomization Experiment
Yuxin Yao
 East China Normal University
ABSTRACT:
A large number of literature has documented peer effects in the education context. However, the literature studying peer effects from misbehaviors is
scarce. Misbehaviors, including externalizing problems and internalizing problems, are important outcomes of noncognitive skills. In this paper we
exploit a field experiment which randomly assigns each student to a deskmate in classroom upon enrollment in the middle schools. By combing survey
data from primary schools, we use a linear-in-mean and value-added model to estimate peer effects from deskmates' ability and their misbehaviors at
the same time. We find a significant and positive peer effect from deskmates' Chinese test scores, but deskmates' misbehaviors do not have meaningful
effects. We explore possible channels that negative effects from deskmates' misbehaviors might be compensated, like time use after class and parents'
guidance.
Author(s): C. Simon Fan, Xiangdong Wei, Yuxin Yao*
Topic: Applied Economics: Labor Market, Field Experiments: General
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Background: Fertility treatments are established technologies to increase the chance of a live birth, with in vitro fertilization (IVF) being the most
common treatment type. In contrast, elective egg freezing (EEF) is a novel technology to prolong fertility. It is becoming increasingly common, yet
there is limited data on the characteristics of women who are accessing this technology and what they perceived the benefits to be. Objective: We will
explore the effects of various participant characteristics on the demand for fertility treatments including EEF and IVF, and determine price and income
elasticities of demand within an incentive-compatible revealed-preference experiment. Our study will address the current gap in knowledge regarding
the demand for fertility treatments, particularly EEF. It will also contribute to the limited literature on incentive-compatible revealed-preference
laboratory experiments in the healthcare sector. Methods: Approximately 150 adult female participants of reproductive age between 24-25 years old
and without children will be recruited from a pool of students registered at the BizLab, University of New South Wales. The experiment will consist of
three treatments corresponding to different levels of government reimbursement for IVF and EEF with two decision periods (a ‘planning period' and a
‘family-formation period') to explore how demand for treatments changes based on the level of health insurance coverage. In each period, participants
will have to indicate their preferred treatment choice with the goal of achieving a live birth within each treatment. The experiment will be followed by
risk and time preference elicitation tasks. Compensation will be based on decisions made and associated cumulative outcomes to achieve proper
incentivization. The experiment will be pre-registered on the Open Science Framework Platform once all pilot sessions have been completed. Ethics:
Ethics approval has been obtained from the UNSW Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee (HC200851).
Author(s): Elena Keller, Andreas Ortmann, Georgina M. Chambers
Topic: Applied Economics: Other, Markets: Other
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(Un)Willing to lead? Men, Women and the Leadership Gap
Yaxiong Li
 University of Auckland
ABSTRACT:
We explore the causes behind the gender gap in leadership; as one moves up the organizational hierarchy, one encounters fewer women. We use the
weak-link game paradigm to simulate intra-organization coordination problems, where participants can volunteer for leadership roles. The leaders' job
is to resolve potential coordination failures. We look at whether: (1) there are systematic gender differences in the willingness to lead and (2) followers
are less likely to follow female leaders. We find that, compared to men, fewer women volunteer to lead, particularly when the leader's gender is
revealed to the followers. But, by and large, male and female leaders choose similar messages and/or actions in this game, and controlling for those,
groups achieve similar levels of coordination success regardless of the leader's gender. We do not find evidence of resistance against female leadership,
even though anticipation of such backlash may lie behind the female reluctance to lead.
Author(s): Yaxiong Li; Ananish Chaudhuri; Erwann Sbai
Topic: Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences, Applied Economics: Labor Market
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An Experimental Study of Guilt Aversion in Group Decision Making
Masao Fukutomi
 Kyoto University, Japan
ABSTRACT:
Why are groups significantly more selfish than individuals? We hypothesize that being in a group significantly reduces the feelings of guilt for letting
down the opponent. We conducted several variants of dictator and ultimatum games to test our hypothesis. The experimental literature that compares
individual and group-representative decisions indicates that people behave more selfishly when they are given the responsibility to act on behalf of a
group than when they make a decision solely on their own behalf. We propose a new explanation for this phenomenon in dictator games in light of
guilt aversion. While an individual-alone facing an opponent considers one's beliefs about the opponent's expectations, an individual acting on behalf
of one's group would be more concerned about one's own group member's expectations. We use a within-subject experiment to investigate the effect of
guilt aversion on group-representative decisions in the dictator game. Instead of trying to manipulate first or second-order beliefs, we directly compare
decisions made in a group dictator game with those made in two variants of a group ultimatum game. In the in-group ultimatum game, the division
proposed by a group representative can be accepted or rejected by one's own group member so that the group representative's beliefs concerning one's
group member's expectations are clearly relevant for decision-making. On the other hand, in the out-group ultimatum game, the division proposed by a
group representative can be accepted or rejected by the opponent group representative so that the proposing group representative's beliefs concerning
the opponent group representative's expectations are relevant for decision-making. We find that the average group representative's offer made in the
group dictator game is significantly lower than one made in the out-group ultimatum game, and not significantly different from one made in the in-
group ultimatum game. Our result suggests that, the reason why people behave more selfishly when they are given the responsibility to make decisions
on behalf of their group, is because they are concerned about their group member's expectations more than the opponent's ones.
Author(s): Masao Fukutomi and Yohei Mitani
Topic: Social Behavior: Group Behavior, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
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Gender Differences, Individual Qualifications, and Leader Selection Mechanisms
Yutong Li
Renmin University of China
ABSTRACT:
This study examines how leader selection is affected by gender differences and incentive mechanisms. Groups are composed of male and female
members. They earn income through answering questions first individually and then by groups when group answers are submitted by a leader. They
vote the group leader based on group members' information about ability, responsibility score, willingness to lead, and personal background. We
measure individual responsibility by the willingness to pay a personal cost for the benefit of the group. Three incentive mechanism form the
experimental treatments: first, in the ability treatment, group income is mainly determined by leader's ability and all members in a group get the same
level of income; second, in the bonus treatment, the group leader can earn a bonus or higher relative income; third, in the responsibility treatment, the
group leader pays a leadership cost to submit a correct answer for the group and earns a lower relative income. We find that in general, female
members are less willing and less likely to be selected as a leader. In the responsibility mechanism, highly responsible members are more willing and
more likely to be selected as a leader. In the ability and bonus treatments, more people are willing to lead. Controlling for ability and responsibility
scores, the gender difference in votes received seem to be explained by one's willingness to be the leader. In particular, women's stronger willingness to
lead did not increase the votes they receive. Despite the weaker expressed willingness to be the leader, the elected female leaders are as effective as the
male leaders, and seem to perform better in the responsibility treatment once they become leaders.
Author(s): Yutong Li, Xianghong Wang, Jie Zheng
Topic: Applied Economics: Labor Market, Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences
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Social Status and public spiritedness in representation: Experimental evidence from Borneo
Nor Izzatina Abdul Aziz
 Institut Kajian Malaysia dan Antarabangsa (IKMAS), National University of Malaysia
ABSTRACT:
A representative exists within a group to improve its social outcome. A common function of a representative, be it a policymaker, a head of an
academic department, or a village leader, is to make a recommendation to their respective group members. To examine the concept of representative as
an agent of the group, we introduced a sender-receiver agency game in which an agency relationship is established between representative and group
members when the recommendation of the representative is accepted by group members. At the start of the game, every player is informed of each
other's potential payoffs. Group members (receivers) are aware of the possible conflict of interest faced by the randomly appointed representative
(sender), i.e. the recommendation made might be skewed in favour of the representative, and concurrently a representative knows the risk that his/her
public-spirited recommendation might be rejected by suspicious group members. We implemented this sender-receiver game in Sarawak (Borneo),
Malaysia among the indigenous tribe of Kayan. The tribe has pre-existing social strata and village leadership is typically in the hands of the aristocrats
of the village. We found that there are more representatives were willing to engage in public-spirited representation than behaved self-interestedly.
Belonging to an aristocrat family is the only social status characteristics that could explained public-spirited representations by these senders. On the
other hand, closeness of relationship with the sender predicts the likelihood of receivers to accept the assigned sender's recommendations.
Author(s): Nor Izzatina Abdul Aziz, Abhijit Ramalingam, Robert Sugden
Topic: Field Experiments: General, Social Behavior: Group Behavior
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Although it has been established, empirically and theoretically, that background risk impacts decision-making, no studies have examined the impacts of
background ambiguity (rather than risk) on risk-taking. We present results from a within-subject experiment in which subjects made a series of
investment decisions by allocating a portion of their controlled wealth towards a risky asset in the presence of various forms of background uncertainty
(both risk and ambiguity). Our main result is that 44% of our subjects showcased some form of background ambiguity aversion, defined as being more
averse to background ambiguity than to background risk. In the aggregate, subjects invest approximately 6 p.p. less on average in the risky asset when
there was background ambiguity as opposed to background risk. In addition, we find that contrary to Gollier and Pratt's (YEAR) theoretical work on
background risk, individuals classified as having CARA (constant absolute risk aversion) and DARA (decreasing absolute risk aversion) are also
background risk-averse. Finally, we use variation in income and socioeconomic status and find evidence that poor individuals react less to background
uncertainty (both risk and ambiguity) than the rich.
Author(s): Mahdi Akbari, Vinayak Alladi, Agnieszka Tymula,
Topic: Decision Theory: Ambiguity, Decision Theory: Risk
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Using survey questions to elicit customers' risk preferences is a common way for finance company. However, it's hard to say whether the risk
preferences elicited via surveys are the true preferences or not. In this study, we conducted a lab-in-the-field experiment to elicit investors' risk
preferences in a finance company. Specifically, we used the Holt-Laury task in the experiment and investors were paid based on their decisions in the
task. The results show that the risk preferences elicited via Holt-Laury task can predict the fraction of risky products in investors' real portfolio, while
the risk preferences elicited via surveys cannot. This study highlights the importance of incentives in risk preference elicitation and provides practical
insights for finance companies.
Author(s): Fadong Chen, Jiatong Han
Topic: Decision Theory: Preferences, Decision Theory: Risk
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A Rubinstein Bargaining Experiment in Continuous Time
Ailin Leng
 Nanjing Audit University
ABSTRACT:
I conduct an experiment to study bargaining behaviour in continuous time. Each of the two players can make a proposal at any time she wants.
However, after making an offer, a player must wait for a specific period of ``waiting time" before she can make a new offer or accept an offer. Also, the
player's share is discounted by her discount rate for every unit of time before an agreement is reached. In the equilibrium, the agreement is reached
immediately, and a player's share increases with her waiting time and decreases with her discount rate. Results show that the differences in the waiting
time and discount rates mainly affect a player's proportion of the discounted share.
Author(s): Ailin Leng
Topic: Games: Bargaining, Games: Bargaining
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Multilateralism Paradox of Network in Bargaining
Duk Gyoo Kim
 University of Mannheim
ABSTRACT:
We study a multilateralism paradox upon a three-player buyout bargaining on a chain network. Three players are endowed with resource shares, which
also work as probabilities of becoming a proposer in the buyout process. Bilateral bargaining, where a proposer can only negotiate with one of the
connected players at a time, can lead to a faster agreement than multilateral bargaining, where a center player as a proposer can negotiate with both leaf
players. We conduct a lab experiment to test whether and to what extent the restrictions imposing one-on-one communication affect bargaining
outcomes and efficiencies. Experimental evidence confirms the center player's different willingness to be bought out, one of the key aspects driving the
multilateralism paradox. However, due to the complexity of calculating the continuation values, the bargaining efficiency is overall low.
Author(s): Duk Gyoo Kim, Joosung Lee
Topic: Games: Bargaining, Games: Networks
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Standard non-cooperative game theory predicts free-riding in public good games, but varying degrees of cooperative behavior and supra-Nash
equilibrium contributions are often observed in the lab. We develop an N-player theoretical model applying the concept of Virtual Bargaining to study
cooperative behavior in public goods characterizing team production. Virtual Bargaining is a modeling framework that characterizes how players may
construct a tacit agreement to coordinate behavior in the absence of explicit agreement, and mutually best-respond with respect to maximization of
their worst-payoff function. Based on the theoretical results, we design an experiment to test whether players exhibit behavior consistent with the
Virtual Bargaining predictions.
Author(s): Scott Gilpatric
Topic: Games: Coordination, Psychology and Biology: Cognition
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Emotional Bargaining After Litigation: An Experimental Study of the Coase Theorem
Ta-wei Hung
 National Taiwan University
ABSTRACT:
Although the Coase Theorem guarantees efficiency regardless of property right assignment, Ward Farnsworth, based on interviews with lawyers,
contests that animosity created during litigation will hinder any deal afterwards. We conduct 120 rounds of an unstructured bargaining game with one-
sided incomplete information, and induce subjects to be angry at their negotiation opponents. We find that the Light treatment, with a legal setting
shown in videos, induces negative emotions on both parties, though the uninformed is more affected. As a result, the uninformed party initially
demands 9% more and the informed party offers 9–15% more (as if sensing opponent anger). However, in the Strong treatment where the raging
uninformed party harmed and stirred up hatred of the informed party in an unfair contest prior to bargaining, average initial offers and demands both
drop back to Control group levels. Deal rates in both treatments drop by only 3–4%, as if subjects are spiteful. In fact, modelling the last instance of the
bargaining process as a chicken game, we can generate this 3% drop by estimating a quantal response equilibrium (QRE) with other-regarding
preferences, which finds similar precision (λ) across treatments, but spite (negative ?��?) in treatments where animosity is induced. To predict final
deals, we estimate the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO) penalty regression and find that 60 rounds of process data sufficient to
predict outcomes of a hold-out sample even across treatments. Using alternatives such as Ridge Regression and Elastic Net do not improve accuracy
much.
Author(s): Yun-chien Chang, David Ta-wei Hung, Chang-ching Lin, Joseph Tao-yi Wang
Topic: Games: Bargaining, Psychology and Biology: Emotions
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Economic Preferences and State-Level Corruption
Yidong Huang
 Shanghai International Studies University
ABSTRACT:
Using newly published data from the Global Preference Survey which cover 74 countries (Falk et al., 2018), we document robust evidence that
economic preferences are partly responsible for state-level corruption. Speci cally,  xed e ects estimation results show that patience, trust, and altruism
discourage corruption, while negative reciprocity encourages corruption. We examine the role of economic freedom and government e ectiveness as
the mechanisms underlying the effect of negative reciprocity. We also  nd that the e ects of patience and negative reciprocity are greater in a more stable
political environment, and smaller in a society with faster economic growth.
Author(s): Xiaolan Yang; Yidong Huang; Wenchao Li
Topic: Decision Theory: Preferences, Decision Theory: Other
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Does social relation have an impact on lying behavior? Under what kind of conditions is the impact intensified or attenuated? We conducted a
laboratory experiment consisting of five treatments to study these questions. The first treatment serves as a control group (Control) in which social
relation does not exist; the other four treatments with social relations differ from each other in the aspect of payoff structure. Specifically, the first
dimension allows the first mover to determine the payoff(s) of 1 (herself) or 2 (both of them) player(s), and the second dimension allows the second
mover to impose the punishment toward the first mover with or without cost. These four treatments are referred to as 1N, 1C, 2N, and 2C, respectively.
We find significant divergence in the first movers' lying behavior under different treatments. First movers lie to a larger extent when lying does not
affect second movers' payoff and when the punishment by the second mover is costly. We also find significant difference in the second movers'
behavior, under different treatments and different behavioral modes of the first movers. Second movers tend to punish those dishonest first movers by
the way of lying themselves, especially when the first movers' dishonest behavior decreased their payoff, while they are relatively less willing to do so
when they must pay for the punishment. Interestingly, in the two treatments of free punishment, second movers punish dishonest first movers harder
when the dishonest behavior is related to their own interest; in the two treatments of costly punishment, the punishment imposed on dishonest first
movers becomes milder under the same condition, probably because the incentive for second movers to make up for the loss outweighs the willingness
to punish. Moreover, second movers tend to also reward those honest first movers by the way of lying themselves. Our study provides more insight
about how social relations affect lying, which has important policy implications for mechanism design aimed at encouraging honest behavior.
Author(s): Jingzhuo Wu, Jie Zheng
Topic: Social Behavior: Lying and Cheating, Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences
Link: www.sem.tsinghua.edu.cn/en/zhengjie
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Group Monitoring, Endogenous Crackdown, and Anti-corruption: An Experiment
Shuguang Jiang
 Zhejiang University of Finance&Economics
ABSTRACT:
We explore the effectiveness of an anti-corruption mechanism that combines the top-down institutions and the bottom-up monitoring from the masses.
Based on a repeated stranger matching harassment bribe game, we introduce the interventions of the group monitoring and the endogenous crackdown.
With the group monitoring, participants in the role of citizens can pay a fixed cost to monitor, while the corrupt officials' probability of being punished
increases with the number of citizens who choose to pay. With the endogenous crackdown, the probability of punishing corrupt officials increases to
50% automatically in the next period if more than 60% of citizens choose to monitor in the current period. Though citizens face the social dilemma of
anti-corruption, a high proportion of citizens paid to monitor, and this significantly decreases the officials' bribe demanding. The endogenous
crackdown mechanism further increases the monitoring of citizens and decreases the bribe demanding of officials.
Author(s): Shuguang Jiang, Qian Wei, Lei Zhao
Topic: Public Choice: Voting and Rent Seeking, Social Behavior: Group Behavior
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Will government officials behave more honestly? Experiment based on samples of civil servants and students
Yixin Chen
 Renmin University of China
ABSTRACT:
Abstract: How to reduce cheating behavior and build a fair and orderly integrity competition environment is an important topic in our current society.
This paper uses laboratory experiments to study the behavior and influence mechanism of civil servant and student samples in the dice deception
experiment. It turns out that there are certain differences in the behavior of the student sample and the civil servant sample. There has always been an
obvious phenomenon of lying in the sample of students in the experiment, and the lying strategy will be adjusted according to the income of the
experiment in order to obtain material and non-material benefits. However, the civil servant samples never showed significant deception in the
experiment, and the results of the robustness test are still valid. Further research found that gender, age and job position have a certain influence on
cheating behavior.This paper uses student samples and civil servant samples to conduct dice deceptive behavior laboratory experiments for the first
time. It finds the differences in the behavior of different groups and proposes possible explanations from the perspective of professional environment.
The research findings of this paper have important reference significance for strengthening the credit system construction of civil servants. Keywords:
Cheating; Professional culture; Non-student samplesԺ�Laboratory experiments
Author(s): Dai ZhixinԺ�Chen Yixin
Topic: Social Behavior: Lying and Cheating, Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices
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The rise of AI algorithms in the financial market indicates that financial advisors have to decide whether to rely on AI algorithms or their own forecast.
Our experiments investigate whether participants rely on robots more after comparing their own performance and robot performance. Firstly, we study
whether participants make a better (worse) decision after receiving good (bad) robot advice. Secondly, we study whether participants rely on good
(bad) robot more (less) after seeing them perform. Thirdly, we study whether participants rely on good robots more when they are allowed to modify
freely. In our experiment, we design the treatments by varying the performance level of robots and the opportunity to learn about own and robots'
performance. Our results show that participants (1) make a better(worse) decision after receiving good (bad) robot advice, (2) trust robots more after
seeing them perform, no matter how the performance level of the robots is, and (3) do not rely on good robots more when they are allowed to modify
freely.
Author(s): TszKwan TSE, Nobuyuki HANAKI, Bolin MAO
Topic: Markets: Finance, Applied Economics: Other
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An Experimental Study on Quantitative Easing
Jieyi Duan
Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
ABSTRACT:
Several empirical studies have demonstrated that Quantitative easing (QE) affects the prices of financial assets. Nevertheless, only a few studies aim to
replicate such an effect in the Lab and investigate its mechanism. This study re-examines the interpretation of Penalver et al. (2020) on the effect of QE
under the experimental framework of Crockett et al. (2018), where participants earn the payment by smoothing the consumption instead of just
speculating. In the experiment, participants can trade the bonds to each other by experimental currency each period. In the treatments where QE
operation exists, the computer purchases a certain amount of bonds from participants after a certain number of periods experienced. The data reports
that QE operation can raise the bond market prices significantly before the QE operation occurs. Moreover, the data shows evidence that high-level
mispricing before the QE operation is associated with a high-level intervention price of the previous round, which implies that the belief that the
computer purchases the bonds with a high-level market price can lead to the bond mispricing. As a result, our data support the interpretation of
Penalver et al. (2020).
Author(s): Jieyi Duan, Nobuyuki Hanaki
Topic: Markets: Macroeconomics, Markets: Finance
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To what extent can AI assistance improve human decision comparing to human or AI alone? It is a crucial question that has profound policy
implications. We experimentally study this issue in a setting of loan approval decision based on historical cash loan data. We find that human decision
with AI assistance improves upon human decision alone, but still cannot beat AI alone. However, subjects demonstrate algorithm aversion in the form
of AI information underweighting, which is significantly related to overconfidence. AI assistance narrows the performance gap among subjects;
surprisingly, due to the underweighting bias some originally good-performers suffer from it.
Author(s): Zeyang ChenԺ� Yu-Jane LiuԺ� Juanjuan MengԺ� Zeng Wang
Topic: Decision Theory: Beliefs, Applied Economics: Labor Market
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Imperfect Tacit Collusion and Asymmetric Price Transmission
Muhammed Bulutay
 Technische University Berlin
ABSTRACT:
We investigate the role tacit collusion plays in Asymmetric Price Transmission (APT), the tendency of prices to respond more rapidly to positive than
to negative cost shocks. Using a laboratory experiment that isolates the effects of tacit collusion, we observe APT pricing behavior in markets with 3,
4, 6, and 10 sellers, but not in duopolies. Furthermore, we find that sellers accurately forecast others' prices, but nevertheless consistently set their own
prices above the profit-maximizing response, particularly in the periods immediately following negative shocks. Overall, our findings support theories
in which tacit collusion plays a central role in APT.
Author(s): Muhammed Bulutay, David Hales, Patrick Julius, Weiwei Tasch
Topic: Markets: Industrial Organization, Games: Repeated Games
Link: www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/231385
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We investigate the relationship between competition and product quality, where quality is unobservable but can be verified before purchase through the
costly reading of contractual `fine print'. We model our environment using a Hotelling-type linear city framework where firms choose both quality and
prices leading to an endogenous type signaling game. Competition is measured via changes in buyers' transportation costs and our main finding shows
that an increase in competition as a result of a decrease in buyers' transportation costs lowers both firms' prices and their probability of offering high-
quality products. We design an experiment to test this prediction and investigate the theoretical complexity and potential underlying influences of
behavioral elements like risk and other-regarding preferences. We study subjects' price and quality choices, as a firm, in response to increasing
transportation costs. Broad evidence supporting our theoretical hypothesis is found and our results are robust to controlling for subjects' risk and other-
regarding preferences. Our results imply that e-commerce platforms, which are typically characterized by such competition, may charge lower prices
but provide relatively more onerous fine print than offline platforms.
Author(s): Surjasama Lahiri
Topic: Games: Other, Markets: Industrial Organization
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Can adjusted reputation score improve market efficiency? -Theory and Experiment
Binglin Gong
 East China Normal University
ABSTRACT:
Reputation system is an important mechanism to solve adverse selection and moral hazard problems. However, in reality reviewers are heterogeneous
and the scores they give might be misleading for people with different standards, especially when sample sizes are small or when reviewers are self-
selected. In this study we first design two adjusted average reputation scores based on first-order information and second-order information and build
economic models to show their effects on market efficiency. Then we test their effects over simple average reputation scores and a baseline treatment
without reputation system in a lemon market experiment.
Author(s): Binglin Gong, East China Normal University
Topic: Markets: Industrial Organization, Markets: Market design and Matching
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We investigate the overall impact of stock-out on individual consumers' information search behavior through both search-theoretic and experimental
approaches. As the probability of stock-out increases, search intensity decreases, while the expected number of searches may increase. Such increases
in stock-out probability also deter consumers from participating in the market.
Author(s): Yuta Kittaka and Ryo Mikami
Topic: Markets: Industrial Organization, Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices
Link: www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2020/DP1104.pdf
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Equality of opportunity in a random dicator's game
Sara Gil Gallen
 University degli studi di Bari - Aldo Moro
ABSTRACT:
Saito (2013) has produced a theoretical model showing that not only the equality of the results have an essential role in the social preferences of the
subjects, but also the equality of opportunity. The main goal of this paper is to measure the sensitivity to equality of opportunity of subjects depending
on who has the property of an indivisible good randomly assigned in a dictator game. Preliminary data analysis shows that the dictator is more selfish
by selecting greater probabilities to appropriate the indivisible good than to keep it when she is on his/her property. In other words, the dictator is more
selfish in the appropriation game. Therefore, the envy feeling of the subjects has a stronger effect than their guilty feeling.
Author(s): Giuseppe Attanasi, Andrea Morone and Piergiuseppe Morone
Topic: Social Behavior: Other, Public Choice: Other
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The reciprocal spillover effects of informal risk sharing on formal insurance
Senran Lin
 Southwestern University of Finance and Economics
ABSTRACT:
People are sometimes reluctant to purchase insurance. One explanation is that they acknowledge the crowding-out effect on informal risk-sharing in
the corresponding market and the spillover effect on informal risk-sharing in other markets. In particular, we show that such spillover may exist
through a reciprocal motivation channel, i.e., the tendency to match behavioral kindness (unkindness) to kindness (unkindness) from others. We
explore this channel in the forms of Dufwenberg and KirchsteigerԺ�2004Ժ�and derive testable hypotheses. To test the validity of our theory, we
design an experiment where in the control group two players need to make risk-sharing decisions simultaneously in two independent markets, while in
the treatment group we allow one player (i.e.Ժ�the insured) to purchase formal insurance in one market beforehand. In addition, we elicit players' risk
attitudes as well as their first-order and second-order beliefs. Our theory predicts that both the insured's belief regarding the uninsured's cooperative
intention and his knowledge about the uninsured's risk attitude can influence his insurance take-up decision. In particular, when the insured believes the
uninsured is more risk-averse and has a higher tendency to cooperate, he is more likely to give up the formal insurance in the corresponding market to
trade for the risk-sharing opportunity in the other market. These predictions allow us to make a clear-cut distinction between reciprocity and other
behavioral channels such as altruism.
Author(s): Senran Lin, Dong Yan, Jiakun Zheng
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Applied Economics: Other
Back to session: Other-regarding preferences 1
Intertemporal Trust Game
Qing Zhang
 Hunan University of Technology and Business
ABSTRACT:
We experimentally investigate the effect of timing of implementation of decisions on trust and trustworthiness. In the “Now” treatment, a standard trust
game is run and subjects receive payment in the same date of the experiment. In the “Later” treatment, subjects make decisions in the same date as the
now treatment, while the decisions are implemented (and hence payment) in a week. The later treatment captures a key feature of social interactions
where decisions are often implemented in the future rather than immediately. Consistent with our model, we find that both trust and trustworthiness are
lower in the later treatment. Our result thus suggests that less patient individuals will have less incentive to undertake an altruistic action when the
decision is implemented with a delay.
Author(s): Qing ZhangԺ�King King Li
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Social Behavior: Norms and Morals
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We check the validity of social preferences' measurement using the standard CES utility function proposed by Andreoni & Miller (2002, Ecta) and
Fisman, Kariv, & Markovits (2007, AER). Thöni (2015, J. Behav. Exp. Econ.) has pointed out some measurement problems using the standard CES
utility function model. For individuals whose utility function is strongly concave or has sharp curvature, another parameter, the share parameter,
becomes meaningless. We modify the CES utility function to cover the whole curvature range, from sharp (i.e., the Leontief function) to linear.
Besides, we conduct an online experiment to reveal the validity of the modified utility function parameters to measure social preferences. We
implement a generalized dictator game experiment using a two-dimensional graph as in Fisman et al. (2007), and at the same time, a public goods
game experiment, a Social Value Orientation measurement experiment, and questionnaires asking about political attitudes and socioeconomic status on
Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Author(s): Yuta Shimodaira, Kohei Shiozawa, and Keigo Inukai
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices
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A Volunteer's Dilemma is a Public Good Game in which at least one person needs to be a volunteer who makes a costly effort to benefit all players in
the group. A dilemma lies in the conflict between private choice and public interest, and players have an incentive to free-ride on others' potential
volunteerism. We experimentally examine the impact of observability of the production of a public good on the volunteer's dilemma under a dynamic
setting, finding a trade-off between the frequency of the public good produced and the size of the public good across different information
environments. In the observable volunteer's dilemma, the probability of players becoming volunteers and the production of public goods is lower; but
the time lapsed in initiating and joining the production of the public goods is lower. The inability to observe others' behavior reduces the probability of
free riding, but substantially slows down the production of the public good. Building upon these results, we further adjust the game parameters with the
aim of finding a setting which can ameliorate this social dilemma: reduced volunteer costs, increased group size, and offered compensation and
recognition to volunteers afterwards. Our study contributes to the literature by investigating how individuals' cooperation behavior depends on
information environments and payoff structures, and has useful policy implications for situations in which improved social welfare outcomes are
hindered by the Volunteer's Dilemma.
Author(s): Jaimie W. Lien (Chinese University of Hong Kong) ; Yihan Xiao (Tsinghua University); Jie Zheng (Tsinghua University)
Topic: Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource, Games: Information
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Reward, Punishment and Children's Cooperation Preference
Yexin Zhou
 Beijing Normal University
ABSTRACT:
Based on a large-scare field experiment of public goods games from more than 1600 students aged 7-17, this paper compares and discusses the effects
of different incentive mechanisms, including endogenous reward, exogenous reward, endogenous punishment and exogenous punishment, on children's
cooperation preference. First, we found that all the mechanisms could significantly promote children's cooperation level, but the effects are different.
Exogenous mechanisms are more effective than endogenous mechanisms, and punishment is more effective than reward. However, at the same time,
some students still showed a tendency to maintain the same supply level of public goods even there existed an institution. Then, we asked children
about their preference for rewards/punishments and found that reward is more popular. More cooperative individuals are more likely to be supporters
of incentive policies. Thirdly, we introduced uncertainty into reward/punishment and found that mechanisms with 50% probability of enactment could
also improve children's cooperation significantly, but the effects are inferior to certain ones. Furthermore, we found a significant positive correlation
between students' supply level and their belief in the contribution of other members. Finally, we found heterogeneous effects of rewards and
punishments on different group of subjects. Girls contributed more facing rewards rather than punishments, while boys showed the opposite side.
Compared with previous studies, this paper systematically analyzed the role of reward and punishment in the improvement of children's cooperation.
Our findings provide experimental evidence for policymakers to adopt cost-saving and individualized incentive measures to guide the development of
children's non-cognitive skills.
Author(s): Yexin Zhou, Siwei Chen, Jubo Yan
Topic: Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource, Social Behavior: Norms and Morals
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A Signal of Following Social Norms Promotes Cooperation in Public Goods Game
Chi Cui
 Northeast Normal University, China
ABSTRACT:
This paper studies how a signal of following social norms affects people's cooperative behavior. We make a comparison between the effect of signaling
and that of internalized social norms on cooperation. The result shows that signaling mechanism can effectively promote cooperation although it leads
some subjects to pretend to be norms-followers. It may be because good environment including intrinsic norms-followers makes those pre- tenders
more prosocial and cooperative than before. Therefore, there is difference between the signaling mechanism and the internalization of social norms. It
demonstrates that ap- propriate institution is able to have positive effects on people's behavior and signaling is profitable for people to make
cooperation. This paper provides a realistic and fea- sible method for promoting social cooperation in the developing countries, and it also
complements the studies on diversification of cooperation. Keywords: public goods game; cooperation; signaling; internalization of social norms
Author(s): Ming Dai, Alexandors Karakostas
Topic: Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource, Social Behavior: Norms and Morals
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Strong reciprocity and selfish intuitions explain cooperation in maintenance and provision dilemmas
Ozan Isler
 Queensland University of Technology
ABSTRACT:
Humans frequently cooperate for collective benefit, even in one-shot social dilemmas. This provides a challenge for theories of cooperation. Two
cognitive process views offer conflicting explanations. The Social Heuristics Hypothesis argues that people rely on cooperative intuitions and predicts
that deliberation reduces cooperation. The Self-Control Account emphasizes control over selfish intuitions and is consistent with strong reciprocity—a
preference for conditional cooperation in one-shot dilemmas. Here, we reconcile these alternative explanations with each other as well as with the
prevalence of strong reciprocity preferences. Using time-limit manipulations, we experimentally investigate one-shot cooperation across two main
dilemma types—provision and maintenance. We replicate previous findings showing cooperation is higher in provision than maintenance, and study
how dilemma type affects cognitive processes underlying this result. We find higher self-regard in maintenance compared to provision across measures
including: the perception of the dilemma, as measured by reaction time patterns of cooperation; social dilemma understanding; perceptions of social
appropriateness; beliefs about others' cooperation; and cooperation preferences. Crucially, and consistent with the Self-Control Account, people are
intuitively selfish in maintenance, with deliberation increasing cooperation. In contrast, consistent with the Social Heuristics Hypothesis, deliberation
tends to increase the likelihood of free-riding in provision. Despite these dilemma-specific asymmetries, we find that preferences, coupled with beliefs,
successfully predict the high levels of cooperation across maintenance and provision dilemmas. We conclude that, while the effects of intuitions are
context-dependent and small, preference for strong reciprocity is the primary driver of one-shot cooperation. We therefore advance the Intuitions and
Strong Reciprocity account as a unifying framework and consider its implications for research and policy.
Author(s): Simon Gaechter, A. John Maule, Chris Starmer
Topic: Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource, Psychology and Biology: Cognition
Link: www.ozanisler.net/
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Abstract We report the results of an experiment on information spillovers in networks. Our treatments compare the “Interacting Cascade” (of Fisher
and Wooders 2017), where two groups share a member in common who theoretically facilitates information spillovers between them, to the “Basic
Cascade” (of Bikhchandani et al. 1992), where there is no common member. We find that the common member successfully enables information
spillovers between groups, albeit at about one-third of the “intensity” predicted by equilibrium theory; decompositions show that the base-rate fallacy
accounts for less than one-fifth of this shrinkage. We further measure, test, and decompose additional types of information spillovers.
Author(s): James Fisher and John Wooders
Topic: Games: Networks, Games: Information
Link: www.dropbox.com/s/mbamfz89trilsd4/ICE%2012.27.2020.pdf?dl=0
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Alcohol Consumption, Promise and Trust: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-field Experiment
Jianxin Wang
 George Mason University
ABSTRACT:
While business drinking is widely believed to promote trust and trustworthiness, experimental tests of this conjecture have not yet appeared. Here we
use a trust game in a lab-in-the-field experiment to fill this gap. In particular, we focus on the effectiveness of a trustee's cheap-talk promise in
promoting trust and trustworthiness after one has either consumed or not consumed alcohol. We find that trustees' promises enhance trustors' trust
behaviors in both sober and intoxicated groups. However, trustees' promises only enhance trustworthy behavior in sober trustees, but not intoxicated
trustees. We speculate that the underlying mechanism may be the detrimental impact of alcohol on the formation of higher order beliefs. This may
interrupt the formation of guilt and leave promises ineffective as a commitment device.
Author(s): Jianxin Wang and Daniel Houser
Topic: Psychology and Biology: Cognition, Social Behavior: Communication
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Honesty and leadership
Sixuan Chen
 Nanjing University of Science and Technology
ABSTRACT:
We study, theoretically and with laboratory experiments, whether suspicions over a leader's honesty impact leadership effectiveness and group
efficiency. Our model predicts that honest leaders are most effective in honest environments, but honest leaders are less effective in dishonest
environments. Dishonest leaders are least effective. We test our hypotheses in a public goods game in which the leaders can suggest contribution
amounts. Leaders are elected, and in some treatments it is common knowledge that it is possible to cheat during the election process. We find that,
consistent with our hypotheses, the most effective leadership and highest group efficiency emerges when leaders can signal their honesty and group
members can also signal the group's honesty. Interestingly, honest leaders who cannot signal their honesty are no more effective than leaders suspected
of being dishonest. Our findings highlight the importance of honesty in leadership, as well as the importance of providing mechanisms that enable
leaders to signal their honesty.
Author(s): Sixuan Chen, Jianxin Wang, Daniel Houser, Yongmei Liu
Topic: Social Behavior: Norms and Morals, Social Behavior: Group Behavior
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Monolingualism in the Lab
Yuet Lyu
 National Taiwan University
ABSTRACT:
We investigate the emergence and persistence of monolingualism in the lab. In a sender-receiver game with no conflict of interest, the sender sends a
message (without prior meaning) regarding a privately observed state to two other receivers who need to choose actions to match the state. Subjects
simultaneously play both roles of sender and receiver in a three-member society. Through repeated play, they learn how to "speak" and "listen" to their
group members. We also employ the strategy method for senders to elicit the message for each state and incentivize the use of a same language. This
design allows us to observe "multilingualism" and "monolingualism" in the lab. To induce convergence to structural languages, we introduce half of
the states first for 10 rounds before introducing the rest, which are 90-degree transposes of the initial states for the treatment group. 17 out of 22 three-
member societies converge to monolingualism in 40 rounds. While the treatment groups indeed converge to structural languages more often, but
slower since their “native” structural languages are perceived as superior and dampens learning. After the same language emerges, we observe the
learning process of “immigrants” who move to another society. Results show that immigrants learn faster in societies with more structural languages.
Author(s): Yuet Lyu, Joseph Tao-yi Wang
Topic: Games: Coordination, Unknown: Unknown
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Take me with you! Economic Incentives, Nudging Interventions, and Reusable Shopping Bags: Evidence from a
Randomized Controlled Trial
Armenak Antinyan
 Wenlan School of Business, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
ABSTRACT:
Little is known about the impact of policy interventions other than taxes and bans aimed at reducing the demand for single-use plastic bags. We report
results from a field experiment run in a large supermarket chain to test interventions based on environmental nudges and financial bonuses. Relative to
the baseline with no intervention, both the bonus and the nudge effectively reduce disposable bag purchase. Free reusable bags combined with the
nudge or the bonus are more effective than the nudge or the bonus alone. Finally, the bonus is more effective than the nudge, irrespective of the
absence/presence of reusable bags.
Author(s): Armenak Antinyan; Luca Corazzini
Topic: Field Experiments: General, Applied Economics: Other
Link: ideas.repec.org/p/ven/wpaper/202108.html
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Commitments and badges as nudges to low-carbon food shopping baskets
Daniel John Zizzo
 University of Queensland
ABSTRACT:
There is increasing concern over the carbon footprint of grocery shopping. Part of the problem could be ascribed to the limited self-control of
consumers whilst food shopping. Commitments have been seen to facilitate self-control in field experiments (Baca-Motes et al., 2013; Schwartz et al.,
2014); and a badge could provide further motivation by rewarding the achievement of a sustainability goal (Gneezy et al., 2012). 725 participants from
the general public made a voluntary or forced commitment to a carbon footprint threshold before online grocery shopping. An online badge was
available to some participants, if the threshold was kept. Participants physically received one of their shopping baskets, keeping any unspent budget.
The online badge was ineffective in reducing the carbon footprint, but results show a significant reduction of around 2,000g of CO2e in shopping
baskets for participants who committed. Commitment mechanisms appear effective in activating self-control and suggest the importance of providing
real-time CO2e information of shopping baskets to facilitate a shift to more sustainable consumption patterns.
Author(s): Natasha Auch, Luca Panzone and Daniel John Zizzo
Topic: Applied Economics: Other, Social Behavior: Norms and Morals
Link: www.danielzizzo.com
Back to session: Environmental economics
The habit-forming effects of feedback: evidence from a large-scale field experiment
Lorenz Goette
 National University of Singapore
ABSTRACT:
Many behaviors display remarkable persistence: how often we go to the gym, when we wash hands, how much energy and water we use, all appear to
be highly correlated over time. In several studies, it has also been shown that the impact of interventions, ranging from financial incentives to providing
feedback on one's behavior, on these behaviors lingers beyond their duration. In this paper, we provide a unique test of competing models of
persistence in behavior. We propose a new attention-based behavioral mechanism for habit formation and contrast its predictions with the Stigler and
Becker (1977) consumption-based habit mechanism. We test both mechanisms using a large-scale field experiment in shower water consumption. Our
experiment varies cycles of household-level real-time feedback that temporarily draws attention to individuals' water consumption. Combining this
design with real-time consumption data, we test the mechanism for persistence in behavior that our experiment generates. We develop structural
empirical models for each of the mechanisms, and test their predictive power in cross-validation exercises to discriminate between the two non-nested
models. Our results strongly support a dynamic attention-based model of habit over the workhorse habit stock model used in economics.
Author(s): David Byrne, Lorenz Goette, Leslie Martin, Lucy Delahey, Alana Jones, Amy Miles, Samuel Schoeb, Thorsten Staake, Verena Tiefenbeck
Topic: Applied Economics: Other, Field Experiments: General
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Signaling pro-social behavior with pro-environmentalism
Christoph Drobner
 Technical University Munich
ABSTRACT:
Do subjects exploit the signaling function of stated pro-environmental preferences for pro-social behavior? In our laboratory experiment, subjects state
their pro-environmental preferences and subsequently play a cooperation or trust game. In this environment, we exogenously vary that subjects make
transfers conditional or unconditional on the stated pro-environmental preferences of their matching partner, providing the opportunity to signal pro-
environmental preferences. Our results show that stronger pro-environmental preferences elicit higher transfers from matching partners but subjects do
not exploit this signaling function by manipulating their stated pro-environmental preferences. However, the opportunity to signal pro-environmental
preferences entirely removes the correlation with cooperative behavior, suggesting that strategic incentives crowd out socially desirable spillover
effects of pro-environmental preferences.
Author(s): Fabienne Cantner, Christoph Drobner, Sebastian J. Goerg
Topic: Social Behavior: Other, Public Choice: Public Goods and Common Pool Resource
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Getting burned by frictionless financial markets
Anirudh Dhawan
 University of Technology Sydney
ABSTRACT:
The evolution of stock markets into highly accessible, low-cost, virtually frictionless venues has been praised by policymakers and institutional
investors. But could frictionless markets actually harm individual investors by increasing impulsive trading driven by heuristics and biases? Using
laboratory experiments, we examine how investor performance is impacted by various trading frictions: transaction costs, time delays in placing
orders, and tasks requiring cognitive effort. High transaction costs and time delays have no effect or harm performance, while cognitive tasks benefit
participants that are most prone to underperforming. Frictions can yield benefits when they help inattentive investors consider information they might
otherwise neglect.
Author(s): Anirudh Dhawan, Benjamin Loos, Marco Navone, Talis Putnins
Topic: Markets: Finance, Markets: Finance
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Drivers of the choice to self-manage one's investments
Stephen Cheung
 The University of Sydney
ABSTRACT:
We report an experiment to examine the factors that influence a decision-maker's choice to either delegate or self-manage their investment tasks.
Participants in our study were presented with two separate, but related, tasks: one that involved constructing a self-chosen investment portfolio, and
another that involved choosing to invest in either the self-chosen portfolio or one that had been constructed by a professional. We varied the order in
which these tasks were presented, as well as the composition of the delegated portfolio, on a between-subjects basis. We find that simply asking
participants to construct a self-chosen portfolio before presenting them with the delegated option makes them roughly 24 percentage points more likely
to invest in their self-chosen portfolio. By contrast there is no effect of offering a growth versus a balanced asset allocation as the delegated option. We
also find that females are more likely to delegate, and that this is mediated by the gender difference in risk tolerance.
Author(s): Stephen L. Cheung and Allan Yip
Topic: Markets: Finance, Psychology and Biology: Gender and Individual Differences
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Craving for Money? Empirical Evidence from the Laboratory and the Field
Elise Payzan-LeNestour
 University of New South Wales
ABSTRACT:
In a series of controlled laboratory experiments, we provide evidence for “Craving by Design” (CbD) hypothesis, where people knowingly expose
themselves to negative tail risk due to craving for monetary gains. We then document the “cheap call selling anomaly:” selling calls priced below $1
has consistently delivered negative long-term returns and negative skew, which is puzzling when viewed from the prevailing body of knowledge alone,
though expected when the latter is augmented with CbD hypothesis. These findings bring novel insights into the topic of limited self-control, the issue
of problem gambling in recreational gamblers, and the motivations underlying investor decisions.
Author(s): Elise Payzan-LeNestour and James Doran
Topic: Psychology and Biology: Neuroeconomics, Markets: Finance
Link: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3545804
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Dynamic prospect theory - two core decision theories coexist in the gambling behavior of monkeys
Agnieszka Tymula
 University of Sydney
ABSTRACT:
Research in behavioral economics and reinforcement learning has given rise to two influential theories describing human economic choice under
uncertainty. The first, prospect theory, assumes that decision-makers use static mathematical functions, utility and probability weighting, to calculate
the values of alternatives. The second, reinforcement learning theory, posits that dynamic mathematical functions update the values of alternatives
based on experience through reward prediction error (RPE). To date, these theories have been examined in isolation without reference to one another.
Therefore, it remains unclear whether RPE affects a decision-maker's utility and/or probability weighting functions, or whether these functions are
indeed static as in prospect theory. Here, we propose a dynamic prospect theory model that combines prospect theory and RPE, and test this combined
model using choice data on gambling behavior of captive macaques. We found that under standard prospect theory, monkeys, like humans, had a
concave utility function. Unlike humans, monkeys exhibited a concave, rather than inverse-S shaped, probability weighting function. Our dynamic
prospect theory model revealed that probability distortions, not the utility of rewards, solely and systematically varied with RPE: after a positive RPE,
the estimated probability weighting functions became more concave, suggesting more optimistic belief about receiving rewards and over-weighted
subjective probabilities at all probability levels. Thus, the probability perceptions in laboratory monkeys are not static even after extensive training, and
are governed by a dynamic function well captured by the algorithmic feature of reinforcement learning. This novel evidence supports combining these
two major theories to capture choice behavior under uncertainty.
Author(s): Agnieszka Tymula, Yuri Imaizumi, Takashi Kawai, Jun Kunimatsu, Masayuki Matsumoto, Hiroshi Yamada
Topic: Decision Theory: Risk, Decision Theory: Learning
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We compare preferences for resolution of uncertainty when the uncertainty is resolved about a probability rather than a value. In various existing
frameworks--e.g., Kreps and Porteus (1978)--, preferences over gradual versus one-shot resolution do not depend on whether values or probabilities
define the object of uncertainty. uncertainty. Yet, in our experiment, a large majority of subjects preferred to resolve uncertainty about a value
gradually, but chose to resolve probabilistic uncertainty all at once. We also find that subjects' preferences were affected by feedback—particularly with
value uncertainty. Subjects were less likely to resolve uncertainty gradually once they learned that the best outcomes were no longer possible.
Author(s): Kathleen Ngangoue, Andrew Schotter
Topic: Decision Theory: Risk, Decision Theory: Preferences
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In East Asian countries, especially China and Korea, parents greatly impact their children's decisions. This study investigates how the parent-child
relationship affects the similarity of parents and children's risk preferences. We conduct a field experiment with 196 sets of workers and their parents at
two companies in China and Korea. We find the existence of intergenerational transmission of risk preferences. More specifically, we show that higher
levels of parental involvement and financial parenting increase the similarities between parents and their children's risk preferences in China. In
contrast, a more demanding parenting style contributes to intergenerational transmission in Korea. We provide evidence that the transmission
mechanisms in East Asian Countries are different from those in the West. This study helps us to better understand the formation of an individual's risk
preference.
Author(s): Bobae Hong, Kichang (David) Kim
Topic: Decision Theory: Risk, Field Experiments: General
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Risky Decisions under Individual and Social Reference Dependence
Yongchun Peng
 Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, China
ABSTRACT:
Reference-dependence has been one of the primary theories in explaining risk preferences. While Prospect Theory and other related theories often
focus on an individual reference point, recent studies have found strong evidence that risk attitudes vary based on social considerations, although
consistent results across different settings have yet to be fully established. Most prior studies have examined reference-dependence from either
individual or social perspectives, but seldom from both simultaneously. This paper provides experimental evidence for the interaction effects and
mechanisms of dual reference dependence in the individual and social domains, and its difference from single domain reference-dependence, as well as
compared to no reference-dependence. We conduct an incentivized laboratory experiment with 4 treatments designed to measure individual and social
reference-dependence separately and jointly. The measurement of risk attitudes is a range of fair gamble lotteries of varying risk levels which allow the
possibility for crossing into the gain or loss domains in the social and/or individual contexts. The cross-treatment comparison of lottery decisions by
subjects allows us to determine the relative influences of the two types of reference points based on varying circumstances of subjects' positions in the
gain and loss domains. Our experiment provides a clean test of the relative influences of individual and social reference points in risky decision
contexts.
Author(s): Jaimie W. Lien , Yongchun Peng , Jie Zheng
Topic: Decision Theory: Risk, Decision Theory: Preferences
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Present-biased time preference for monetary rewards - a meta-analysis
Xueting Wang
 The University of Sydney
ABSTRACT:
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting is one of the most well-known and used models to capture self-control problems. The underlying assumption of the
model is that agents have a “present bias” toward current consumption, as all future rewards are downweighed relative to rewards in the present, in
addition to the standard exponential discounting of delayed rewards. To create a meta-analytic dataset of present bias estimates, we searched all major
research databases using the intersection of a set of methodology keywords with a set of topic keywords. We identified 63 articles with 85 estimates of
present bias parameter. The literature shows that people are on average present biased towards money (β=0.82), but substantial heterogeneity across
studies exists. The source of heterogeneity comes from the subject pool, methodology (e.g. BDM auction), geographical location of data collection,
payment method, the study place (e.g. online vs. lab). Reward type also has an influence on the estimates of present-bias parameter: individuals show
stronger present bias towards real effort and health outcomes compared to monetary rewards. There is evidence of publication bias in the direction of
overestimating present-bias, but the present bias still exists after correcting for potential publication bias.
Author(s): Stephen Cheung, Agnieszka Tymula, Xueting Wang
Topic: Decision Theory: Other, Decision Theory: Other
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Alleviating behavioral biases at job search: Do nudges work?
Gergely Horvath
 Division of Social Sciences, Duke Kunshan University
ABSTRACT:
In an online experiment, we study the effectiveness of policy interventions in reducing the impact of behavioral biases on job search. Due to the present
bias, individuals set a lower search effort and a lower reservation wage than the optimal values, while sunk-cost fallacy makes individuals reduce their
reservation wage over the search spell. We compare the effects of search cost reduction and nudging on alleviating these biases. We find that search
cost reduction increases the investment in search effort and the individual welfare but not the reservation wage. Conversely, nudging increases the
reservation wage, but not the investment in search effort or individual welfare. Furthermore, we show that both search cost reduction and nudging are
effective in alleviating the impact of sunk-cost fallacy on the choice of the reservation wage. Our results suggest that behavioral interventions should
be part of active labor market policies.
Author(s): Gergely Horvath
Topic: Applied Economics: Labor Market, Applied Economics: Other
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Measuring Preferences over Intertemporal Profiles
Chen Sun
 Humboldt University Berlin
ABSTRACT:
We develop a simple method for measuring intertemporal preferences: directly measuring preferences over intertemporal profiles, that is, combinations
of outcomes at several points in time. The method is parameter-free and independent of time horizon effects. It requires weak assumptions on
preferences to be measured, and hence can be used to test a wide range of models. It is easy to implement, clear to subjects, incentive compatible, and
as efficient as existing methods if identical assumptions are imposed. By applying the method, we document two characteristics of preferences over
monetary gain profiles. First, utility curvature is smaller for higher stakes, but no evidence shows that (generalized) discount factors change with the
stake (the magnitude effect). Second, people are overly impatient when it is possible to have all rewards on the earliest date (the all-sooner effect).
Author(s): Chen Sun
Topic: Decision Theory: Preferences, Unknown: Unknown
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Time Costs and Search Behavior
Maros Servatka
 Macquarie Graduate School of Management
ABSTRACT:
Sequential search is often costly and time-consuming. The time cost is usually unknown ex ante and its presence and duration must be inferred as the
search progresses. We disentangle the effect of time cost on search behavior from people's (in)ability to perceive time delay between offers. We find
that people are able to infer the existence of the time cost, but their inference is imperfect. We also compare the effect of time cost with the effect of
monetary cost and find that the time cost reduces the amount of exerted search, but not as much as the monetary cost does. Discriminating between the
effects is critical for increasing the empirical validity of search models and designing mechanisms capable of improving the quality of decisions,
especially in unfamiliar or infrequently encountered situations.
Author(s): Yu-Chin Hsiao, Simon Kemp, Maros Servatka, Matt Ward, Le Zhang
Topic: Applied Economics: Other, Decision Theory: Other
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Mind your Ps and Qs! Variable Allowance Supply in the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
Lana Friesen
 University of Queensland
ABSTRACT:
We investigate the new institutional design for the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). The scheme incorporates two allowance reserves
that adjust the supply of allowances in the event of unexpectedly high or low allowance demand. These reserves are enacted if the clearing price
breaches a predetermined set of trigger prices. Our experiment finds trigger prices act as focal points: the distribution of clearing prices is bimodal and
aligns with the trigger prices. Further, decreasing the range between trigger prices increases total revenue but decreases allocative efficiency. The
regulation is more sensitive to changes in trigger prices than reserve quantities.
Author(s): Lana Friesen, Lata Gangadharan, Peyman Khezr, and Ian A. MacKenzie
Topic: Applied Economics: Other, Markets: Auctions
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The Default Effects of Online Rating: A Field Experiment
Zhi Zhu
Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
ABSTRACT:
Most of the previous research about online rating focus on the biased distributions of rating results and how to identify consumers' true consumption
experiences and the true quality of products. Rare studies have investigated the effects of default setting on online ratings. To examine this question,
this study conducted a field experiment on an e-commence platform. In the experiment, the default value was set to five-star, zero-star, or a random
value between one to four-star. Moreover, the order of star ratings and text reviews was also randomized. We collected 2,210 valid ratings (reviews) on
398 products of 14 categories from an online platform. We find that when the default rating is 5-star, there are more unrated behavior than that of a
random default star and consumers give higher ratings than that of both random star and 0-star. In the condition of default 0-star, there is a greater
proportion of lower ratings (1-star, 2-star) and this reduces the extremity bias of online ratings, while in the other two conditions, higher ratings (4
stars, 5 stars) are dominated. Compared to rating first, consumers post higher ratings when they input text comments first. Our study provides practical
insights for companies about how to design the online feedback system and for government about how to regulate the system.
Author(s): Fadong Chen, Zhi Zhu, Shuzhong Ma
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China is going to start a national carbon market which would double the volume of worldwide CO2 emissions covered by taxes or emission trading
systems (ETS) when fully implemented. A key component of the market is the initial allocation of the tradable emissions permits. With a unique
opportunity of recruiting five hundred of potential market participants, we investigate alternative emissions permit allocation designs in a series of lab-
in-the-field experiments. Specifically, we compare the three existing mechanisms of free allocation (grandfathering), uniform price auction (UPA), and
consignment auction (CA) in terms of price discovery, trading volumes, and compliance behavior. In our setup, all firms receive free permits initially
and need to buy back a share of the permits under the two auction mechanisms with auction revenues returned to the firms (CA) or not (UPA) in the
primary market, followed by a spot (secondary) market for all mechanisms with the continuous double auction. We find enforced consigned permit
transactions in the primary market induce a higher price closer to the marginal benefit of permits, which facilitates price discovery and increases
trading volumes in the spot market and ultimately results in more efficient allocations. Both auctions reduce non-compliance compared with
grandfathering, which could be attributed to the process of auction in the primary market which makes firms better prepared for the future. Our results
provide insights on the emissions permits allocation design for the national carbon market in China and other countries alike.
Author(s): Zhi Li, Da Zhang, Xiliang Zhang
Topic: Markets: Auctions, Markets: Finance
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The erosion of unity: How changes in social norms impact minority groups
Manuel Munoz
 New York University Abu Dhabi
ABSTRACT:
Individuals from minority groups may abandon their social norm to adopt that of the mainstream majority, when doing so promotes inter-group contact
and economic mobility. However, minority individuals may persist on an inefficient norm if others in their social network oppose change by imposing
barriers. In this paper, I study how changes in norms impact the economic position of minority groups focusing on the two most prominent barriers to
norm change: social sanctions and pluralistic igno- rance. I develop a theory to characterize equilibrium outcomes and find that despite the barrier
faced, if the entire minority adopts the mainstream norm in unison and form network connections with the majority, efficiency is highest. But also, that
a divided minority where some become mainstream and integrate and others oppose and segregate, is stable but inefficient. I test this experimentally
and find that social sanctions are barriers that divide the minority and prevent economic mobility more often than pluralistic ignorance, despite the
efficiency gains of acting in unison. I also test whether sharing a common norm improves attitudes across groups and find that minority members act
less generously towards the majority the more divided the minority is. The majority, however, is unresponsive to the changes in norms of the minority.
Author(s): Manuel Munoz
Topic: Games: Networks, Social Behavior: Group Behavior
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Confucian Culture, Moral Reminder, and Gift Exchange
Shuguang Jiang
 Zhejiang University of Finance&Economics
ABSTRACT:
We developed a newly designed gift exchange game with the attribute of soft corruption that can test subjects' behaviors acting both as a gift giver and
as a gift recipient. In the experiment, we use the priming technique to make the Confucian culture mentally salient and measure its impact on subjects'
behaviors in the gift exchange game. Besides, we introduce another mechanism called “moral reminder” to constitute a 2×2 treatment design with
Confucian culture priming. We show that priming Confucian culture cannot reduce the behavior of gift-giving in absence of the intervention of moral
reminder, while has a small effect of reducing gift-giving with the intervention of moral reminder. Regardless of moral reminder, priming Confucian
culture promotes gift recipients' fairness. We suggest that Confucian culture has an impact on gift exchange behavior via influencing subjects' moral
considerations while this is restricted by wiggle room that is morally justifiable.
Author(s): Shuguang Jiang, Qian Wei
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We study if reciprocity in a trust game varies depending on whether the decision is taken in a hot decision-making state versus a cold one. To do so, we
compare reciprocal decisions elicited via the direct response method and strategy method. We formulate predictions considering psychological aspects
or aspects of the strategic environment that can predict a difference between hot and cold decision-making. Our data show that reciprocation rates were
significantly higher under cold decision-making than under hot decision-making. This result is in line with the conjecture that individuals can commit
to reciprocity under cold decision-making, while under hot decision-making, they cannot. We also rule out differences in second-order beliefs,
complexity, and stakes as possible alternative explanations.
Author(s): Riccardo Ghidoni, Sigrid Suetens, Jierui Yang
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We compare the incentive effect of two-grade reporting rules, namely, coarse and refined reporting. As a backdrop, we consider students whose
performance in an exam will be disclosed to a potential employer. The disclosure rule is either a coarse-reporting in the form of pass or fails grade or a
refined-reporting in the form of a raw score between 0 and 100. We are interested in analyzing which reporting rule would motivate students to work
harder? Existing theories provide two predictions. First, a refined-reporting will provide a stronger incentive than a coarse-reporting if the former can
better reflect the differences in effort levels of students with varying abilities. Second, a coarse-reporting provides a stronger incentive than a refined-
reporting if the former allows a mediocre ability type to be pooled together with better types. We bring these theoretical predictions into a laboratory
economic experimental test and show that subjects' behavior is consistent with the first prediction. Our result sheds some light on the optimal design of
performance evaluation.
Author(s): Yukihiko Funaki, Edward Halim, Michiko Ogaku, Yohanes Eko Riyanto
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Decision Theory: Beliefs
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Is socially responsible investment driven by altruism? A tDCS study
Shu Chen
 Shanghai International Studies University
ABSTRACT:
Socially responsible investment (SRI) is a fast-growing investment strategy that integrates environmental and social impacts into investment
considerations. Altruism is usually believed to be the motive of SRI, while other motives such as profit-maximization or risk-aversion may also
account for investing in socially responsible corporations. This study aims to verify the existence of altruistic motive in SRI by testing whether
modifying the activity in the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) impacts SRI decisions, given
that the rTPJ has been proved to be crucial in altruistic decision-making. We found that enhancing the activity in rTPJ significantly increased the
participants' level of altruism and willingness to invest in the SRI fund while inhibiting the activity in rTPJ decreased the above variables. Our study
helps to understand more about the motives of SRI and provides implications for the neural mechanism of moral-versus-material decision-making.
Author(s): Shu Chen
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Selecting a public-spirited allocator: the role of cooperative preference and demographics
Jing Yu
 Beijing Institute of technology
ABSTRACT:
We experimentally examine if and how people's cooperative preferences and demographics are associated with their allocation behavior in a
hierarchical mechanism (an allocator has absolute power over the inputs of every group member in social dilemmas). Using variants of the public
goods game, we find that after gaining the allocation power, conditional cooperators – in particular self-serving ones – tend to be more selfish than
stated in their contribution schedules. Yet, there is a significantly positive correlation between people's cooperative preferences and their allocation
fairness/efficiency. Controlling for this correlation, we also detect gender and age effects in that women and older subjects are significantly more other-
regarding in their allocation behavior.
Author(s): Jing Yu
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When individuals differ in terms of their abilities/costs of generosity, an asymmetric reciprocity concern arises in settings involving trust. We study this
issue in a series of trust game scenarios, in which the abilities of matched senders and receivers are randomly assigned. In addition to the main
reciprocity game, in which players know about the upcoming opportunity for reciprocity, we also implement an unknown reciprocity game (in which
players are not aware of the subsequent reciprocity opportunity), and a dictator game as a control. In general, more capable senders are willing to give
more in the first stage, but the amount returned by the receivers does not differ significantly by their ability. Senders in the known reciprocity
opportunity game do not exhibit greater generosity compared to the unknown reciprocity game. However, receivers in the former are more rewarding
towards senders than in the latter game, to respond to their trust. Furthermore, controlling for the amount received, they reciprocate more substantially
in response to more costly transfers made by the senders - that is, the trusting behavior of the highly-capable senders are discounted based on their low
costs or efforts. We further vary the information condition about the receiver's ability for senders. Public information about the receiver's ability leads
senders to hold back their trust substantially when encountering a less capable receiver. On the other hand, the receiver's reciprocation is unaffected by
whether his own multiplier is known to the sender. Therefore, the results indicate that the receivers generally tend to act in conformity with the
expectation of senders. Our study helps reveal how heterogeneous ability endowments affect individuals' giving and reciprocating tendencies in
society.
Author(s): Yunwen He, Jaimie W. Lien, Yang Yang, Jie Zheng
Topic: Social Behavior: Other-regarding Preferences, Decision Theory: Preferences
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Random Incentive System (RIS) is a standard method to incentivize participants in economic experiments. However, recent theoretical studies point
out a possibility of its failure when participants concern about ambiguity. We conducted an experiment to investigate the relationship between the
validity of RIS and participants' preferences under ambiguity. We obtained the following results: (1) participants' preferences for randomization and
conformity with reversal of order axiom are heterogeneous after controlling ambiguity attitude, (2) preferences for randomization does not significantly
increase inconsistent choices under RIS, (3) modifying RIS following Baillon et al. (2021) does not significantly reduce inconsistent choices.
Author(s): Tomohito Aoyama, Nobuyuki Hanaki
Topic: Methodology: Experimental Design, Tools and Practices, Decision Theory: Ambiguity
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We investigate how information impacts goalsetting and performance by conducting a field experiment in a college physical education course that
varies whether students know or not know their true ability when they set their goals. We document that all students intend to set challenging goals,
either based on their actual or estimated abilities. However, only a small proportion of students predict their performance accurately; under- and over-
estimation are equally common. Consequently, consistent with our theoretical prediction, receiving information about one's ability significantly
improves goals - increasing goals set by underconfident students while decreasing goals set by the overconfident ones. We find that providing
information significantly raises final test performance for underconfident students. However, we do not find any effect on performance for
overconfident students. The control group performs similarly to both goal-setting treatment groups, which is likely driven by private, unelicited goal-
settings of at least some of its members.
Author(s): Haoran He, Marcus Roel, Ronghai Su, Qian Weng
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On the consistency of latent risk preferences across contexts
Filip Fidanoski
 UNSW Business School
ABSTRACT:
There are presently more than 100 ways how to elicit risk preferences. Unfortunately, the results of the different elicitation mechanisms [EMs], often
differ (and occasionally even contradict each other), making it difficult to identify latent risk preferences. Many EMs have not yet been compared
directly to each other. Also, the comparisons that have been made have been afflicted by problematic design and implementation choices, as well as
questionable estimation techniques. Specifically, we are interested in understanding why various EMs, or contexts, provide risk-preference estimates
that often are inconsistent across EMs even if the domain (another potential contextual variant) is the same. Robust elicitation of latent risk-preferences
remains a challenge for scholars and policymakers alike, given their importance for (the calibration of) many economic models. Our research
complements the literature by providing response on the following: 1) What is the degree of consistency and convergence within, and across revealed
[Random Lottery Pair Design (RLP), Multiple Price List (MPL), Dynamic Experimental Estimation of Preferences (DEEP), Staircase Task (ST),
Portfolio Choice (PC), Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET)] and stated [Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) and Socio-Economic Panel Study
(SOEP)]? 2) Is there logical choice consistency in decision-making under risk and what is the relevance of the multiple switching behaviour [MSB]? 3)
How noise specification affects risk-preference estimates and which utility model and parametric specifications fit best our data? 4) What is the
difference in the risk attitudes elicited through revealed and stated or hypothetical EMs i.e. whether the hypothetical bias exists and how it matters? 5)
How socio-demographic and personal characteristics, state, and life events are moderating risk-preference estimates across contexts i.e. what are
determinants of conditional context consistency? We have conducted a pre-registered experiment in the Business School Experimental Research
Laboratory at the University of New South Wales in December-January. We have collected data for 119 subjects. Among the findings so far, 38% of
subjects are consistent across BRET and MPL.
Author(s): Filip Fidanoski, Vinayak Dixit, Andreas Ortmann
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TIE-BREAKING AND EFFICIENCY IN THE LABORATORY SCHOOL CHOICE
Wooyoung Lim
 Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
ABSTRACT:
We consider a simple school choice problem with coarse priorities where Deferred Acceptance (DA) may result in inefficient stable outcomes due to
tie-breaking. Earlier theoretical literature proposed the Stable Improvement Cycle (SIC) mechanism and Choice-augmented Deferred Acceptance
(CADA) mechanism as remedies for inefficiencies in environments with coarse priorities. However, neither of these mechanisms is strategy-proof, and
an equilibrium analysis is needed to fully investigate their effectiveness. In our simple environment, we theoretically analyze equilibrium behavior in
DA, SIC, and CADA mechanisms and show that efficiency gain exists in SIC but not in CADA relative to DA according to the predictions from the
Nash equilibria in weakly undominated strategies. These predictions are largely confirmed by our experimental data from two environments with
different sizes of the economy.
Author(s): Wonki Jo Cho, Isa E. Hafalir, Wooyoung Lim
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Every year during school and college admissions, students and their parents devote considerable time and effort to acquiring costly information about
their own preferences. In a market where students are ranked by universities based on exam scores, we explore ways to reduce wasteful information
acquisition–that is, to help students avoid acquiring information about their out-of-reach schools or universities–using a market design approach. We
find that, both theoretically and experimentally, a sequential serial dictatorship mechanism leads to less wasteful information acquisition and higher
student welfare than a direct serial dictatorship mechanism. This is because the sequential mechanism informs students about which universities are
willing to admit them, thereby directing their search. Additionally, our experiments show that the sequential mechanism has behavioral advantages
because subjects deviate from the optimal search strategy less frequently under the sequential than under the direct mechanism. We also investigate the
effects of providing historical cutoff scores under the direct mechanism. We find that the cutoff provision can increase student welfare, especially when
the information costs are high, although the effect is weaker than that of a sequential mechanism.
Author(s): Rustamdjan Hakimov, Dorothea Kuebler, Siqi Pan
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An experimental study on strategic preference formation in two-sided matching markets
Natsumi Shimada
 Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
ABSTRACT:
We study an experiment of the students-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) in matching markets where firms are matched with students.
We investigated the three different situations: (i) Students do not know firms' preferences and firms submit their true preferences, (ii) Students know
firms' preferences and firms submit their true preference, (iii) Students know firms' preferences and firms submit a higher ranking to students who give
them higher ranking. This experiment confirms that the matching results under DA influence students' preference formation, which decreases the
degree of stability. If firms do not submit their true preferences, students also do not submit their true preferences. As a result, the situation induces
instability.
Author(s): Natsumi Shimada
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Cooperation in infinitely repeated games with private monitoring
Xue Xu
School of Economics, Nankai University
ABSTRACT:
I study experimentally whether cooperation can be sustained and how players act in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas with private monitoring,
where there is a known probability that in the stage game the player will privately receive a different action from the other player's true choice. I
compare a private monitoring treatment to a perfect monitoring treatment both when the theoretically predicted difference in their highest payoffs
achieved is sharp and when the difference is mild. I find that cooperation levels are significantly lower with private monitoring than with perfect
monitoring in either case, and the negative impact of private monitoring on cooperation is mildly weaker when the difference mentioned above is
smaller. Additionally, players in the private monitoring treatments are less responsive to the previous (received) cooperative action of the other player
than those in the perfect monitoring treatments would do. This fact also holds for a longer history of (received) cooperative actions of the other player,
but to a lesser extent.
Author(s): Xue Xu
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Framing effect and children's conditional cooperation under the inequality of endowment
Yexin Zhou
 Beijing Normal University
ABSTRACT:
Based on public goods and public bads field experiments on a large sample of more than 1,600 rural students, this study explores “framing effect” in
children's conditional cooperation under the “2×2” treatments of “the endowment equality-inequality" and "public goods-public bads". Field evidence
shows that the framing effect is heterogeneous under different conditional contribution levels; besides, the low-endowed subjects show higher levels of
cooperation under the positive frame, while the high-endowed cooperate more under the negative frame. In general, the role of framing effect is weaker
when endowment is unequal than when it is equal. Experimental results also suggest that children's conditional cooperation shows a downward trend,
which is inconsistent with previous conclusions of unconditional cooperation experiments. The results have implications for the improvement of the
level of social cooperation in this post-epidemic era, highlight that frame matters more under equality.
Author(s): Yexin Zhou, Xinyu Li, Jubo Yan
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Does Informing Public Actions Contribute to Successful Risk Mitigation? An Experimental Study of Strategic




Non-pharmaceutical interventions are critical in mitigating the spread of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19). The effect of an agent's mitigation
effort depends on the efforts of neighboring agents. Given this spatially weighted risk externalities, the COVID-19 epidemic calls attention to the
ability to think about others. The literature suggests that policy interventions are required to facilitate cooperation where risk externalities exist.
However, we do not yet have evidence of the effect of revealing information about others' behavior on successful risk mitigation under different
degrees of intervention. In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to investigate whether informing public actions contributes to successful risk
mitigation at different degrees of intervention. Our baseline result confirms that a risk mitigation strategy that relies on voluntary measures is not likely
to be effective. Next, our main result illustrates that the effectiveness of revealing information about others' behavior on successful risk mitigation
depends on intervention degrees and whether mitigation choices are strategic complements or substitutes. By drawing lessons from experimental
results, we offer a significant behavioral insight into designing and evaluating risk mitigation measures in connection with the COVID-19 epidemic.
Author(s): Yohei Mitani; Naoya Yukizaki
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Psychological and Social Determinants of Cooperation and Punishment in Social Dilemmas: Theory and Evidence
Mengxing Wei
 School of Economics, Nankai University
ABSTRACT:
It is a puzzle why people punish in social dilemmas. This study theoretically and experimentally explores the psychological and social determinants of
cooperation and punishments in the voluntary contribution mechanism with punishment (VCMP). Our results show that the determinants of
punishment are psychological and may lie in the belief-based emotions of frustration, anger, indignation, outrage, and a hardwired preference for
reciprocity. We also find that the determinants of contributions lie in the anticipation of future punishment, and the emotion of shame from breaking a
norm of contributions, arising from a proclivity to follow such norms (Bicchieri, 2006; Elster, 2011).
Author(s): Sanjit Dhami, Mengxing Wei
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